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INTRODUCTION

The struggle between simplicity and fairness in the income tax that has
taken place in the last decade and a half, and which has reached an astonishing
crescendo in serious consideration of some form of simplified tax,' is not
entirely new. A similar struggle was waged long ago, albeit on a smaller scale
(though it did not seem so then), over the statute of limitations. In its simplest
form the issue was this: could a taxpayer who erroneously enjoyed a tax benefit

1. It is astonishing to recall in this sour age that public officials once extolled payment
of taxes in general and the civic virtues promoted by our progressive tax in particular. See, e.g.,
Compafiia de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (opining
that "Itaxes are what we pay for civilized society. . . ."). According to Franklin D. Roosevelt,

"taxation according to income is the most effective instrument yet devised to obtain just
contribution from those best able to bear it and to avoid placing onerous burdens upon the mass
of our people." A Message to the Congress on Tax Revision (June 19, 1935), in 4 THE PUBLIC
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEvELT 270, 271 (1938).

In sharp contrast, and reflecting frustration with the perceived onerousness of federal
taxation, is the incitement of popular discontent embodied in a recent statement by
Representative Bill Archer of Texas, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means:
"I am convinced that the overwhelming majority ofAmericans will realize that simply fixing the
I.R.S. is not enough, but the true answer lies in uprooting today's oppressive and unfair tax."
David E. Rosenbaum, InternalAudit Confirms Abusive LR.S. Practices,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14,
1998, at Al5.
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(i.e., non-reporting of income) in an earlier tax year, again enjoy such a benefit
because the year in which it was enjoyed was now barred by the statute of
limitations?' Conversely, could a taxpayer who had erroneously paid (or had
been required to pay) a tax in an earlier year, or had sustained some other
detrimental tax consequence, be required to suffer the same burden again
because it was legally sustainable in the year at issue rather than the (now
barred) earlier year?3
One response might have been to accept the notion that the existence of a

2. From the government perspective the problem was described in 1938 by Aubrey
R. Marrs, head of the Technical Staff of the Bureau of Revenue:
In the early twenties the Bureau men were set back on
their heels by this practical situation:-A taxpayer
would come in for a particular year, contending that
an item was deductible (and my argument applies
equally well to the Commissioner sometimes). We
listened to him. He argued strenuously that it was
deductible in such-and-such a year ... Sometimes in
a close question he brought in other forms of
persuasion like National Committeemen and
Senators, and so forth. And after listening to the
taxpayer very patiently we said, "All right! We'll
agree with you; it is an allowable deduction in this
year and you are relieved of the deficiency, or you are
entitled to the refund."
And then, to our amazement, after that year became
closed by the statute of limitations, in came that same
taxpayer for another year, usually with a different
lawyer, saying: "We are terribly sorry. An error has
been committed. It's too bad. We regret it just as
much as you do. But taxes must be determined
according to the law and the law is that this was an
allowable deduction in another year which is now
open and we demand that our case be closed in
accordance with law."
Proceedingsof the Seventh Tax Clinic of the American Bar Association, 16 TAXES 663, 665

(1938).
3. The government, through no less than the person of Robert H. Jackson, then
Assistant General Counsel of the Bureau of Revenue, was remarkably up-front about hedging
its bets:
A statute is passed, a question raised. Often the
Supreme Court will not hear it unless and until there
is a conflict of decision in Circuit Courts. Meanwhile,
we guess at what the law will be, but we do not trust
our guess. . . . [P]ending decision you may be
shocked to know that we sometimes take both
positions. That is, we take opposite sides of the same
question, whichever will be to the advantage of the
revenues. I was shocked at the apparent dishonesty of
that policy when it first came to my attention. But I
can find no way to avoid it.
Robert H. Jackson, Equity in the Administrationof FederalTaxes, 13 TAXEs 641, 644 (1935).
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statute of limitations will always make uncorrectable a certain amount of
injustice and to balance that against the benefits of repose conferred by
limitations. Another factor that counseled acquiescence in the ostensible
inequities permitted by that statute of limitations was the annual accounting
rule,4 a corollary of which is that events in one taxable year generally do not
determine taxable income in other taxable years.5 Viewing inequities caused by
the statute of limitations for what they are often requires viewing as a whole
transactions spanning more than one taxable year, something that is generally
anathema under the regime of annual accounting.6
Notwithstanding the benefits of repose from the statute of limitations and
to the flow of revenues from strict annual accounting, the first two decades of
the income tax law produced stark inequities that public policy could not
abide.7 As early as 1933 the Treasury Department recognized the need for a
legislative solution. Thus, in that year, Acting Secretary of the Treasury, Henry

4. I.R.C. § 441(a) (1994) (providing that "[t]axable income shall be computed on the
basis of the taxpayer's taxable year.").
5. See Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364-65 (1931).
6. Robert H. Jackson observes:
A strict annual basis for the computation of the tax
has been followed in this country .... We... take a
gradual process like the recognition that a debt has
become a loss, or that a stock has become worthless
and insist that a momentbe fixed when it passed from
one class to the other.
Jackson, supranote 3, at 645.
In reality, of course, the annual accounting principle has never been a strict bar to the
determination of taxation in one year by reference to another. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952) (holding that a payment which would have been a capital
transaction in a prior year is not transformed into an ordinary business transaction simply
because the transaction actually took place in a later year). An exception to the annual
accounting principle that has a remarkably sweeping potential scope is the tax benefit rule, one
significant aspect ofwhich allows the government to hold taxpayers accountable for tax benefits
enjoyed in long-barred years. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 377
(1983). This rule is bottomed on preventing taxpayers from enjoying tax benefits in different
years that are "fundamentally inconsistent." Id. at 383. In Part V, infra, the methodology of the
tax benefit rule will be promoted as a better method of assessing when to allow an adjustment
concerning a barred year than the present structure of the mitigation provisions.
7. A leading example, which is highlighted in Arthur H. Kent, Mitigation of the
Statute of Limitations in FederalTax Cases, 27 CAL. L. REv. 109, 110-11 (1939), occurred in
Bigelow v. Bowers, 68 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1934). In 1916 taxpayer received a stock dividend the
value of which he reported as income. Bigelow, 68 F.2d at 839-40. In 1918 he sold this stock
using a basis that reflected his treatment of the stock dividend as taxable (i.e., taxpayer increased
his basis by the amount ofgain recognized). Id. at 840. In 1920 the Supreme Court held in Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), that stock dividends such as Bigelow's were not taxable.
Bigelow, 68 F.2d at 840. In 1923, after the time in which taxpayer could have claimed a refund
for 1916 had expired, the government redetermined taxpayer's income for 1918, denying him
the basis increase attributable to the 1916 tax paid on the stock dividend. Id.
The dissent anguished: "If what the [government] has contended for here prevails, it
results in the evil of double taxation .... We can attribute to Congress no such intention unless
the statute expressly so provides." Id. at 843.
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Morgenthau, stated: "The Treasury strongly endorses the proposal to amend the
statute of limitations to insure that, in cases of disputes as to the proper year in
which income or deductions should be reported, such items shall be taken into
account once and only once."' Nonetheless, no statutory solution came forward
until 1938 because of the "many formidable technical difficulties which even
a partial legislative solution of the problem involve[d]."9
The courts did not always sit idly by until the legislative response in 1938.
In a number of cases the courts applied the equitable principle of estoppel,
whichprevents ataxpayer from obtaining abenefit that is factually inconsistent
with a result obtained in an earlier year barred by limitations." Courts also
applied the principle of recoupment, which requires a taxpayer or the
government to reduce a claimed benefit (or tax) if such benefit or tax has been
obtained with respect to the same transaction in an earlier year presently barred
by the statute of limitations." Unfortunately, these remedies offered
unsatisfactory relief from unfair exploitation of the statute of limitations.
Estoppel was inadequate because of its inflexibility, conceptual limitations, and
one-sidedness." It is now available to the taxpayer only under limited
circumstances. 3 Similarly, the doctrine of equitable recoupment did not
develop as a satisfactory remedy for multiyear inequities.14 For reasons that will

8. Revenue Revision, 1934: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways andMeans,
73d Cong. 132 (1934).
9. Kent, supra note 7, at 118.
10. For example, in R. H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54 (1934), the
taxpayer and the government had a dispute about the taxpayer's tax for 1917. They executed two
waivers of the statute of limitations for 1917, but the second one was not signed by the
government. The taxpayer claimed overpayments for tax years 1918 through 1921 and asked that
such overpayments be applied against a claimed deficiency for 1917. The government agreed.
Id. at 56-58.
The taxpayer later contended that the waiver for 1917 was invalid and that the credit
against the 1917 liability was invalid as against a barred deficiency under § 609 of the Revenue
Act of 1928 (current version at I.R.C. § 6514). The taxpayer sued to recover the amount credited
against the 1917 deficiency. Id. at 59-60.
In denying the taxpayer's recovery the Court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to
renounce the consequences of its attempted waiver. Justice Cardozo stated for the Court: "[It is
enough] for present purposes that the disability has its roots in a principle more nearly ultimate
than either waiver or estoppel, the principle that no one shall be permitted to found any claim
upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong." Id. at 61-62.
11. See, e.g., Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935) (allowing the taxpayer, under
a recoupment theory, to have an overpayment of estate tax credited against a deficiency of
income tax, even though the statute of limitations had run).
12. See John M. Maguire, et al., Section 820 ofthe Revenue Act of 1938,48 YALE L.J.
509, 514 (1939) [hereinafter Maguire].
13. United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997). See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
Under the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act ofJuly 22, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-206, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 740-41, infra note 455, limitations may be tolled for an
individual taxpayer in instances of financial disability.
14. See S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 49 (1938) (stating recoupment and other judicial
principles are not effective in preventing misuse of the statute of limitations). Two leading
commentators on the state of the law prior to the adoption of mitigation referred to the
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be explored in Part IV, the history of equitable recoupment has involved
progressively stronger restrictions on its use by the Supreme Court."5
In response to the ineffectiveness of estoppel and recoupment, Congress
concluded in 1938 that legislation was needed "to supplement the equitable
principles applied by the courts and to check the growing volume of litigation
by taking the profit out of inconsistency, whether exhibited by'1taxpayers
or
6
revenue officials and whether fortuitous or the result of design.
The legislative response was to enact the first mitigation provisions of the
Code.' 7 In amended form these provisions still appear in the Code today.' 8 The
provisions allow the government to reopen, or the taxpayer in certain
circumstances to seek to reopen, a year barred by limitations when tax
treatment of an item in an open year is inconsistent with treatment of the same
or a related item in the barred year. Whether such reopening is ultimately
allowed is decided in a judicial forum, as though it were an adjudication of a
deficiency or claim for refund. ' 9
Unlike estoppel and recoupment, mitigation involves reopening a barred
year. In one sense, it represents a simple solution to inequitable exploitation of
the statute of limitations. It operates only in specified circumstances." The
limited scope of the mitigation power is intended to accommodate the largely
conflicting aims of keeping intact the statute of limitations and preventing
limitations from being exploited inequitably. 2' Mitigation is purportedly simple
in that it creates no sweeping power in the courts to address anomalous and
inequitable invocations of limitations. It is purportedly fair because it allows
substantial exactness in adjusting the barred year to reflect inconsistent
treatment of an item in an open year.'
Despite these purported benefits, this Article contends that the present
mitigation provisions, in attempting to reconcile the advantages of the statute
of limitations with the prevention of inequitable exploitation from its use, have
struck the balance too far in favor of the former. The closed-ended approach of
the mitigation provisions has unnecessarily exalted limitations over equity and,
far from promoting simplicity and predictability, has created statutory
provisions which, in nearly six decades of practice, have proven monstrously
development of .'Assumpsit of an Equitable Nature"' as "speckled with question marks." John
MacArthur Maguire & Philip Zimet, Hobson's Choice and Similar Practices in Federal
Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1321-22 (1935).
15. This development reached its culmination in UnitedStates v. Dalm,494 U.S. 596,
608 (1990), where the Court clearly indicated that the scope of equitable recoupment was
narrow.
16. S.REP.No. 75-1567, at 49.
17. I.R.C. § 3801 (1939).
18. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1994).
19. I.R.C. § 1314(b) (1994).
20. See I.R.C. § 1312(1)-(7) (1994).
21. S. REP.No.75-1567, at 49.
22. See Steven J. Willis, The Tax Benefit Rule: A Different View anda Unified Theory
ofErrorCorrection,42 FLA. L. REV. 575, 601-02 (1990).
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complex.'
This Article will advocate that the mitigation provisions be repealed and
replaced with a proposed statute that functions similarly to equitable
recoupment. Part II of this Article will describe the mitigation provisions. Part
HI will explore several problems that have arisen in six decades of experience
with the provisions. Part IV will explore equitable recoupment and examine
why it has not been given a greater role in redressing multiyear anomalies in
tax law. Part V will set out a statutory proposal that embodies recoupment, will
explain how it works and will argue that it is preferable to the current
mitigation provisions.
II. THE MITIGATION PROVISIONS
Mitigation, or a corrective adjustment, is permitted under I.R.C. § 1311 (a)
if a determination brings about any of the inequitable results described in I.R.C.
§ 1312.24 The "determination" that creates the inequity may be (1) a decision
of the Tax Court or other competent court "which has become final",s (2) a
closing agreement under I.R.C. § 7121,26 (3) a final disposition by the IRS of
a claim for refund, 7 or (4) an agreement which serves as a determination. 8
23. "Testimonials" abound to the complexity of the mitigation provisions. From the
Tax Court: "In the aggregate, sections 1311 through 1314 set forth a highly complicated and
confusingly interrelated set of provisions authorizing the correction of error which is otherwise
prevented by operation of law ..... Bolten v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 397,402 (1990).
From the Fifth Circuit: "[W]e face the maze of the mitigation provisions ofthe Code."
O'Donnell v. Belcher, 414 F.2d 833, 833 (5th Cir. 1969).
And a sampling of the scholarship: "Few areas within the tax field enjoy less
understanding and generate more uncertainty than do Sections 1311 through 1315 of the Internal
Revenue Code, which deal with mitigation of limitations." Irving Bell, Recent Developments
Amid the Mysteries of Mitigation, 17 UCLA L. REv. 542, 542 (1970); "Who can blame the
lawyer orjudge who, occasionally, instead of reading the law, merely guesses at what it says?"
Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr., Mysteries ofMitigation: The Opening of Barred Years in
Income Tax Cases,30 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 229 (1961).
24. I.R.C. §§ 1311-1313 (1994).
25. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(1) (1994). As noted in Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-l(b) (1999), the
finality of a Tax Court decision is controlled by I.R.C. § 7481, which turns upon whether appeal
to a court of appeals and, later, petition for a writ of certiorari is pursued. I.R.C. § 7481 (Supp.
1999).

26. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(2) (1994). Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-2 (1999) a closing
agreement may relate to the total tax liability of the taxpayer for a particular year or years or to
one or more separate items affecting such liability. Under this provision of the regulations a
closing agreement becomes final for purposes of mitigation on the date of its approval by the
Commissioner. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(3) (1994). In some circumstances the disposition of a refund
claim is final when it is allowed or when notification of disallowance is mailed. I.R.C.
§ 1313(a)(3)(A) (1994). This rule applies, according to Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-3(b)(1) (1999),
if:
(i) The taxpayer's claim for refund is unqualifiedly
allowed; or
(ii) The taxpayer's contention with respect to an item
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These requirements were intended to limit operation of the mitigation
provisions to instances in which the inconsistency has been set in stone and
both years are closed.29
A. The CircumstancesofAdjustment
The centerpiece of legislative timidity concerning corrective adjustment is
I.R.C. § 1312. This provision limits mitigation to seven "[c]ircumstances of
adjustment."3 Each of these circumstances is discussed below.

is sustained and with respect to other items is denied,
so that the net result is an allowance of refund or
credit; or
(iii) The taxpayer's contention with respect to an item
is sustained, but the Commissioner applies other
items to offset the amountof the alleged overpayment
and the items so applied do not completely offset
such amount but merely reduce it so that the net result
is an allowance of refund or credit.
In each of these instances the taxpayer prevails as to the item that is the subject of the
determination and obtains at least some refund or credit of tax. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5.07[3][c] (2d ed. 1991).
Under Treas. Reg. 1.1313(a)-3(b)(1) (1999) if the taxpayer is sustained as to the item
at issue but receives no refund or credit of tax, the final disposition is date ofmailing. Practically
speaking, this indicium of finality controls when the IRS may seek a corrective adjustment.
Under the circumstances enumerated in I.R.C. § 1313(a)(3)(B) (1994), a refund claim
is finally disposed ofwhen the time for filing suit on such claim expires unless suit is filed before
such time expires, in which case a determination may come about with the result of such suit.
This rule applies, according to Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-3(c) (1999), if:
(1) The taxpayer's claim for refund is unqualifiedly
disallowed; or
(2) The taxpayer's contention with respect to an item
is denied and with respect to other items is sustained
so that the net result is an allowance of refund or
credit; or
(3) The taxpayer's contention with respect to an item
is sustained in part and denied in part.
Likewise, under Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-3(d) (1999), if the IRS reduces a claimed refund by the
amount of an item, resulting in a net refund or credit, the disposition of the item so applied
becomes final upon the expiration of the time for instituting suit under I.R.C. § 6532, unless suit
is filed prior to the expiration of such period.
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-3(e) (1999) the taxpayer may eliminate the two year
waiting period until the time for filing suit for refund expires by reaching a closing agreement
or, under Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-4 (1999), an agreement to a determination.
28. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(4) (1994). Such an agreement, which must state the amount of
tax determined in the open year and describe the error in the closed year and the manner in which
the error was treated in computing the tax in the open year, constitutes authorization for
assessment of the agreed deficiency or refund of the agreed overpayment. J. Robert Coleman,
Mitigationof the Statute ofLimitations-Sections1311-1315,2 N.Y.U. THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1575, 1583-84 (1973).
29. See S. REP.No.75-1567, at 50 (1938).
30. I.R.C. § 1312 (1994).
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1. ErroneousInclusion ofIncome
The first circumstance of adjustment occurs when a determination requires
a taxpayer to report as gross income "an item which was erroneously included
in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or in the gross
income of a related taxpayer." 3 ' For example, assume that a cash basis
taxpayer's last paycheck from his employer for 1995 is lost in the mail. The
taxpayer receives areplacement in March 1996, after she has received her W-2
statement of wages for 1995. The W-2 statement was promptly sent to her
accountant in 1995 without telling the accountant of her failure to receive the
lost check that year. The taxpayer's return for 1995 thus includes an amount
that she did not receive and which has thus been erroneously reported. When
the taxpayer files her own return for 1996, she does not report the amount of
the replacement check for 1995. Because the check was received in 1996,
however, it is income for 1996. Her failure to report this amount is discovered
by the IRS before April 15,2000--a timely discovery as to 1996,32 but too late
for the taxpayer to file a claim for a refund of the same amount reported in
1995. 33 Once there has been a determination of the inconsistent tax treatment
of the same item in two different tax years, the taxpayer has one year to seek
a reopening of 1995 to claim a refund for the amount of tax she erroneously
overpaid.34
2. PriorAllowance of Credit or Deduction
The second circumstance in which a corrective adjustment is permitted
under the mitigation provisions is when a determination allows the taxpayer a
deduction or credit that she has already enjoyed in a previous year that is barred
in the year of determination.35 For example, consider a taxpayer who deducts
a bad business debt in 1995. The same taxpayer, in 1999, has second thoughts
about whether such debt was worthless in taxable year 1995 and decides to
deduct it in 1999.36 The IRS challenges this deduction, but the Tax Court
upholds the taxpayer in 2003, long after any adjustment for 1995 is barred.
Within one year of the Tax Court's decision, the IRS may send a notice of
deficiency to the taxpayer for 1995.37

31. I.R.C. § 1312(1). "Related taxpayer" is defined in I.R.C. § 1313(c) (1994) and will
be addressed below. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
32. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (Supp. 1998).
33. Id. Here the deadline for filing a claim for a refund would ordinarily be April 15,
1999. See I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1994).
34. See I.R.C. § 1314(b) (1994). The manner in which the adjustment is computed and
allowed is described below. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
35. I.R.C. § 1312(2).
36. Under I.R.C. § 166(a) (1994), a bad debt is deductible in the taxable year in which
it becomes worthless.
37. I.R.C. § 1314(b).
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3. ErroneousExclusion ofIncome

The third circumstance in which a corrective adjustment is permitted is
when a determination requires exclusion from income of an item that was
erroneously excluded by the taxpayer for another year or by a related taxpayer
for the same or another taxable year.38 The statute distinguishes between
instances in which the determination requires exclusion of an item the taxpayer
has included in a return she has filed" and instances in which the determination
requires exclusion of an item the taxpayer has not included in a return but that
is includible in the taxpayer's gross income or in the income of a related
taxpayer for another year.4'
The former circumstance is governed by I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A). As an
example, consider a partnership made up of father and son, each entitled to one
half of partnership items. For the 1995 partnership taxable year, father reports
the entire income of the partnership and son reports no partnership income.
Shortly before expiration of the time for claiming a refund for the taxable year
in which the father has reported the partnership income," the father files a

claim for refund for the portion of partnership income properly reportable by
son. The claim is allowed by the IRS after the time has expired for asserting a
deficiency against the son. A corrective adjustment would be permitted with
respect to the son for his share of the 1995 partnership income.42
Exclusion of an item that has not been included in income in another year
by the taxpayer or by a related taxpayer is described in I.R.C. § 1312(3)(B). An
adjustment is not permitted in such cases unless assessment of a deficiency was
not barred either "for the taxable year in which the item is includible or against
the related taxpayer" at the time the IRS first maintained that the item must be
included in the taxpayer's gross income for the taxable year to which the
determination relates.43 In circumstances described by I.R.C. § 1312(3)(B) it
is not necessary that the taxpayer maintain, in connection with the
determination, a position inconsistent with erroneous exclusion of the item in
the other taxable year.'

38. I.R.C. § 1312(3).
39. I.R.C. § 1312(3)(A).

40. I.R.C. § 1312(3)(B).
41. Under I.R.C. § 706(a) (1994), a partner reports partnership items for any
partnership taxable year ending within his or her own taxable year.
42. This example is patterned on example 2 under Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-3(a)(2)
(1999).
43. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). This rule is discussed in more detail in connection with
the inconsistency requirement of I.R.C.§ 1311 (b). See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
44. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1) (1994). The requirement of the inconsistent position is
discussed infra at notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
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4. DisallowanceofDeduction or Credit
The fourth circumstance in which a corrective adjustment is permitted is
when a "determination disallows a deduction or credit which should have been
allowed to, but was not allowed to, the taxpayer for another year, or to a related
taxpayer."'45 This is the other circumstance in which the party seeking the
determination (in this case the IRS) need not maintain, in connection with the
determination, a position inconsistent with earlier exclusion of the item.46 It is
necessary, however, that the deduction or credit sought by the taxpayer in the
determination not have been barred at the time the taxpayer first maintained
"that he was entitled to such deduction or credit for the taxable year to which
the determination relates."47 As an example of this circumstance, consider a
taxpayer who deducts a bad debt on his 1995 calendar year return at a time
when a deficiency for 1994 is not barred. 48 The IRS denies this deduction for
1995 on the basis that the debt became worthless in 1994.49 In1998, after any
refund for 1994 is barred, s° the Tax Court upholds the IRS. In this situation an
adjustment would be permitted to allow the deduction for 1994.
5. Correlative Deductions and Inclusions for Trusts, Estates,
Legatees, Beneficiaries or Heirs
The fifth circumstance in which a corrective adjustment is allowed
involves "[c]orrelative deductions and inclusions for trusts or estates and
legatees, beneficiaries, or heirs."'" In the Internal Revenue Code there are
instances in which a trust or estate may deduct distributions to a beneficiary52
or legatee. 3 The Code contains correlative provisions requiring distributees to
include such distributions in income.54 A determination obtained by or against
a trust or estate that its treatment of an item of income or deduction was
erroneous may upset the correlative treatment contemplated by the Code. For
example, a determination establishing that an amount of undistributed trust
income was not required under the trust terms to be distributed, contrary to
reporting of such item by the trust, would indicate correlative treatment of that
same item as income by the beneficiary was erroneous."5 The mitigation

45. I.R.C. § 1312(4).
46. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1).
47. I.R.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(B). This rule is discussed in more detail in connection with
the inconsistency requirement of § 1311 (b). See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
48. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (1994).

49. See I.R.C. § 166(a) (1994).
50. See I.R.C. § 6501(a).
51. I.R.C. § 1312(5) (1994).
52. I.R.C. § 651(a) (1994).

53. I.R.C. § 661(a) (1994).
54. I.R.C. §§ 652(a), 662(a) (1994).
55. See I.R.C. § 662(a).
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provisions permit an adjustment allowing a deduction to the beneficiary if the
determination against the trust occurs when the taxable year in which the
beneficiary reported the item is otherwise barred. 6
6. Correlative Deductions and Credits for Corporations in an
Affiliated Group
The sixth circumstance allowing a corrective adjustment involves
correlative deductions and credits for corporations which are members of an
affiliated group." The regulation pertaining to this circumstance presents a
good example similar to the following 8 : X Corporation, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of YCorporation, pays $5,000 to Yin 1990 and deducts this amount
on its 1990 tax return as an interest expense. Y correspondingly reports the
same amount as interest income on its 1990 taxable year. In 1995 the Tax
Court determines that the $5,000 payment fromXto Ywas a dividend to Xand
denies Xits interest deduction. If Y's 1990 taxable year is otherwise barred, Y
is permitted an adjustment allowing Y to deduct the payment from X as
dividend qualifying for the dividends received deduction. 9
7. ErroneousTreatment ofBasis
Finally, I.R.C. § 1312 allows a corrective adjustment when a
"determination determines the basis of property, and in respect of any
transaction on which such basis depends, or in respect of any transaction which
was erroneously treated as affecting such basis, there occurred," any of three
types of errors affecting the following classes of taxpayers:6
(i) the taxpayer with respect to whom the
determination is made,
(ii) a taxpayer who acquired title to the property in
the transaction and from whom, mediately or
immediately, the taxpayer with respect to whom the
determination is made derived title, or
(iii) a taxpayer who had title to the property at the
time of the transaction and from whom, mediately or
immediately, the taxpayer with respect to whom the
determination is made derived title, ifthe basis ofthe

56. I.R.C. § 1312(5).

57. I.R.C. § 1312(6). A member of an "affiliated group" of corporations, as defined
in I.R.C. § 1504(a) (1994), is categorized as a "related taxpayer" under I.R.C. § 1313(c)(7)
(1994).
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-6(b) example 1 (1999).
59. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 243 (1994) (addressing the deductibility of dividends
received by corporations).
60. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/4
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property in the hands of the taxpayer with respect to
whom the determination is made is determined under
section 1015(a) (relating
to the basis of property
6
acquired by gift).
To be in the second class of taxpayers listed above, a taxpayer must have
"acquired title to the property in the erroneously treated transaction," been "a
predecessor in title to the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is
made, and" been one "through whom the latter derived a carry-over basis for
the property."'62
The following hypothetical, based on the regulations,63 presents an
example of this class of taxpayer: Taxpayer A makes a gift of preferred stock
in Z Corporation to taxpayer B, who is not related to A. A received such stock
in 1990 in a distribution from Z Corporation. A treated the distribution as
nontaxable. When B sells the stock in 1995 she treats her basis as $1000, the
fair market value of the stock when it was distributed to A. Assume that a
closing agreement with B upholds this treatment in 1998. An adjustment is
permitted as to A for 1990 because the determination of basis in the closing
agreement indicates
that A's treatment of the distribution to him as nontaxable
64
was erroneous.
As an example of the third class of taxpayer, assume that A in his 1990
taxable year acquires stock in X Corporation in exchange for property in a
transaction thatA believes is not taxable because of I.R.C. § 351.65 A makes a
gift of this stock to B. In 1995, B sells it. B reports a gain that reflects that the
exchange in which A acquired the stock was a taxable transaction.66 The Tax
Court sustains B's position in 1999, long after A's taxable year 1990 is barred.
In this instance an adjustment would be allowed against A.
The following three types of erroneous treatment may serve as grounds for
an adjustment as a result of a determination of basis:
(i) an erroneous inclusion in, or omission from, gross income,
(ii) an erroneous recognition, or nonrecognition, of gain or
loss, or
(iii) an erroneous deduction of an item properly chargeable to
capital account or an erroneous charge to capital account of
an item properly deductible.6'

61. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(B).

62. See Coleman, supra note 28, at 1611.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-7(c) example 2(i) (1999).
64. Id.
65. Under I.R.C. § 35 1(a) (1994), no gain or loss is recognized on transfer ofproperty
to a corporation in exchange for its stock if after such transfer the transferor or transferors
control the corporation as defined in I.R.C. § 368(c).
66. B's assumption might be that the 80% control requirement of I.R.C. §368(c) was
not met in the transaction in which A acquired the stock. I.R.C. § 368(c) (1994).
67. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(C) (1994).
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B. Adjustments Involving Related Taxpayers
The first four circumstances of adjustment discussed above permit
adjustment as to barred years in favor of and against "related" taxpayers (i.e.,
taxpayers that are not involved in the proceeding which gives rise to the
determination).6" The relationships between taxpayers that serve as the bases
for such adjustments are relationships in which one might anticipate difficulty
in allocating income and deductions.69 They include the following: "(1)
husband and wife, (2) grantor and fiduciary, (3) grantor and beneficiary, (4)
fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee, or heir, (5) decedent and decedent's estate,
(6) partner, or (7) member of an affiliated group of corporations.... "70 Such
a relationship to "the taxpayer with respect to whom a determination is made"
must have existed at some time in the taxable year in which the erroneous tax
treatment occurred.7 Further, if it is the IRS that seeks an adjustment against
a related taxpayer, the relationship with the taxpayer with respect to whom the
determination is made must, with one exception,72 exist at the time the taxpayer

first maintains the position upheld in the determination or at the time of the
detennination.73
C. An InconsistentPosition
The paramount condition in most circumstances of adjustment is the
requirement that the party who "wins" the determination must have previously
sung a different tune about the erroneous, inconsistent treatment of the item
involved in the determination. If the determination would provide the basis for
an adjustment against the taxpayer for another year or against a related
taxpayer, the taxpayer must have maintained in connection with the
determination a position inconsistent with the erroneous treatment of the item
by the taxpayer in another year or by the related taxpayer.74 On the other hand,
if the determination provides the basis for an adjustment creating an
overpayment by the taxpayer for another year or for a related taxpayer, the IRS
must have maintained a position inconsistent with the erroneous treatment of

68. I.R.C. § 1312(1)-(4);see alsoI.R.C. § 1313(c) (1994) (defining related taxpayers).
69. SALTZMAN, supra note 27, 5.07[4], at 5-61.
70. I.R.C. § 1313(c).
71. Id.
72. I.R.C. § 131 1(b)(3) (1994). This exception applies when, under § 1312(3)(B), the
determination requires the exclusion from income of an item the taxpayer has not included on
his return. In such a circumstance it is not necessary, as a condition of allowing an adjustment
in favor of the IRS, that the taxpayers maintained inconsistent positions in connection with the
determination and the inconsistent erroneous treatment ofthe item involved in the determination.
I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1).

73. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(3).
74. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B).
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the item by the taxpayer in another year or by another taxpayer.75
Notwithstanding the fact that a statute of limitations often creates
circumstances of ostensible injustice, it works a form of justice of its own
because it effects repose. Thus exceptions to the statute of limitations should
be administered sparingly. In the mitigation provisions Congress has used the
inconsistency requirement to limit corrective adjustments to instances in which
either the government or a taxpayer seeks to enjoy some benefit a second time
because correction of the first time is barred by the statute of limitations.
Congress said the following about this requirement:
To preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of
limitations, corrective adjustments should (a) never modify
the application of the statute except when the party or parties
in whose favor it applies shall have justified such
modification by active inconsistency, and (b) under no
circumstances affect the tax save with respect to the influence
of particular items involved in the adjustment.76
The rationale for this extraordinary sidestepping of the statute of limitations
was perhaps stated most succinctly as follows: "He who seeks repose should
practice it by letting sleeping dogs lie.""
As previously noted, the inconsistency requirement is inapplicable to two
circumstances of adjustment." The first instance is when "the determination
requires the exclusion from gross income of an item not included" in income
"by the taxpayer and with respect to which the tax was not paid but which is
includible in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year or in the
gross income of a related taxpayer. '79 The second instance is when "[t]he
determination disallows a deduction or credit which should have been allowed
to, but was not allowed to, the taxpayer for another taxable year, or to a related
taxpayer.""0 These two circumstances of adjustment were not part of the
original 1938 statute; they were added in 1953.8"
Although it is not necessary in these two circumstances for the party who
benefits from the determination to have maintained aposition inconsistent with
erroneous treatment of the item in another year or by a related taxpayer, the

75. I.R.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(A). This inconsistency may simply arise from the IRS's
adoption of a position in connection with the determination that is inconsistent with its
acquiescence in erroneous treatment of the item in the closed year. Such acquiescence would be
implicit in the IRS's acceptance of the return containing such erroneous treatment. SALTZMAN,
supra note 27, 5.07(2][a], at 5-48 to 5-50.
76. S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 49 (1938).
77. Maguire, supra note 12, at 518.
78. I.R.C. § 1311(b)(1) (1994).
79. I.R.C. § 1312(3)(3) (1994).
80. I.R.C. § 1312(4).
81. Technical Changes Act of 1953, ch. 512, sec. 211 (a) § 3801 (b), 67 Stat. 615, 625.
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party seeking a corrective adjustment must meet a different condition. If the
determination entitles the taxpayer to exclude an item she has excluded in
another year, or that another taxpayer has excluded, the prior year of the
taxpayer or related taxpayer must not have been barred by the statute of
limitations at the time the IRS first maintained that the item should be included
in the taxpayer's income." By the same token, if the determination disallows
a deduction which should have been allowed to the taxpayer for another taxable
year or to a related taxpayer, an adjustment is permitted only if the year in
which such deduction should have been allowed was not barred by the statute
that he was entitled
of limitations "at the time the taxpayer first maintained ...
to such deduction or credit for the taxable year to which the determination
relates."

3

In these two circumstances of adjustment, the requirement of an
inconsistent position might perversely allow the IRS or a taxpayer to open up
a closed year by maneuvering the opponent into a position inconsistent with
treatment of an item in a barred year.
For example, consider taxpayer A, who suffered in his 1991 taxable year
what he thought to be a partially worthless bad business debt.84 He deducted the
worthless portion in 1991. In 1993, on audit, the IRS demanded an explanation
and then accepted A's return. In 1995, after the running of the statute of
limitations for the 1991 tax year, A concluded that the debt was wholly
worthless in 1991.85 Nevertheless, A deducts the remaining portion of the debt
for tax year 1995. On audit, the IRS denies the remaining portion of the debt,
concluding also that the entire debt was worthless in 1991.
Should the IRS position become the basis of a determination, its
1991.86
inconsistent position would provide a lever for the taxpayer to reopen
This is not permitted, however, unless 1991 was open at the time A first
maintains in writing before the IRS the entitlement to the deduction of the
portion of the debt not deducted in 1991. A cannot benefit from a later
determination unless the issue was raised before the running of the statute of
limitations; the IRS's inconsistent position is irrelevant to the issue of whether
an adjustment is allowed.

D. Method ofAdustment
The amount of the adjustment under I.R.C. § 1311 is computed under
I.R.C. § 1314. Under I.R.C. § 1314(a) the amount of the adjustment is the
difference between the tax as previously computed in the year the error was

82. I.R.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(A).

83.
84.
85.
86.

I.R.C. § 1311(b)(2)(B).
See I.1.C. § 166(a)(2) (1994).
See I.R.C. § 166(a)(1).
See I.R.C. § 1312(4) (1994).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/4

16

Lynch: Income Tax Statute of Limitations: Sixty Years of Mitigation--Eno
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 62

made and the tax as computed with the item correctly treated. 7 The tax for the
year adjusted is not otherwise changed. 8 Adjustments may be made to other
taxable years if the adjustment of the year in which the error occurred effects
a carryback or carryover of a net operating loss89 or capital loss.9"
If the determination permits an adjustment, such adjustment must occur
within one year of the determination.9' If the adjustment entails an increase in
tax, the IRS must issue a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer.92 Although the
determination that permits the adjustment may be ajudicial decision involving
the same taxpayer, the taxpayer as to whom the adjustment is sought "may
contest the deficiency before the Tax Court... or may pay the deficiency," file
a claim for refund and then file a refund suit in a district court or in the Court
of Federal Claims. 93 If the adjustment indicates that the taxpayer has overpaid
tax in the year in which the error was made, the taxpayer must file a claim for
refund. If the IRS denies the refund claim, the taxpayer must file a suit for
refund. The manner in which the statute functions sometimes requires two
adjudications of the same anomaly: one to establish an inconsistency and a
second to establish that the inconsistency is the sort that warrants relief from
the statute of limitations,94 or, worse still, that the "determination" is the sort
that invokes mitigation.95
III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MITIGATION PROVISIONS
The judicial reluctance to provide a means to address inequities caused by
the statute of limitations is addressed in Part IV. The preceding explanation of
the mitigation provisions demonstrates a highly qualified approach to multiyear
anomalies. There is no inherent reason that Congress needed to embrace the
judiciary's timidity; nevertheless, it did.
If a solution as crabbed as the mitigation provisions had yielded a
mechanism which 96 (1) might be applied simply and predictably, and (2) paid
sufficient homage to the advantages of the statute of limitations and annual
accounting principle, it would be unwise to question Congress's wisdom in
embracing it.
Six decades of experience has demonstrated, however, that the mitigation

87. I.R.C. § 1314(a) (1994); Coleman, supra note 28, at 1615.
88. Coleman, supranote 28, at 1615.
89. I.R.C. § 172 (1994).
90. I.R.C. § 1212 (1994).
91. I.R.C. § 1314(b).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.1314(b)-i(a) (1999).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 485, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1964).
95. Commissioner v. Estate of Weinreich, 316 F.2d 97, 104-05 (9th Cir. 1963).
96. Arthur W. Andrews, Modern-Day Equitable Recoupment and the "Two Tax
Effect: "Avoidance ofthe Statutes ofLimitations in FederalTax Controversies,28 AiZ. L. REV.
595, 619-20 (1986).
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provisions, in structure and administration, have proved a morass of
complexity, unpredictability, and sometimes indisputable injustice. 97 This
section addresses the following four flaws of the mitigation provisions: A.
Limitation of applicability of the mitigation provisions to a narrow
catalogue of errors.
B. Limited capacity of the mitigation provisions to address the
consequences of basis errors.
C. Confusion about what constitutes an inconsistency that invokes
the mitigation provisions.
D. The tendency of the determination requirement to spawn
redundant litigation.
The author does not claim to have been the first to identify any of these flaws,
but time and judicial construction has not cured them.
A. Limitation ofApplicability of the MitigationProvisionsto a Narrow
CatalogueofErrors
Mitigation operates only in the circumstances of adjustment identified in
I.R.C. § 1312.9s This restriction is a genuflection to the statute of limitations"
and no doubt bespeaks a fear of resort to any form of equitable discretion to
remedy inequitable exploitation of limitations.' ° Thus, mitigation sidesteps
limitations only in precisely defined instances.
Mitigation also serves as an escape valve from the rigors of the annual
accounting principle, which has been aptly described as "obviously directed to
taxable years rather than transactions or events." ' Although mitigation is only
one of many safety valves from the rigors of annual accounting, among other
legislative0 2 and judicial' 13 escape hatches, mitigation is ordinarily construed

97. Ironically, a major advantage ofmitigation touted by its supporters at its inception
was that its highly detailed structure would be the approach to multiyear anomalies that would
entail the least litigation. See Kent, supra note 7, at 156; Maguire, supra note 12, at 775-76.
98. I.R.C. § 1312(l)-(7) (1994).

99. See Maguire, supra note 12, at 516-17.
100. As the Assistant General Counsel of the Bureau ofRevenue stated in 1935: "The
occasions when courts exercise the powers to do equity are rare and not likely to be very much
extended. Meanwhile, the old adage that 'hard cases make bad law' is frequently exemplified

in tax decisions." Jackson, supra note 3, at 642.
101. Andrews, supra note 96, at 619-20. See also Bumet v. Sanford &Brooks Co.,
282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931).

102. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 111 (1994) (allowing a tax benefit for income treatment of
items deducted previously); I.R.C. § 172 (1994) (allowing net operating loss deductions); I.R.C.
§ 1341 (1994) (allowing optional reference to earlier year ofinclusion when amount held under

claim of right is restored).
103. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1952) (characterizing
loss in a tax year as having been determined by circumstances in an earlier year); Dobson v.
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489,493 (1943) (deciding that the extent of income inclusion in a tax
year was to be determined by circumstances in an earlier year); R. H. Steams Co. v. United
States, 291 U.S. 54, 60-62 (1934) (holding that the consistent treatment of a transaction was
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parsimoniously.' °4 The narrowness with which the mitigation provisions have
been written and generally construed has exacerbated the tendency of annual
accounting to bring about inequity. A number of cases demonstrate this.
First and foremost is the 1975 decision of the Tax Court in B. C. Cook &
Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner(Cook 11).5 In that case the taxpayer, which was
engaged in the business of acquiring citrus fruit for distribution to processing
plants, was the victim of embezzlement by its bookkeeper for tax years ending
in 1958 through 1965. The culprit wrote checks to a fictitious payee for whom
he maintained a bank account. These checks were treated by the bookkeeper
as purchases of fruit, thus increasing the taxpayer's cost of goods sold and
lowering its taxable income in the years involved.'15 The taxpayer discovered
the embezzlement in 1965, obtained some reimbursement from the bookkeeper,
and deducted a theft loss of $605,116.52 that year. 7 The IRS denied these
deductions to the extent that embezzlements in years 1958 through 1962 were
reflected in taxpayer's cost of goods sold.0 5 The taxpayer contested this denial
in the Tax Court, which upheld the taxpayer.'0 9
The Tax Court noted in Cook I that its earlier decision in the 1972 Cook

required notwithstanding the running of the statute of limitations); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S.
281, 283 (1932) (holding that although assessment and collection were barred by statute of
limitations, the government could still retain and apply overpayments to amounts "which might
[otherwise] have been properly assessed and demanded").
104. The complex statutory scheme of mitigation has been viewed as inhibiting the
liberal application of mitigation: "Incorporating rough justice or equitable principles into the
elaborate scheme of the mitigation provisions would add inestimable mischief to the rigorous
statutory scheme." Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 867,874 (1994),
aff'd, 72 F.3d 1338 (7th Cir. 1996). See also O'Donnell v. Belcher, 414 F.2d 833, 844 (5th Cir.
1969) (stating that the court would not interpret the mitigation statutes as liberally as the service
had requested). This rigidity has been viewed as even-handedly presenting occasional hardships
to both taxpayers and the government. See Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United States, 265
F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1959).
Compounding the work of interpreting these complex mitigation provisions is a
"recessive" strain ofjudicial thought which holds that as a relief provision, mitigation should be
construed liberally. See Note, Sections 1311-15 of the InternalRevenue Code: Some Problems
in Administration,72 HARv. L.REv. 1536, 1543 (1959) (quoting Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.
v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 94, 100 (Ct. C. 1948)).
105. 65 T.C. 422 (1975) [hereinafter Cook 11].
106. Id. at 422-23.
107. Id. at 424. This deduction resulted in a net operating loss which the taxpayer
carried back to tax years 1962, 1963 and 1964. Id. at 424-25.
108. Id. at425.
109. B. C. Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 516 (1972) [hereinafter Cook
1]. In CookIthe Commissioner argued that allowing the theft loss for 1965 would constitute an
impermissible double deduction. Id. at 520. The court held the prohibition against double
deductions of the same item in different years applies only when the earlier deduction is proper.
Id. at 521-22. The court stated that the remedy for a deduction incorrectly taken in one year is
to take it out of the year in which it was deducted. Id. at 521. The court hinted that the
appropriate remedy for this situation was mitigation. Id. at 521-22. The determination that
"expenses for fruit" were inreality losses from theft established the requisite erroneous treatment
of such amounts in the earlier years.
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Icase represented a determination within the meaning ofI.R.C. § 1313(a)(1),"°
and thus an occasion for the Commissioner to invoke mitigation. The
Commissioner ultimately failed in this effort.
The Commissioner relied on I.R.C. § 1312(2), stating that the prior
determination in Cook I entailed double allowance of a deduction in that the
taxpayer received overlapping deductions for embezzlement losses and
purchases of fruit, the latter increasing its cost of goods sold. The
Commissioner urged that double allowance of a deduction or credit should
include "any position taken by a taxpayer which would result in a double
reduction of tax."' The Commissioner urged that such a construction of the
circumstance of adjustment was "necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
mitigation provisions.""'
There is much to commend in the position of the IRS in CookII. The first
paragraph of the Senate Report concerning the mitigation provision stated:
"This section of the bill provides an equitable solution of certain classes of
income-tax problems, now very numerous, which have caused much hardship
to taxpayers and great difficulty to the Commissioner, the Board of Tax
Appeals, and the courts."".
The Tax Court perceived Congress's remedy to be somewhat narrower. It
quoted the House Report to the effect that, notwithstanding its statement of
general principles, Congress acted to correct only "some of the inequities under
the income-tax laws caused by the statute of limitation and other provisions
which now prevent equitable adjustment of various income-tax hardships."'n 4
The court concluded that "Congress intended to preclude the possibility of a
double tax benefit only in the specific circumstances set forth in section
1312," and construed the double deduction circumstance in that spirit.
The Cook II court conceded that Cook I had allowed the taxpayer a theft
loss deduction for 1965 but stated that it was not "a deduction 'which was
erroneously allowed to the taxpayer for another taxable year.""'6 The court
viewed the error the Commissioner tried to correct, the overstatement of cost

110. Cook 11, 65 T.C. at 422, 425 (1975).
111. Id. at427.
112. Id. The IRS cited the Senate Report that accompanied the original version of the
mitigation statute to support its contention that it was Congress's intent that "disputes as to the
year in which income or deductions belong, or as to the person who should have the tax burden
of income or the tax benefit of deductions, should never result in a double tax or double
reduction of tax, or an inequitable avoidance of tax." Cook 11, 65 T.C. at 427 (quoting S.REP.
No. 75-1567, at 49-50 (1938)).
Ofcourse the IRS does not always urge such abroad construction ofthe circumstances
of adjustment if it does not serve its litigation objectives. See, e.g., Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp.
v. United States, 265 F.2d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1959).
113. S.REP.No. 75-1567, at48.
114. CookI, 65 T.C. at428 (quoting H.R. REP.No. 75-2330, at 56 (1938)) (emphasis
added by the court).
115. Cook I, 65 T.C. 422, 428 (1975).
116. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 1312(2) (1994)).
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of goods sold in the amount of the embezzled funds, as simply an offset in the
computation of gross income. 1 7The court also noted that the term "deduction"
is not used in I.R.C. § 1312 in connection with errors in gross income, but
rather, the statute uses the terms "inclusion," "exclusion," and "omission" with
respect to such errors."'
The distinction drawn by the court between deduction and offset for the
purpose of denying mitigation is not implausible." 9 In support of its
hypertechnical approach to construing the scope of the circumstances of
adjustment the court relied upon Brennen v. Commissioner,120 which is
addressed immediately below. The court in CookIl assumed that Congress, in
enacting the mitigation provisions, was cognizant of the "fundamental
differences therein between the tax treatment of either basis or cost of goods
sold and itemized deductions,"''M and that Congress included only the latter
within the ambit of I.R.C. § 1312(2).' 22
Despite the distinction, the result was terrible! The taxpayer benefitted
twice from the amounts represented by embezzled funds, a result which
seemed to trouble most members of the Tax Court."~ Such a result, however,

117. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (1957)).
118. Id. at 430 (citing I.R.C. § 1312(2) (1994)).
119. The court cited a number of decisions in support of its distinction, including
Curtis Gallery & Library, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1967); Bridges v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 968 (1975); EstateofDomv. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1651 (1970); Estate
of Bray v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 577 (1966), aff'd, 396 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1968). Cook I, 65
T.C. at 428-30.
120. 20 T.C. 495 (1953).
121. CooklI,65 T.C. 422,431 (1975).
122. Id. at 431-32.
123. Judge Sterrett, who wrote for the majority, stated:
It maybe fairly said that [the taxpayer] has not turned
the appropriate square corner with its Government. It
has availed itself of a situation which slips between
the statutory cracks to gain an unwarranted tax
advantage. Nonetheless, it is entitled to our
unprejudiced interpretation of the law in issue.
Id. at 432.
Chief Judge Dawson, agreeing with the result from a technical standpoint in Cook!,
lamented that he now believed he had erred in Cook I. He stated: "This time I have simply
decided to go along with the majority so that we can avoid producing more bad law in this
already bad case." Id. (Dawson, CJ., concurring).
Both Judges Drennen and Wilbur, in separate dissents, criticized the restricted
construction given to "deduction" by the majority. Significantly, however, Judge Drennen made
what was very nearly an argument based on equitable recoupment. He stated:
I would agree that the mitigation provisions were
probably not intended to cure all abuses of the statute
of limitations but I think the circumstances of this
case qualify for the benefits thereof. Congress was
concerned with double deductions and credits which
produced tax avoidance, not with the fine distinctions
between deductions from gross income and
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is a predictable by-product of a scheme so fixated on deference to the statute
of limitations.
A similarly inequitable result occasioned by the restrictiveness of the
circumstances of adjustment may be seen in the Tax Court's decision in
Brennen v. Commissioner.'24 In that case the taxpayer took a deduction in 1944
for an amortizable bond premium under section 125 of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code. 25 In 1945 the taxpayer sold the bonds to which the premium
he had deducted pertained. He reduced his basis in the bonds by the amount of
the bond premium he had deducted the previous year.'26
In 1946 the government audited the taxpayer's 1944 and 1945 returns. It
denied deduction for the bond premium for 1944 and correspondingly
decreased the taxpayer's gain on the sale of the bonds in 1945. The taxpayer
cashed a refund check for 1945 but continued to litigate denial of the 1944
deduction in the Tax Court. 27
The Tax Court disposition of that matter was held in abeyance pending the
Supreme Court's resolution of the deductibility of amortizable bond premium
issue in another similar case. 28 The Supreme Court's decision in that case
vindicated the taxpayer's deduction for 1944.129 Since the statute of limitations
on 1945 had run by time the Tax Court upheld the taxpayer's deduction for
1944, the government relied on mitigation to disgorge the taxpayer's 1945
refund. It relied in vain.
The Commissioner asserted the applicability of§ 3801(b)(2) and (b)(5) of
the 1939 Code. 30 These correspond to § 1312(2) (double allowance of
deduction) and § 1312(7) (error relating to a determination of basis) in the 1986
Code.13 ' The court rejected applicability of both circumstances of adjustment

reductions of gross income. This is particularly true
here where the very same actions or transactions of
the embezzler gave rise to both the reductions in
gross income in the years 1958-61 and the loss
deduction this Court allowed for 1965.
Id. at 434-35.
As noted below, the essence of equitable recoupment is to prevent an inconsistent
double benefit, or tax, on the basis of the same transaction. The assessment of whether such a
double benefit is sought may entail consideration of different tax years. See infra notes 458-507
and accompanying text.
124. 20 T.C. at 495.
125. Brennen v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495, 496 (1953); Revenue Act of 1942, 56
Stat. 798, 822 (current version at I.R.C. § 171 (1994)).
126. 20 T.C. at 497.
127. Id. at 497-98.
128. Id. at 498 (citing Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619 (1950)).
129. Id. at 498-99 (referring to Korell, 339 U.S. at 628).
130. Id. at 500.
131. Although the language of the corresponding provisions of the 1939 and 1986
Codes is not identical, the provisions are not different from each other in any way material to the
discussion herein.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/4
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under the facts of the case.'
Much in the manner that it did in Cook II, the court in Brennen held that
the error in 1945 was not a deduction. Instead, the court viewed the transaction
in 1945 as an adjustment to basis, something not covered by I.R.C.
§ 3801(b)(2).133 The court rejected the applicability of subsection (b)(5)
because it held that its determination with respect to 1944 was not a
determination of basis, as that subsection requires, but rather of the propriety
of a deduction (albeit one which affected basis).'
As in Cook II, the Brennen court's restrictive view of the scope of
mitigation permitted the taxpayer to enjoy a double benefit from the same item.
Judge Turner dissented, focusing on I.R.C. § 3801(b)(5), 35 the provision
concerning errors in connection with basis, which shall be addressed in more
detail below. 136 He argued that the bond premium issue determined earlier by
the Tax Court was defacto part of the taxpayer's basis."37 Notwithstanding his
criticism, however, the decision in Brennen and its egregious result may be
seen as faithful to congressional intent for mitigation to provide only restrictive
safe harbors from manipulation of the statute of limitations.'
Cook 1I and Brennen are hardly the only examples in which the "list" of
circumstances ofadjustment, as construed restrictively, was too short to address
patent inequity. 139 Nevertheless, the large number of tribunals engaged in
132. 20 T.C. at 500-01.
133. Id. at 500.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 502 (Turner, J., dissenting).
136. See infra notes 153-218 and accompanying text.
137. Brennen v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495, 502 (1953) (Turner, J., dissenting).
138. It must be conceded that in most cases both taxpayers and the government may
protect themselves from litigation. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) (1994) (providing that the
government may obtain a waiver from the taxpayer of limitation on assessment for a taxable
year); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank of Green Bay v. United States, 330 F.2d 635, 639 (Ct. Cl.
1964) (noting that a taxpayer may file a protective claim for refund).
That limitations may be avoided in such ways raises two policy questions: (1) If one
accepts as appropriate the restrictive nature of mitigation, is this purpose served if limitations
may be readily avoided? (2) Is it appropriate that the greatest flexibility in correcting errors may
be obtained only by the procedurally agile? The author's view is that the scope of relief from the
statute of limitations to remedy inequity would be better placed in the hands of tribunals with
broader remedial powers than mitigation now permits.
139. For example, see Evans Trust v. United States, 462 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1972). In
1967 the estate of Cora Evans, which included a beneficiary trust established to hold assets from
the estate of Arthur Evans, Cora's husband, was required to include a substantial asset
representing income in respect of a decedent. The trust claimed a deduction for estate tax paid
by Cora's estate for 1961, 1962, 1963, and 1964. The IRS allowed such a deduction only for
1964, which was not then barred. The trust sought relief through the mitigation provision for
correlative items for trusts, estates, and beneficiaries under I.R.C. § 1312(5). Id. at 523.
In much the same spirit as the Tax Court in Cook I and Brennen, the Court of Claims
held mitigation inapplicable. Among other reasons, it noted that the statute refers to deductions
or inclusions in computing taxable income of an estate or beneficiary. It also noted that the
determination as to which the taxpayer sought mitigation entailed inclusion of an asset in the
estate of Cora. Id. at 524.
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deciding tax cases makes it inevitable that not all will follow the restrictive
approach to construing the scope of the circumstances of adjustment. In
Cocchiarav. United States"' for example, the Fifth Circuit construed the scope
of I.R.C. § 1312(l)-the section dealing with the double inclusion of an item
of gross income-in a manner that is probably inconsistent with the
congressional purpose of mitigation (and certainly with how the courts have
generally construed this purpose). Coincidentally, the court averted a
significant injustice.
In Cocchiara the taxpayers sold two mineral leases in 1959 for
approximately $2,000,000. They reported the gain from this sale on the
installment basis in their tax years from 1959 to 1965. The IRS and the
taxpayers agreed to hold these years open for assessment until 1972. The IRS
denied the taxpayers the benefit of installment reporting, requiring the entire
amount of gain to be reported for 1959. This caused a deficiency for that year
but also created overpayments for tax years 1960 through 1965. These
overpayments were credited against deficiencies in those years."'
The taxpayers sued for a refund in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana.1 2 The court upheld the IRS denial of installment
treatment in 1959 but held that the IRS, through its adjustments in 1960
through 1965, had received $511,878.03 more in taxes than it should have. The
court held, however, that over half of this amount was barred by limitations.'"
The taxpayers' recovery was reduced still further by the Fifth Circuit.'"
Subsequently, the taxpayers, dependent upon mitigation for relief, filed a
refund action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana."'5
A master found that the taxpayers had paid a double tax on the same item
of income, the sale of the mineral leases in 1959, for which they had never
received a refund or credit against taxes legitimately owed." The important
question was whether this constituted a double inclusion of income within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 1312(1).
The IRS argued that it was not and the district court agreed, finding that the
taxpayers were "taxed once on the mineral lease sale and once on other items
of income, albeit erroneously.""' 7 This surely provides a cogent explanation as
to why the taxpayers literally did not qualify for mitigation. Crediting

140. 779 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1986).
141. Id. at 1109.
142. Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1975),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part,613 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1980).
143. Republic Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 613 F.2d 518,521-22(5th Cir. 1980)
(describing the district court's findings).
144. Id. at 527.
145. Roussel v. United States, 676 F. Supp. 119, 120 (E.D. La. 1984), rev'd,
Cocchiara v. United States, 779 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1986).
146. Roussel, 676 F. Supp. at 122.
147. Cocchiaria,779 F.2d at IIII (describing the district court's findings).
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overpayments of tax attributable to installment payments for 1960 through
1965 against other taxes for those years that proved to be erroneous literally did
not entail double reporting of income from the 1959 sale.
The appellate court, in reversing the district court, remarkably agreed that
the determination did not require the taxpayers to include the income from the
mineral lease sale in both 1959 and the years from 1960 to 1965.14 The court
stated, however, that "it is the taxes due on the items of gross income, not the
double inclusion of the gross income itself, that the statute by implication refers
to."' 49 Later the court concluded that "[t]hese statutes are essentially equitable
in nature. They relieve the parties from the disabilities imposedby the pertinent
statute of limitations under the Internal Revenue Code."' 50
The court's approach in Cocchiaraessentially analyzes the net tax result
of a transaction to see whether it has been taxed twice. As such, it resembles
equitable recoupment.$ Since it is used offensively-that is, as the basis of a
separate refund action for a year as to which limitations has expired-it would
5 the Supreme Court's
probably be impermissible under UnitedStates v. Dalm,"'
last word on recoupment. While mitigation was thought to be an antidote to the
inadequacies of equitable recoupment, the majority of courts applying
mitigation have not been as inclined to "do equity" as the court in Cocchiara.
For the Cocchiaracourt's approach to be the norm, it would be necessary to
replace the mechanics and spirit of mitigation with those of equitable
recoupment.
B. Limited Ability of the Mitigation Provisionsto Address the
Consequencesof BasisErrors
Section 1312(7) allows an adjustment when a "determination determines
the basis of property, and in respect of any transaction on which such basis
depends," the determination establishes that any of three types of error
occurred.'53 These errors are (1) "an erroneous inclusion in, or omission from,
gross income," (2) "erroneous recognition, or nonrecognition, of gain or loss,"
and (3) "an erroneous deduction of an item properly chargeable to capital
account or an erroneous charge to the capital account of an item properly
deductible."'- 4 As previously discussed, this adjustment may be made to the
income of

148. Id. at 1113.
149. Id. It must be noted that when Congress wishes to make a distinction between
the tax consequences of an item ofincome or deduction and the item itself, it is capable ofdoing
so explicitly. See, e.g., IR.C. §§ 111, 1341 (1994).
150. 779 F.2d at 1114.
151. Equitable recoupment is discussed in detail in Part IV of this Article.
152. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
153. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A) (1994).
154. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(C)(i)-(iii).
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(i) the taxpayer with respect to whom the determination is
made,
(ii) a taxpayer who acquired title to the property in the
transaction [in which error occurred] and from whom,
mediately or immediately, the taxpayer with respect to whom
the determination is made derived title, or
(iii) a taxpayer who had title to the property at the time of the
transaction [in which error occurred] and from whom,
mediately or immediately, the taxpayer with respect to whom
the determination is made derived title, if the basis of the
property in the hands of the taxpayer with respect to whom
the determination is made is determined under I.R.C.
§ 1015(a) .... 155
The opacity of the mitigation provisions probably reaches its zenith with
this circumstance of adjustment. The provision's history in the courts
demonstrates, for the most part, that the complex terms have been used as a
course of hurdles that have often thwarted mitigation's overall purpose-to
take the profit out of inconsistency. 15 6 This has been particularly true with
respect to the requirements that a determination "determine[] the basis of
' and that
property"157
the determination also determine that an error' 58 has
occurred "in respect of any transaction on which such basis depends."' 5 9Failure
to meet either of these requirements of the statute prevents a mitigation
adjustment even60 when an adjustment would ostensibly be compelled by the
circumstances.'
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the harshness with which the basis
provision has been construed is to look first at an instance in which it was
applied liberally. Such an instance is provided in United States v.
Rosenberger.'6' In that case the taxpayer held stock and debentures in a
corporation. From 1932 to 1942 she received from the corporation payments
she treated as distributions in reduction of the principal of her debentures. In
tax years 1946 and 1947 the taxpayer received two large distributions that
liquidated the principal of her debentures. She reported capital gain on these
62
distributions, having reduced her basis by earlier distributions.
In 1950 the taxpayer filed a timely claim for refund for 1947. She
contended that her treatment of earlier distributions as reducing her basis was

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

I.R.C. § 1312(7)(B).
S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 49 (1938).
I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A) (1994).
Of the type specified in § 1312(7)(C).
I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A) (1994).
See, e.g., Brennen v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495, 500-01 (1953).
235 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1956).
Id. at71.
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erroneous, and that these distributions were in fact dividends.'6 3 After the
taxpayer's claim was disallowed she sued for a refund."6 The district court
agreed with the taxpayer that the distributions between 1932 and 1942 were
dividends that should not have reduced the taxpayer's basis prior to the
liquidating distributions in 1946 and 1947. The court, however, permitted the
government to offset taxes on the dividends between 1932 and 1942 against the
taxpayer's refund.165 The taxpayer then filed a claim for refund with respect to
1946, which was barred by limitations.'66 The taxpayer's argument for
application of mitigation was that since she had been required for 1947 to
report distributions between 1932 and 1942 as dividends, such distributions
should not have reduced her basis. Since these distributions were so employed
in calculating
her basis with respect to the 1946 distribution, her gain was
67
overstated.
The district court agreed with the taxpayer that mitigation was appropriate
under the statutory antecedent of I.R.C. § 1312(7).161 The government argued
on appeal that the district court erred because there had not been, in the
litigation of the 1947 tax year, a determination of basis of the debentures. It
also argued that there was no erroneous tax treatment of an item in respect of
a transaction on which basis depends.'69
The court brushed aside the government objections with little explanation.
It noted that while one relying on the mitigation provisions must prove the
existence of the prerequisites to its applicability,
[t]hat... does not mean that the statute should be so strictly
or narrowly interpreted as to defeat its apparent purpose,
which it has been said was "to provide a fair and workable
formula under which taxpayers and the Government would be
given relief from the unfair and unjust results occasioned by
corrections . . . of errors .. .inconnection with proper
treatment of items affecting
taxable income and tax liability
' 70
in more than one year.' 1
163. Id. In a proceeding involving the corporation which made the distributions, 1432
Broadway Corp. v. Commissioner,4 T.C. 1158 (1945), the Tax Court denied the corporation's
interest deductions pertaining to the debentures involved in Rosenberger.The 1432 Broadway
court found the "'debentures' more analogous to preferred stock than evidences of
indebtedness." Rosenberger,235 F.2d at 71 (citing and summarizing 1432 Broadway,4 T.C. at

1166).
164. Bauman v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Mo. 1952).
165. Rosenberger,235 F.2d at 72 (summarizing the district court's findings in
Bauman).
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citing I.R.C. § 3801(b)(5) (1939)).
Id. at 73.
Id. (quoting Gooch Milling &Elevator Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 94, 100

(Ct. Cl. 1948)).
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The court's conclusion was consistent with its overarching statement that

the statute should not be parsimoniously interpreted to the point of frustrating
its purpose. In deciding that the taxpayer reported too much capital gain income
in 1947, the court had to determine her basis."' In determining that
distributions from 1932 to 1942 did not reduce her basis, the district court had
determined that these distributions should have been taxed as dividends and it
thus allowed the government to reduce her refund to collect such tax. 72 ThiS
action resulted in double taxation of a portion of these distributions for the
1946 tax year. Some of the amount by which the taxpayer had reduced her
basis to reflect these distributions was taxed as capital gain in that year. The
error in 1946 was traceable to transactions the tax treatment of which was the
subject of the refund suit for 1947 and which affected taxpayer's basis.
Notwithstanding the clear appropriateness of the result, there is ample support
in the caselaw under I.R.C. § 1312(7) for a different result on account of failure
to satisfy the requirements of a determination of basis and that such
determination conclude that an error occurred "in respect of [a] transaction on
which basis depends."'7
1. DeterminationofBasis
That it may plausibly be argued that the facts of Rosenbergerlacked the
essential determination of basis may be seen in Sherover v. United States,74 a
case which bears significant factual similarities to Rosenberger. In Sherover
the taxpayer was a participant in a joint venture that owned a ship. In 1941
certain repairs to the ship were capitalized. In 1946, in a consolidated
proceeding involving the venture, the Tax Court determined that half of the
amount capitalized in 1941 should have been deducted as expenses.'75 The ship
had been destroyed in 1942 and the owners received an insurance payment for
the loss.'76

In 1947, following an audit of the taxpayer's 1942 return, the government
assessed additional tax against the taxpayer for that year. It did so by lowering
the taxpayer's basis by the proportional amount of expenses that the venture
should have deducted. 77 The taxpayer paid the tax and then sought, through
mitigation, to obtain a refund based on the amounts in 1941 that events proved
should have been deducted.'78 In rejecting the applicability of mitigation, the
court determined, interalia,that there hadbeenno determination of basis under

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See I.R.C. § 1001 (1994).
Rosenberger,235 F.2d at 72.
I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A) (1994).
137 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affid, 239 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1956).
Id. at 779-80 (citing Worth S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 654 (1946)).
Worth, 7 T.C. at 662-63. The Leslie was sunk by a German submarine. Id.
Sherover, 137 F. Supp. at 780.
Id. at 780.
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what is now I.R.C. § 1312(7).' The court stated that the earlier Tax Court
determination of thejoint venture's taxable income for 1942 simply determined
the propriety of the tax treatment of repair expenses and not the taxpayer's
basis. 80
Although this conclusion is defensible,' it seems harsh under the
circumstances. The determination had the effect of creating a capital gain as to
an open year of the taxpayer, 1942, by reducing the taxpayer's basis; indeed,
no unreported gain could have been found unless the determination presented
a basis lower than the taxpayer's amount realized.
The court in Rosenberger might just as plausibly have held that the
determination therein concerning 1947, strictly speaking, did not determine the
basis but rather required inclusion of distributions in earlier years as dividend
income.'82 The Rosenberger court did not take that approach and thus the
taxpayer was able to avoid double taxation on capital gain in 1946. In Sherover
the court divorced a decision pertaining to an item that clearly affected the basis
of property from the overpayment of tax in a closed year. The taxpayer was
compelled to pay a double tax with respect to 1941. Again, the result is
logically defensible, but harsh. Sherover's restrictive view regarding what
constitutes83a determination of basis, however, is consistent with the weight of
authority.
179. Id. at 78 1.At issue in Sheroverwas I.R.C. § 3801(b)(5) (1939), the predecessor
ofI.R.C. § 1312 (1994).
180. Sherover v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 778, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd, 239
F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1956).
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-7(a) (1999) (stating thatI.R.C. § 1312(7) applies if,among
other things, a "determination establishes the basis of property"). In Sherover, the
"determination" of basis was implicit; the case actually determined a capital gain owed by the
taxpayer. All but one of the examples in the regulations providing examples of determinations
of basis involve determinations in closing agreements, which may be fashioned by the parties
to address issues specifically (particularly in the imagination of a regulation author). Example
5, however, like Sherover, involves a determination by the Tax Court of an additional capital
gain occasioned by an earlier error. The example appears to recognize that there may be an
implicit determination of basis in the explicit determination of additional capital gain against a
taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-7(c) example 5 (1999) (as amended in 1962).
In Fong v. Commissioner,75 T.C.M. (CCH) 2299 (1998), the Tax Court ruled that
language in a stipulation not adopted by the court in its decision could not be regarded as
determining basis. This stipulation allowed taxpayer deductions for depreciation that indicated
that the taxpayer should have reported a higher capital gain when such asset was distributed to
her. Since there was no determination of basis, however, mitigation was inapplicable. Id. at
2303.
182. The "determination" ofbasis that created an overpayment of capital gain tax in
Rosenbergerin 1947 triggered not the overpayment of capital gain tax for 1946, but rather the
underpayment of dividend income from 1932 to 1942.
183. This head-in-the-sand approach has cut egregiously against both taxpayers and
the government For example, in CentralHanoverBank & Trust Co. v. United States, 163 F.2d
60 (2d Cir. 1947), the personal representative of an estate sought a mitigation adjustment
concerning the sale of a block of stock in 1936. The decedent had treated the basis of the stock,
which represented only a part of her holdings in the company, on an average per share. The
decedent taxpayer had reported a sale in 1935, of her holdings in the same company the same
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The examples in the Treasury Regulations reflect the prevailing narrow
judicial construction of determination of basis. 84 It appears that to qualify as
a determination of basis, the determination must simply resolve the question of
basis of property for purposes of comparing basis with the amount realized in
order to calculate the amount of gain or loss in the year to which the
determination applies. The regulations surely are a strong indication of the
appropriateness of the narrow judicial interpretation of the statute, 8 5 but so
construed, the statute is a weak bulwark against multiyear inequity.
A decision that contrasts remarkably with this limited construction about
what constitutes a determination of basis is Goodingv. United States.'86 In this
case the taxpayers transferred to a corporation assets of a business they had

operated as a partnership in exchange for stock, assumption of partnership debt,
and notes of the corporation. The taxpayers treated the notes as boot, and hence

way. The government required an adjustment for 1935, contending that basis must be calculated
first in, first out. This increased the taxpayer's gain for 1935 but necessarily indicated that the
taxpayer's basis in calculating her loss for 1936 was too low. Id. at 61. Nevertheless, the court
denied the taxpayer's adjustment with respect to the barred year, 1936.
The court held, inter alia, that the determination with respect to 1935 did not
determine basis of the property at issue in 1936, but instead only determined the basis of the
stock sold in 1935. Id. at 62. This was an extraordinary holding because the government's
insistence that the taxpayer shift from average cost to first-in-first-out necessarily'"pours" basis
from the year at issue to other years when other portions of the block of stock are sold.
Consequently, the taxpayer was deprived of full use of its cost basis against sale
proceeds-surely a close relative of double taxation.
Such hypertechnicality has also served the cause of inappropriate tax avoidance. This
may be seen in American Foundation Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 502 (1943). Taxpayer had
treated receipt of stock in 1931 as a nonrecognition transaction. The government contested this
in an earlier case, but the taxpayer was upheld by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 505-06. See American
Found. Co. v. United States, 120 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1941).
However, in 1934, 1936, and 1937 the taxpayer sold portions of the stock received in
1931. As its basis in these sales it used the stock's fair market value in 1931, which was
inconsistent with treating receipt of the stock as a nonrecognition transaction. 2 T.C. at 506-07.
When litigation concerning 1931 was completed, the government sought mitigation adjustments
for 1934, 1936 and 1937. Id. at 507.
The Tax Court held, inter alia, that the determination with respect to 1931 did not
determine the basis of the stock sold in the years for which adjustment was sought, but instead
only whether gain or loss should have been recognized in 1931. 2 T.C. at 508. While that,
speaking very strictly, may be true, the determination that the 1931 transaction was not taxable
inescapably affected the basis ofthe property obtained and, thus, later dispositions of such stock.
Pretending that it did not permitted the taxpayer a double inconsistent exclusion of gain with
respect to the stock at issue. The Tax Court, a few years later, allowed another taxpayer a similar
windfall under somewhat analogous circumstances. See Brennen v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495
(1953).
184. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1312-7(c) (1999) examples 2(i), (ii), & (4) (as amended in
1962).
185. See, e.g., Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 127 (1952) (noting that Treasury
regulations are "entitled to substantial weight").
186. 326 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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87
treated the transaction as capital gain to that extent.1
As the corporation paid the notes the taxpayers treated the payments as tax
free return of capital. The government disagreed. It regarded the transfer to the
corporation as nontaxable and payments on the notes as dividends.'88 The Tax
Court sustained the Commissioner. 8 9
Shortly thereafter, the taxpayers filed claims for refund of the capital gains
tax paid in the year of the exchange of the partnership assets to the corporation.
Since that year was then barred, the taxpayers relied on the mitigation
provisions in their refund action. 90 In finding for the taxpayers, the court relied
on I.R.C. § 1312(7). Somewhat surprisingly it found that the Tax Court, in
holding that payments on the notes were dividends, had determined basis as
required by I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A). The court stated that by treating the exchange
as tax free, the Tax Court determined that the notes and other assets shared a
common basis. As the notes were repaid, any basis allocable to them was
reallocated to other assets. 9' The court concluded that a decision that had "such
a direct, immediate, and drastic impact on the basis of the notes" was a
determination of basis for purposes of I.R.C. § 1312(7).'9
This is a sensibly broad interpretation of I.R.C. § 1312(7), but it is at
variance with the approaches of Sherover, CentralHanoverTrust, 3 American
Foundation,9 4 and Brennen. It could be just as plausibly argued that the Tax
Court determination at issue in Gooding simply resolved the question of
whether payments excluded by the taxpayer were taxable dividends, and that
any effect on basis was incidental. The fact that either approach is plausible,
however, undercuts the supposed advantages of a narrowly crafted statute:
certainty of application and maximum protection for the statute of limitations.

2. In Respect of a Transactionon Which Such Basis Depends
In Rosenberger95 the taxpayer obtained a mitigation adjustment with
respect to capital gain she overpaid in 1946. This was triggered by a setoff
against her refund claim for 1947 of dividends between 1932 and 1942 that
taxpayer had treated as distributions in reduction of her basis. The setoff as to
the 1947 refund meant that the amounts thereby taxed as dividends were taxed
twice to the extent that they reduced the basis used to calculate gain on the

187. Id. at 989-90 (citing I.R.C. § 112(c) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 351(b)
(1994))).
188. Id. at 990.
189. Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408,421 (1954), aff d, 236
F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
190. Gooding, 326 F.2d at 990.
191. Id. at 992.
192. Id.
193. See supranote 183 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
195. United States v. Rosenberger, 235 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1956).
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distribution to taxpayer in 1946. ' 96 It could plausibly be argued, however, that
the taxpayer's erroneous double taxation with respect to 1946 did not occur "in
respect of' any transaction upon which the basis of property depended, at least
in the sense that this statutory requirement.97 has been construed by some
courts.

InAmericanFoundationCo. v. Commissioner'98 for example, the taxpayer
treated a 1931 acquisition of stock as a nonrecognition transaction. The
government disputed this treatment, but the taxpayer ultimately prevailed. The
taxpayer had inconsistently reported subsequent sales of the stock received in
the 1931 transaction as if it had recognized gain on the 1931 transaction. The
court rejected the government's attempt to obtain a mitigation adjustment. In
addition to holding that the determination did not determine basis,'99 the court
also held that the erroneous understatement of capital gain in subsequent sales
did not occur in respect of a transaction on which basis depended-that is, the
acquisition of the stock in 1931-but rather in respect of the three transactions
in later years in which the stock was sold. 00 While this is logically defensible,
it overlooks the reality that the determination with respect to the 1931
transaction established the erroneous treatment of the later transactions in
closed years.
Another hypertechnical construction of the requirement that the error be
"in respect of' the transaction determining basis may be seen in O'Brien v.
United States.20 ' In this case the taxpayer's father was the sole shareholder of
a close corporation. The father made gifts of stock during his lifetime, but they
were brought back into his estate as "gifts made in contemplation of death."2 2
The estate valued the stock at $215.7796 per share. The IRS disputed this
valuation." 3 While that matter was pending, the corporation was liquidated and
the taxpayer reported his gain on the liquidation using a valuation of
$215.7796. 04 Later the Tax Court established the valuation of the stock at
$280.10 per share. 205 This determination also indicated that the taxpayer's basis
in calculating his gain on the liquidation had been too low and that he had paid
too much income tax. The tax he paid was incompatible with the estate tax paid

196. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text. For a fuller discussion of
American Foundation,see supra note 183.

197. See I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A) (1994).
198. 2 T.C. 502 (1943).
199. American Found., 2 T.C. at 508.
200. Id.
201. 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985).
202. Id. at 1040 (citing I.R.C. § 2035 (1954)).
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1014 (1994) (addressing the "[b]asis of property acquired
from a decedent").
205. 766 F.2d at 1040.
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by the estate on the stock.2" 6
The IRS denied the taxpayer's claim for a refund as untimely.0 7
Subsequently the taxpayer sued for a refund on the basis of the mitigation
provisions and prevailed.20 8 The appellate court reversed, holding, inter alia,
that the taxpayer's erroneous reporting of excessive capital gain did not occur
"in respect of' the transmission of the stock by the father through his estate,
which was at issue in the Tax Court proceeding in which basis was
determined. 2 The error occurred "in respect of' the liquidation of the
corporation."
Again, this construction of "in respect of' is not illogical and fosters a
restrictive scope ofthe I.R.C. § 1312(7) circumstance of adjustment. However,
it overlooks the inescapable link between the basis determination in the Tax
Court and the amount of the taxpayer's gain on the corporate liquidation. The
limitation of the scope of transactions "in respect of' the basis determination
to the estate tax valuation proceeding seems highly artificial.
A third case that demonstrates the harshness of a narrow scope of
transactions "in respect of" a transaction affecting basis is presented in Koss v.
United States.21 In Koss the taxpayer was a lawyer who agreed to perform
legal services in exchange for stock in a corporation. He received such stock
in 1974 and valued it at $4,400. In 1977 the stock became worthless, although
the taxpayer did not claim a deduction for such worthlessness in his return for
that year. In 1980 the IRS determined a deficiency of $44,788.05 against the
taxpayer for 1974 on the basis of valuing the stock at $110,000.212 Koss
petitioned the Tax Court, which upheld the IRS, and the appellate court upheld
that decision. 2 3 Following the sustaining of the deficiency for 1974, the
taxpayer sought a mitigation adjustment for 1977 under I.R.C. § 1312(7).214
Notwithstanding his failure to claim the loss in 1977 for the worthless
stock, the assertion by the taxpayer of the applicability of I.R.C. § 1312(7) was
not farfetched. The determination of the amount of income recognized by the
taxpayer on receipt ofthe stock necessarily determined the taxpayer's basis in
the stock. Taking an approach similar to the court in O'Brien,2 5 the court held

206. Mitigation could be rejected as a threshold matter if, as Steven J. Willis
strenuously contends, mitigation does not apply to inequitable inconsistencies between income
and estate taxes. Steven J. Willis, Some Limits ofEquitable Recoupment, Tax Mitigation, and
ResJudicata:Reflections Promptedby Chertkofv. United States, 38 TAXLAW. 625,626 (1985).
207. O'Brien v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1985).
208. O'Brien v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 203, 208 (C.D. Ill. 1984).
209. O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1043.
210. Id.

211. 69 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 1995).
212. Id. at 706-07.
213. Id. at 707 (citing Koss v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 882 (1989), aff'd,
908 F.2d 962 (3d Cir. 1990)).
214. Id. at 709.
215. Indeed, the Koss court relied on O'Brien.Koss, 69 F.3d at 710 (citing O'Brien
v. United States, 766 F.2d 1038, 1043).
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the erroneous failure to take a deduction for the worthless stock in 1977 was
not "in respect of' the acquisition of the stock in 1974.216
Koss concededly does not present as compelling an example of the
harshness of the "in respect of' requirement as American Foundation or
O'Brien.1 7 The taxpayer in Koss was simply attempting to avail himself of the
fortuity of the later worthlessness of the stock in order to offset the effects of
his failure to report properly its value in the year of receipt. On the other hand,
the government reaped what was essentially a windfall because it had to reckon
with only one end of a continuum pertaining to the stock at issue. The
determination of its value on receipt logically determined the magnitude of the
taxpayer's loss on the worthlessness of the stock.
The construction of the requirement that the error occur "in respect of' a
transaction on which basis depends has caused courts to disregard windfalls
logically related to determinations that have affected basis. This approach
would likely have yielded a different result in Rosenberger.The offset therein
of dividends against the taxpayer's refund for 1947 recouped erroneous
exclusions of the dividends in years long closed. The taxpayer's mitigation
claim for 1946 related to the effect that retroactive characterization of these
amounts as dividends had on her basis.2 8 Under the reasoning of American
Foundationor O'Brienit could be argued that the erroneous basis reductions,
not the erroneous mischaracterizations of dividends, resulted in erroneous
reporting of income in 1946. Thus the erroneous amount of gain for 1946
would not be "in respect of' the mischaracterization of dividends, the
transactions on which basis depended.
The basis portion of the mitigation provisions is, of course, intended to be
narrow. Unfortunately, this narrowness thwarts adjustments for anomalies that
warrant correction. Cases such as Rosenbergerand Gooding indicate that this
narrow construction has not been applied with complete consistency, but
consistency would probably be too much to expect for a provision as complex
as the basis provision.
C. ConfusionAbout What Constitutesan Inconsistency ThatInvokes the
MitigationProvisions
Most of the circumstances of adjustment require that the party against
whom a mitigation adjustment is sought must have acted inconsistently (1) in
connection with the original erroneous tax treatment of an item and (2) in

216. Koss, 69 F.3d at 710-11.
217. Certainly taxpayers in the circumstances of Koss may file a protective claim for
refund as to the later year. There is no guarantee that taking such action will not result ultimately
in two different suits, one to determine the value of the stock in the year of receipt and one to
determine whether the stock became worthless in the later year in which taxpayer seeks a
deduction.
218. United States v. Rosenberger, 235 F.2d 69, 72 (8th Cir. 1956).
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connection with the determination that establishes such treatment as error. 9
This restriction ostensibly serves an overriding congressional objective that
mitigation provide only a narrow exception to limitations-that it serve only
to correct inequitable attempts to use the statute of limitations as a shield.
A construction of the term "inconsistency" that requires active and
deliberate inconsistent conduct, if applied uniformly, would indeed serve the
policy of supporting the statute of limitations and engender predictable results
in mitigation cases. The Senate Finance Committee long ago made clear the
appropriateness of such a construction of the inconsistency requirement. "To
preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of limitations,
corrective adjustments should ... never modify the application of the statute
except when the party or parties in whose favor it applies shall have justified
such modification by active inconsistency.""
Unfortunately, at least with respect to the objective of "check[ing] the
growing volume of litigation," the Senate report also aims mitigation at
inconsistency "whether fortuitous or the result ofdesign."' Although this may
be logically taken to mean simply that active inconsistency need not be part of
a prearranged scheme, hatched at the time of the original error, this is not the
only sensible interpretation of the statement. The statement may also be taken
to mean that a benefit derived by acquiescence in inconsistent treatment of a
transaction may result in a mitigation adjustment. This interpretation is tenuous
in light of the general tone of the history, legislative and otherwise, of the
mitigation provisions, but some courts have embraced it.' The split ofjudicial
authority on this point has compromised the benefits that a restrictively drawn
statute is supposed to achieve.
A relatively recent example of the restrictive view of the inconsistency
requirement is F. W. Boelter Co. v. UnitedStates.'2 In that case the taxpayer,
in 1982, discovered an error in the manner in which it had computed the value
of its inventory for taxable years 1975 through 1981. These errors resulted in
overstatement of income for those years. The taxpayer filed amended returns
claiming refunds for tax years 1979 through 1981.224 In 1983 the IRS allowed
refunds in accordance with the amended returns. The taxpayer then filed
amended returns claiming refunds for tax years 1975 through 1978. These

219. Maintenance of an inconsistent position is not required when an adjustment is
sought on account of double exclusion of an item ofgross income under I.R.C. § 1312(3)(B) and
double disallowance of a deduction or credit under I.R.C. § 1312(4). I.R.C. § 1311 (b)(1) (1994).
220. S. REP. No. 75-1567, at49 (1938). Some insight into what the Committee meant
by "active" inconsistency may be gleaned from language earlier in the same paragraph which
excoriates active exploitation of opportunities available only by "assum[ing] a position
diametrically opposed to that taken prior to the running of the statute." Id.
221. Id.
222. See F.W. Boelter Co. v. United States, 12 C. Ct. 120, 125 (1987).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 121.
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adjustments were denied on the basis of the statute of limitations.2 Although
the court agreed with the taxpayer that there had been a double inclusion of
income, it held in favor of the IRS on the basis that the agency had maintained
no active inconsistency in connection with the purported items ofadjustment 26
The taxpayer's arguments that the IRS was chargeable with the requisite
inconsistency were somewhat creative. In particular, the taxpayer relied on
Moultrie Cotton Mills v. United States," 7 which also involved inventory
valuations. The taxpayer inMoultrie hadbeen required to recompute inventory
values for past taxable years by Treasury regulations. The government allowed
refunds for these recomputations only in open years, not closed years."8 The
court held that denial of refunds as to closed years in the face of allowance of
refunds for open years constituted the inconsistency the mitigation provisions
required."'
In F. W. Boelter the court rejected application of Moultrie in part because
the case at hand, unlike Moultrie,did not involve recomputations mandated by
the IRS.23° More importantly, the court rejected application ofMoultrie because
any inconsistency between IRS acquiescence to adjustments for open years and
its refusal to allow adjustments in the closed years was not active
inconsistency."l The IRS, in allowing refunds for open years, simply
acquiesced to a position taken by the taxpayer. Although this position was
inconsistent with the taxpayer's earlier reporting of similar transactions in

225. Id. at 122. Initially the IRS agent erroneously allowed a refund for 1977, which
the IRS successfully sought to recover through a counterclaim. The taxpayer had recovered a
settlement from its former accounting firm equal to the tax overpayments the IRS had not
refunded, and had treated this recovery as income. Id.
226. Id. at 125.
227. 151 F. Supp. 482 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
228. Id. at 483.
229. Id. at 485. Although the court in F. W.Boelter did not address the point, the
stated reasoning of the court in Moultrie regarding the inconsistency is specious. Mitigation is
not based on any general requirement that similar items must be treated the same in different
years. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Philadelphia v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 899, 903 (1952),
afj'd, 205 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1953). For mitigation there must be an inconsistency between tax
treatment of an item established in a determination and treatment of the item in an earlier year.
Unless correction with respect to the earlier year affects another taxable year, see I.R.C.
§ 1314(a), other taxable years are unaffected. In Moultrie,while similar mistakes were made in
several years, they were not causally related to each other through shifting of income or
deduction from year to year.
230. F.W. Boelter Co., 12 Cl. Ct. at 125. The court stated:
To require that inventories be valued correctly and
consistently is no different than requiring that they be
reported properly and without mistake in the first
ifistance. The same requirement applies to all items
reported on federal tax returns. If an error is made, it
can be corrected unless the year is closed by the
statute of limitations.
231. Id.
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closed years-to which the IRS acquiesced by accepting the returns-such a
change of heart, at the behest of the taxpayer, was not the sort of active
inconsistency contemplated by the mitigation provisions. As the court stated,
the plaintiff "cannot originate and actively assert an inconsistent position and
then use that position to extricate [itself] from the defense of the statute of
limitations merely because the Commissioner passively accedes to plaintiff1's]
assertions.""
If one accepts the notion that any exception to the statute of limitations
should be narrow, the active inconsistency gloss to the inconsistent position
requirement of I.R.C. § 131 l(b) is sensible. This notion has been applied by
courts other than the former Court of Claims. 3 Unfortunately, as discussed
below, a number of courts have not insisted on active inconsistency as a
condition of a mitigation adjustment.
A stark rejection of the active inconsistency construction may be seen in
2 4 In that
Chertkofv. Commissioner."
case the taxpayer, in 1965, agreed to a
redemption of his stock in a corporation that owned a shopping center in
exchange for one third of the corporation's assets. The surrender of stock and
receipt of assets did not occur until 1966. The taxpayer reported capital gain for
that year. In 1969 the IRS audited the taxpayer's 1965 tax return and
determined that the transaction reported as capital gain in 1966 was actually a
dividend in 1965. At the same time, the IRS determined that the taxpayer's
reporting of the capital gain for 1966 resulted in an overpayment. The taxpayer
paid the deficiency for 1965 and filed a suit for refund. The taxpayer also
accepted the refund from the IRS voluntarily made for 1966.2s
The district court, in the refund action, had upheld the taxpayer's
contention that the taxable transaction occurred in 1966, not 1965.2.6 The
taxpayer's contention in connection with the determination was consistent with
his initial reporting of the transaction, though, of course, the taxpayer accepted
the refund by the IRS of tax he paid for 1966. Because the statute of limitations
had run with respect to the taxpayer's 1966 return at the time of the district
court's determination regarding 1965, the IRS had to rely on mitigation to
extricate itself from the consequences of its error concerning 1965.23'
The court squarely rejected the taxpayer's contention that mitigation was
not permitted under the circumstances because the taxpayerhad not maintained
inconsistent positions in reporting the transaction initially and then in the

232. F. W.Boelter Co., 12 CI. Ct. at 125 (quoting Glatt v. United States, 470 F.2d 596,
601 (Ct. Cl. 1972)).
233. See Commissioner v. Estate of Weinreich, 316 F.2d 97, 105 (9th Cir. 1963);
Sherover v. United States, 137 F. Supp. 778, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'dper curiam, 239 F.2d
766 (2d Cir. 1956); Estate of SoRelle v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 272, 275 (1958).
234. 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981).
235. Id. at 265-66.
236. Perma-Rock Prods., Inc. v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 159, 161 n.1 (D. Md.
1973).
237. Chertkof,649 F.2d at 266.
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district court suit. 8 The court looked at the statutory language and legislative
history to conclude:
[T]here is no requirement that the party who benefits from the
application of the statute of limitations must have maintained
a position inconsistent with that which it initially advanced.
It is only necessary that the position adopted in the
determination be inconsistent with the exclusion or deduction
in another year. 39
Thus the court required the taxpayer to report the transaction for 1966,
something the taxpayer had attempted to do before the statute of limitations had
run for that year but which the IRS error thwarted. 24
There is much to commend about the result in Chertkof The taxpayer
executed a taxable transaction that was reported and taxed before the statute of
limitations ran. Fairness commands that a taxpayer report such a transaction in
some year. Nevertheless, the legislative history of the mitigation provisions
'
evinces its unambiguous goal to "tak[e] the profit out of inconsistency."241
Chertkofserved no such purpose.
The taxpayer's position in the district court was consistent with its
reporting of the transaction. The only inconsistency involved was that between
the result sought by the IRS in district court and the result obtained. The court
in Chertkof permitted this "inconsistency" to allow the IRS to invoke
mitigation to attempt to tax the transaction in another year when it could have
preserved its right to do so through diligence before limitations ran.242 While

238. Id.
239. Id. at 267-68.
240. To add insult to injury, the court held that the transaction, as a dividend, was
taxable as ordinary income, substantially increasing the taxpayer's tax. Id. at 270.
241. S. REP. No.75-1567, at 49 (1938).
242. Under I.R.C. § 6503(a)(1) (1994), issuance of a notice of deficiency suspends
the running of the period of limitation.
The Tenth Circuit refused to take a similarly indulgent view toward the government
under somewhat analogous circumstances in Kent Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner,455 F.2d 316
(10th Cir. 1972). In this case the taxpayer received condemnation proceeds with respect to
housing it had constructed on land owned by the United States Army. The taxpayer's 1958 tax
year ended January 31, 1958. The agreement carrying out the condemnation was executed in
March 1958, which was in the taxpayer's 1959 year. The taxpayer contended that the transaction
should have been reported in 1963, when all legal proceedings among parties to the transaction
were concluded. Reporting in 1963 would have resulted in no tax. Id. at 317-18.
The IRS issued a deficiency for 1958. The district court, on the basis that
condemnation documents were not executed until March 1958, held that gain was reportable by
taxpayer for 1959. Id. at 660. The court held the IRS action was based on a misreading of the
facts in documents the IRS had before it. The Tenth Circuit refused to allow a mitigation
adjustment when the IRS attempted to open 1959 after losing in the district court with respect
to 1958. The court found no inconsistency on the part of the taxpayer, which consistently
asserted that 1963 was the proper year to report the transaction. Id. at 318-20.
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it may serve equity, the approach of Chertkof is contrary to the protection of
the statute of limitations supposedly served by a narrow scope of mitigation.
Nevertheless, this approach to the requirement of I.R.C. § 1311(b) of an
inconsistent position has been embraced by a number of courts at least
comparable to the number of courts that have embraced the "active
inconsistency" view.243 In light of the split of authority concerning how the
inconsistent position requirement shouldbe construed, this writer contends that
the current mitigation provisions fail significantly to obtain their objective of
providing a clear and limited exception to the statute of limitations.
D. The Tendency ofthe DeterminationRequirementto Spawn Redundant
Litigation
In order to obtain a mitigation adjustment the taxpayer or the government
must be able to point to a determination involving some tax treatment inone
year that contrasts inequitably with tax treatment of the same item or
transaction in a different closed year.' Such a determination may be a court
order,24 a closing agreement," a final disposition of a claim for refund, 7 or
an agreement pertaining to a person's tax liability for any taxable period.248 The
determination requirement is intended to give "authoritative sanction to the
inconsistent action."" 9 In the words of one commentator, the determination

The approach of Chertkof,if applied in Kent Homes, might have yielded a different
result. The result in the district court-that 1959 was the proper year to report the
transaction-was inconsistent with taxpayer's reporting of the transaction. The court noted,
however, that "there is no evidence of actual inconsistent positions by the taxpayer, nor is there
evidence that the taxpayer used any devious means to avoid the mitigation section with
knowledge withheld from the government." Id. at 320. The court required that the inconsistency
be in the conduct of the taxpayer.
243. See Yagoda v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1961); H.T. Hackney Co. v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 101 (Ct.
CI. 1948); Albert W. Priest Trust v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 221 (1946).
244. I.R.C. § 1311 (1994).
245. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(1) (1994).
246.- I.R.C. § 1313(a)(2).
247. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(3).
248. I.R.C. § 1313(a)(4). The usefulness of this procedure, as described in the
regulations, would appear to be quite limited. The agreement pertains to the tax consequences
of the closed year and does not become determinative as to such consequences until the tax
liability of the open year becomes final. Treas. Reg. § 1.1313(a)-4(d) (1999). Either the taxpayer
or the IRS may pursue positions as to the open year at variance with what they pursued as to the
closed year; if such position prevails the agreement as to the closed year is revoked. Id. See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.1314(b)-1(d) (1999) (providing that if revocation occurs, "any overpayment or
deficiency resulting from such redetermination shall be refunded or credited, or assessed and
collected.").
It would seem that the only circumstance in which such an agreement might be used
efficaciously is when the taxpayer and the government make an agreement as to the closed year
in coordination with a closing agreement as to the open year.
249. S. REp. No. 75-1567, at 50 (1938).
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6
consolidate claims and issues to avoid multiple litigation." The mitigation

provisions were adopted before much of this development, and were amended
to skirt the doctrine ofresjudicataY7 In much of the world outside the maze of
the mitigation provisions, if a party is aware that a right or interest may be
affected in a proceeding she must bring this awareness to the fore or suffer the
consequences of her failure to do so."

256. See, for example, FLEMING JAMES, JR., ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (4th ed.
1992), which states:
As the rules of litigation have changed in the
evolution of modern procedure, so have the rules of
resjudicata. The changes in thejoinder and discovery
rules have come about through statutes and rules of
court. The corresponding changes in the rules of res
judicata have been developed almost entirely through
decisional law that evolved in the wake of these
legislative reforms.... As the rules of procedure
have expanded the scope of the initial opportunity to
litigate, they have invited a corresponding expansion
of the extent to which that opportunity forecloses a
subsequent opportunity.
Id.
257. I.R.C. § 1311(a) (1994) (permitting a mitigation adjustment notwithstanding res
judicata by stating "correction of the effect of the error.., is prevented by the operation of any
law or rule of law").
In UnitedMine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 722-24 (1966), the Supreme Court,
in addressing pendent jurisdiction, discussed the scope of the unit of litigation before the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938-the same year in which Congress
enacted the mitigation provisions. The Court used as an example the case ofBaltimoreSteamship
Co. v. Phillips,274 U.S. 316 (1927), which described a cause of action as "the violation of but
one right by a single legal wrong." Id. at 321. The federal rules have generally expanded res
judicata so that it applies the "same transaction or occurrence" requirement on a broader scope.
See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.4 (2d ed. 1993).
258. An exquisitely harsh demonstration of the willingness of the federal courts to
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
apply this rule maybe seen inFederatedDepartment
The Court in that case prohibited a party from sharing in his co-parties' success on appeal
because the party failed to appeal an unsuccessful result below. Justice Rehnquist professed no
remorse at the result:
The Court of Appeals also rested its opinion in part
on what it viewed as "simple justice." But we do not
see the grave injustice which would be done by the
application of accepted principles of res judicata.
"Simplejustice" is achieved when a complexbody of
law developed over a period ofyears is evenhandedly
applied. The doctrine of res judicata serves vital
public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc
determination of the equities in a particular case.
There is simply "no principle of law or equity which
sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the
salutary principle of resjudicata."
Id. at 401 (quoting Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946)).
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"definitively establishes the correct treatment of an item or transaction in the
open year and, by so doing, the existence of an error in the treatment of the
same item or relevant transaction in another year."25 The determination starts
running the one-year clock for seeking a mitigation adjustment.25'
The determination requirement makes sense only if one decides to address
problems of inequitably inconsistent tax treatment only after such treatment has
been set in stone, leaving the "victim" of such inconsistency to seek redress in
a later, sometimes judicial and sometimes duplicative, procedure. Although a
party to a proceeding in which a determination occurs may often possess
knowledge that the determination will create a result incompatible with some
other year, and may often take steps to prevent such consequences, 252 such a
party may also save his ammunition for a later affray-that is, he may allow an
open year to become closed and then seek mitigation. 3
The circumstances of adjustment in which mitigation is permitted under
I.R.C. § 1312 effectively require a close transactional or factual relationship
between the matter resolved in the determination and the matter in which one
seeks a mitigation adjustment. This transactional or factual relationship is not
unlike the relationship between a claim and a compulsory counterclaim under
Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under that rule, if the
defendant has a compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff, one that arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiffs claim, the defendant
must assert the counterclaim or it is thereafter barred.5 4 Liberal joinder rules,
some of them mandatory,"5 have marched hand-in-hand with an everexpanding scope of the doctrines of former adjudication, namely res judicata
and collateral estoppel, to encourage and sometimes compel litigants to

250. SALTZMAN, supranote 27, 5.07[3].
251. I.R.C. § 1314(b) (1994).
252. Although the Tax Court may determine the tax consequences only with respect
to years as to which the IRS has determined a deficiency, see NINA J.CRIMM, TAX COURT
LITIGATION-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2.2[2][a][iv] (1996), it may consider facts with
relation to taxes for other years to determine correctly the amount of such deficiency. I.R.C.
§ 6214(b) (1994).
As to open years, the IRS may assert new deficiencies and the taxpayer may file
claims for refund, even if only of a protective nature. See Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank of Green
Bay v. United States, 330 F.2d 635, 639 (Ct. Cl. 1964); see also SALTZMAN, supra note 27,
11.08[3] (stating that "[a] claim for refund may be filed to protect a potential right to receive
a refund contingent on the occurrence of a future event").
253. Coleman, supranote 28, at 1592-93.
254. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 564 (5th ed. 1994).

255. Rule 13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as noted above, effectively
requires the defendant to assert a compulsory counterclaim against the plaintiff. FED. R. CIV. P.
13(a). Rule 14(a) similarly requires a plaintiff, under some circumstances, to assert a claim
against a third-party defendant. FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a). The Supreme Court has held that if a party
wishes to bind strangers to a suit by its result, she must join such persons under Rule 19. See
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763-65 (1989).
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It is doubtful that there have been many situations involving mitigation,
particularly when it is sought by the taxpayer, in which the party seeking
mitigation was unaware of the inequitable inconsistency that a determination
would bring about before such determination occurred. Yet a party is under no
obligation to inform the tribunal or adversary of the possibility that a
determination may result in more related litigation. In many cases, of course,
the tribunal under current law would not be able to do anything about closed
years.
The modem trend with respect to res judicata is embodied in the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which provides that a judgment
extinguishes "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with
respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions,
out of which the action arose., 25 9 In determining what facts comprise a
transaction, the Restatement looks to whether facts are "related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether
their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business
understanding or usage.
Such a grouping neatly describes the relationship of transactions to which
mitigation applies. Although any two transactions in different years that yield
an inequitable inconsistency may not represent one "cause of action" as that
term was understood in former times, they nonetheless involve separate tax
liabilities in separate years, thus triggering the temporal and motivational
relationships of the Restatement test.
For example, assume a taxpayer wishes to deduct fully a bad debt pursuant
to I.R.C. § 166. She is unsure whether it became worthless in 1992 or 1993.
She chooses 1993. After the statute of limitations has expired on 1992, the IRS
denies the deduction for 1993 contending that it became worthless in 1992.
Surely an inquiry as to whether the deduction is proper for 1992 or 1993 would
"form a convenient trial unit" in the parlance of the Restatement. 26' A tribunal,
in considering the propriety of the deduction for 1993, may not really pick one
year or the other because the tribunal may not award a deduction for 1992 if it
invalidates the deduction for 1993. Under mitigation, only another tribunal may
do so.
Concededly, instances may arise in which an inquiry involving transactions
may not involve a simple choosing of the proper year for a deduction. A
complete trial may have to be held about a transaction in one year. Alternative
treatment of the same item in another year may be governed by the result of
such trial. The approach of modem rules of procedure is to adjudicate

ET AL.,

259. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFJUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982), quotedin FRIEDENTHAL
supra note 257, § 14.4, at 629.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982).
261. Id.
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contingent but related claims in separate trials, 262 not separate lawsuits.
Although the determination requirement reflects Congress's desire in 1938 to
require solemn establishment of error with respect to a closed year before it
may be reopened, now is the time to assess whether the mechanism for
reopening a closed year should reflect six decades of new learning about res
judicata andjudicial economy. The determination requirement runs contrary to
such learning. This requirement has allowed taxpayers and the government, by
design or inattention, to concoct unnecessary litigation or has necessitated such
litigation even for attentive parties.
Several cases demonstrate this. For example, in OlinMathieson Chemical
Corp.v. United States,263 the taxpayer sought a mitigation adjustment to deduct
a capital loss for tax year 1945. The taxpayer hadpreviously deducted the same
loss as an ordinary loss in tax year 1944. The government disallowed it as an
ordinary loss, declaring it to be a long-term capital loss instead. The district
court upheld the decision in a refund suit by the taxpayer. When that judgment
became final in 1956, the taxpayer sought to carryover the capital loss to 1945.
The government defended by way of the statute of limitations. 2"
In the taxpayer's second suit for refund the court allowed the taxpayer to
use the mitigation provisions to carryover the loss to 1945.265 Although the
second decision cured an inequity, the court may have exerted unnecessary
effort. At the time of the first judgment in 1956, the taxpayer was probably
aware that if its 1944 ordinary loss was recharacterized as a capital loss, the
taxpayer did not have enough capital gains against which to offset the loss
advantageously.266 In this case it is apparent that if the taxpayer were
unsuccessful as to characterization of the loss then it would need to carry the
loss back or forward to some other year. In 1956 this prior year might well
have been barred by limitations. It would have been more efficient to permit the
district court in 1956 to address the consequences of its recharacterization of
the taxpayer's 1944 loss than to have the parties, and perhaps another court,
revisit the matter in 1959.
Unfortunately, the mitigation rules do not always promote such efficiency.
If the capital loss for the 1945 tax year was barred at the time of the first district
court suit in 1956, the determination requirement of I.R.C. § 1311 would have

262. See FED. R. Cv. P. 42(b); see also FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., supra note 257, § 6.6,
at 347 (noting that "[m]odem rules also authorize thejoinder of prospective claims, even when,
had the claims been prosecuted separately, rendition of a favorable judgment on one of them
would have been required before litigation could proceed on the other").
263. 265 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1959).
264. Id. at 296. The government resisted mitigation on the basis that since the capital
loss deduction was allowed for 1944, albeit without tax effect, no double disallowance of a
deductionhad occurred (the circumstance ofadjustment upon which the taxpayer relied). Id.; see
I.R.C. § 1312(4) (1994). The court rejected this argument.
265. Id. at 297.
266. See I.R.C. § 1211 (a) (1994), which like its predecessor, I.R.C. § 117(d) (1939),
limits deduction of capital losses for corporations.
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made the parties spin their wheels again. Although litigants in other
circumstances are generally required by the ever-expanding doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel to be attentive to preclusive effects of
judgments, the determination requirement at times virtually mandates just the
opposite-duplicative litigation.
Had the mitigation rules permitted the taxpayer in OlinMathiesonto assert
both its contentions about deduction of the ordinary loss for 1944 and the same
loss as a capital loss carryover to 1945, the latter would be asserted only if the
former were unsuccessful.267 Common law would not have permitted
simultaneous assertion of such alternative bases of recovery. 268 Although
modem pleading rules do allow a party to hedge her bets by pleading
alternatively, 269 the ability to assert alternative claims does not generally permit
a party to assert usefully a barred claim as an alternative claim. Mitigation,
however, is the obvious exception. The notion that the policy underlying the
statute of limitations would be unduly compromised by permitting a party who
has a barred contingent claim to call it to the attention of the court for whatever
value comparing the open and barred claims may have, and perhaps then to
adjudicate it, seems quite far-fetched. This situation flies in the face of how
litigation is otherwise conducted at the close of the twentieth century.
The futility of requiring a second tribunal to address what is essentially the
same controversy may also be seen in Benenson v. United States.2 Benenson
involved one of the remarkable artifices taxpayers employed to manufacture
interest deductions in the era of the 91% marginal tax rate.27' In 1955 taxpayers
"borrowed" $2 million to purchase 1.875% Treasury notes. The taxpayers paid
and deducted $67,550 in interest in 1955. In 1956 the taxpayers "sold" the
bonds to the broker who had "purchased" them for his account and received a
check which was $7,550 more than the "interest" he had paid in 1955. The
taxpayers reported a capital gain for 1956 in that amnount. 27 2

In 1959, on audit, the IRS disallowed the 1955 interest deduction. The
court agreed with the IRS that the loan transaction lacked substance.273 As an
alternative position the taxpayers sought to deduct their out-of-pocket cost of
the transaction in 1956, the year in which it was closed. Since 1956 was barred
by the statute of limitations, and since the taxpayer in the district court was
litigating the validity of the 1955 deduction (which the court was
simultaneously rejecting), the taxpayers were unable to avail themselves of

267. 265 F.2d at 293.
268. FRIEDENTHAL ETAL., supra note 257, § 5.12, at 266.
269. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
270. 257 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 385 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
271. For 1955 the maximum marginal tax rate was 91%. I.R.C. § 1 (1954).
272. 257 F. Supp. at 104-05.
273. Id. at 107. The broker from whom the taxpayers supposedly borrowed the
purchase price of the bonds did not have funds sufficient to make such a loan. The broker had
purchased the bonds short; thus, thebonds were never delivered to or on behalf of the taxpayers.
Id. at 104-05.
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beneficial tax treatment flowing from rejection of their primary objective. The
taxpayers could only avail themselves of any tax benefit for 1956 through
mitigation. Since at the time the 1955 deduction was itself at issue, there was
no determination for that year.27
The Benenson court noted that the taxpayers were offered a chance by the
IRS to execute a closing agreement concerning 1955 that would have enabled
them to seek an adjustment concerning 1956.275 However, such an agreement,
which under I.R.C. § 1313(a)(2) would have provided the determination
required for a mitigation adjustment, would have conceded the primary basis
ofthe taxpayers' attack on the treatment of the multiyear transaction-probably
too high of a price for the taxpayer to pay for judicial economy. Thus it seems
that delaying a taxpayer's alternative quest for "half a loaf' may require
another tribunal to address the same transaction.
The decision in Prentis v. United States276 also demonstrates how the
determination requirement may engender redundant litigation. In this case the
elderly principals of a corporation engaged in construction and civil
engineering wishedto transfer the business to youngerpersons. They organized
a new corporation, to be controlled by younger employees of the old
corporation, and "sold" the equipment of the old corporation to the new. The
old corporation paid tax on this sale.277
In the next tax year, the new corporation took depreciation on the
equipment it had "bought" from the old corporation at its market value at the
time of sale. In rejecting depreciation deductions on that basis,278 the
government contended that transfer of assets to the new entity constituted a taxfree reorganization,279 thus requiring depreciation of assets under the old
company's lower basis.2"'
The court upheld the government's contention concerning the asset basis.
The taxpayer sought to recover the payment of tax on the purported sale of
assets by the old company, which would not have been imposed in a transfer
pursuant to a reorganization. Although the Second Circuit stated in an earlier
consideration of the transaction that such payment of tax was erroneous and
" ' the
urged that the taxpayers be permitted to so contend on remand,28
trial court
refused to entertain this issue because of the determination requirement.282
274. Berensen v. United States, 257 F. Supp. 101,112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 385
F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967).
275. Id. at 112.
276. 273 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
277. Id. at 465-68.
278. Prentis v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 449,456 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); see also Turner
Constr. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 525, 531 (2d Cir. 1966) (remanding an earlier decision
of the district court in the same case).
279. See I.R.C. § 112(b)(4) (1939). The current version of this statute is located at
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (1994).
280. Prenis,273 F. Supp. at 476-77.
281. Turner Constr. Co., 364 F.2d at 538-39.
282. Prentis,273 F. Supp. at 479.
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The remarkable extent to which the determination requirement may
frustrate efficient and equitable resolution of disputes pertaining to a multiyear
transaction may be seen in O'Donnellv. Belcher.283 In this case the taxpayers
were partners in a venture that sold a tract of land in 1950. The partnership
reacquired the land in a foreclosure sale in 1953, realizing a capital gain that
the partners did not report as income. The 1950 purchaser transferred its right
of redemption to the partnership in 1954.284 In 1959 the IRS issued deficiency
notices to the taxpayers for 1953. Taxpayers contested these notices in
consolidated cases in the Tax Court, which the court decided on January 8,
1965. The Tax Court held that there was no gain for 1953.28 s One of the
partners proceeded in the district court with other issues, and that court in 1963
decided the reacquisition of the tract resulted in a taxable gain in 1954 for the
taxpayer.2" 6 The IRS issued deficiency notices to all of the partners for 1954 on
January 22, 1964. These deficiencies were paid by the taxpayers on August 20,
1964. Taxpayers filed claims for refund on February 25, 1965, asserting that
the assessments they paid had been barredby limitations. On May 16, 1966 the
government amended its answer in the taxpayers' refund suit to assert its
entitlement to a mitigation adjustment for 1954. The government did not issue
another deficiency notice to the taxpayers within one year after the finality of
the Tax Court's decision on April 8, 1965, as required by I.R.C. § 1314(b)."8 7
Before that time the IRS had asserted that it was entitled to tax for 1954 if
it was not so entitled for 1953. However, it had asserted deficiencies for 1954
in January, 1964 before the final April, 1965 Tax Court decision, which would
have been the determination upon which a mitigation adjustment might have
been based. It is not surprising that the IRS failed to issue new deficiency
notices after finality of the Tax Court decision, because by that time the
taxpayers had already filed claims for refund that raised precisely the same
issue, tax liability for 1954. These claims were the subject of a refund suit. The
court held that a deficiency notice before the determination was not sufficient
to permit mitigation.2 "
The predicament in which the government found itselfwas at least in part
a product of the reliance of the mitigation scheme on setting an inequity in
stone before allowing a corrective adjustment. Particularly following the 1963
district court decision, which involved one of the partners, it should have been
apparent that ifpartnership gain on the foreclosure was not taxable in 1953, the
issue in the Tax Court proceeding, it must have been taxable in 1954. Since

283. 414 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1969).
284. Id. at 834.
285. Thisjudgment became final on April 8, 1965. O'Donnell,414 F.2d at 840. See
Belcher v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 13 (1965).
286. Abernathy v. Patterson, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9678 (N.D. Ala. 1963). The
court offset tax on such gain against refunds otherwise due the taxpayers for 1952, 1954, and
1955. Id.
287. O'Donnell,414 F.2d at 836, 844.
288. Id. at 841-42.
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1954 was otherwise barred while the Tax Court proceeding was pending, the
IRS could not really have urged the Tax Court to resolve the question of the
appropriate year to report the income. The government had to abide by the
result in Tax Court. Unfortunately for the government, the IRS acted
prematurely.
O'Donnell is unusual only in that the redundant proceedings were
commenced before the detennination. O'Donnellhas been analyzed before,. 9
with the analysis essentially viewing the unfortunate result as amatter ofpoorly
timed strategy on the part of the government."9 Though this analysis may be
correct, it is contended herein that the current determination requirement, in
necessitating the creation of an inequity before it may be corrected, fosters
unnecessary litigation.29' Litigation is unnecessary, as are other administrative
proceedings to resolve inequities, because inequities occasioned by an earlier
determination might have been resolved more efficiently in the course of those
earlier proceedings that resulted in the determination.
IV. RECOUPMENT: THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED

A. Development ofRecoupment in the Supreme Court
Before Congress created the mitigation provisions, the primary method of
correcting injustices wrought by limitations was recoupment, first applied by
the Supreme Court to the modem revenue law in Bull v. United States. 92
Courts now refer to this method as equitable recoupment. Courts choosing to
fashion some sort of remedy for some inequitable circumstances is certainly
understandable. Nevertheless, judicial application of equitable recoupment
historically evinces a strong desire to keep the equity genie in the bottle
because a genie who possesses equitable powers threatens values dear to the
law of taxation and, indeed, the entire federal system. These threatened values
include the annual accounting principle,293 limitation of actions, and its
esteemed relative, sovereign immunity. Thus, in the absence of any statutory
sanction for judicial employment of recoupment, the courts have more often
rejected its application. Thisjudicial restrictiveness has resulted to some degree
from a mistaken assumption that recoupment is necessarily equitable in
character. This Article contends that most legitimate qualms about recoupment

289. See Bell, supra note 23, at 565-71.
290. Id. at 570.
291. See Blomhv. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,106 (S.D. Ala. 1993)
(holding thatBlomh v. Commissioner,994 F.2d 1542 (1 th Cir. 1993), must become final before
the court would rule). Other cases show the potential for such litigation. See Farmer v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 435 (1998); Vaughn v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 677
(1991).
292. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
293. See, e.g., North Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932); Bumet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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in tax cases would be alleviated by legislative authorization of a carefully
detailed form of recoupment in tax cases.
1.

What is Recoupment?

The short and obvious answer to this question portends trouble:
recoupment, before the notion of counterclaim came into fashion under modem
rules of procedure, was one method by which parties who had mutual claims
avoided a multiplicity ofactions.294 The trouble portended is that understanding

recoupment entails understanding a procedure that has limited application in
contemporary litigation.295 It is awkward to explain, and even more so to
defend, modem application of a procedure that has generally been long
supplanted.296 No doubt adaptation of an old doctrine to contemporary litigation
breeds confusion.
The leading treatise on former practice concerning mutual claims describes
recoupment as follows:
A defense by way of recoupment denies the validity of the
plaintiff's cause of action to so large an amount as he alleges
he is entitled to. It is not an independent cross claim like a
separate and distinct debt or item of account due from the
plaintiff; but is confined to matters arising out of, or
connected with, the contract or transaction which forms the
basis of the plaintiff's claim.297
One may glean the following three points from this definition: (1)

294. See, e.g., 24 RULING CASE LAW Set-off and Counterclaim § 3 (William M.
McKinney et al. eds., 1929); JAMES ET AL., supra note 256, § 9.9.
295. See FRIEDENTHALETAL., supranote 257, § 6.7. The authors discuss howmodem
counterclaim practice is quite different from former practice, when recoupment and the related
doctrine of setoff held sway, and note that modem counterclaim practice reflects expanded
notions ofjoinder and res judicata.
296. The same is true ofrecoupment's procedural relative, setoff, which has also been
conscripted to fill a contemporary role in federal taxation-a role that does not very closely
resemble the role it played before the adoption of counterclaim rules. See Lewis v. Reynolds,
284 U.S. 281 (1932). Professor Steven J. Willis, no doubt the leading contemporary authority
on multiyear anomalies in taxation, has confessed a temptation to describe the Supreme Court's
distinction between setoff and recoupment in the tax context as "laughable." See Willis, supra
note 206, at 633 n.63.
While the distinctions may be unclear today, setoff and recoupment in their former
contexts had clearly defined roles. At common law recoupment was available only to defeat or
diminish a plaintiffs recovery, and such a claim had to arise out of the same transaction as that
to which plaintiff's claim related. A setoff allowed affirmative recovery and might entail
assertion of claims unrelated to the transaction on which plaintiffs claim was based. See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 257, § 6.7, at 349.
297. THOMASW. WATERMAN, ATREATISEONTHELAWOF SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT, AND

COUNTER-CLAIM § 424, at 471 (1869) (footnote omitted).
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recoupment is asserted defensively, (2) recoupment serves only to reduce the
claim of the plaintiff, and (3) recoupment must relate to the basis of the
plaintiff's claim. These elements have largely been carried over to modem
definitions of recoupment for purposes of internal revenue taxation.293 An
undercurrent to recoupment has been deftly, if somewhat polemically,

298. A number of scholars have defined equitable recoupment for tax purposes. For
example, Professor Camilla E. Watson defines recoupment as "a limited equitable remedy
allowing a defendant to mitigate or defeat a plaintiff's claim for damages when there was no
statute that directly prevented its application, and when the defendant affirmatively claimed that
damages should be reduced, in whole or in part, because of an earlier payment or recovery."
Camilla E. Watson, Equitable Recoupment: Revisiting an Old and Inconsistent Remedy, 65
FoRDHAM L. REv. 691, 713 (1996) (footnote omitted).
Like most scholars of recoupment, Professor Watson "defines" recoupment
functionally, as a list of elements:
Based on four Supreme Court cases, two important
elements determine the applicability of equitable
recoupment: (1) an inconsistency based on a single
transaction and (2) a single taxpayer or an identity of
interest sufficient to consider two taxpayers a single
unit. A third element has emerged from the
subsequent lower court cases-two different
taxes ....
Id. at 734-35.
Professor James E. Tierney states that "[e]quitable recoupment allows a party to use
atax related claim, barred by the statute of limitations, as a defense to another party's timely taxrelated claim, where the two claims arise out of the same transaction or taxable event." James
E. Tierney, EquitableRecoupment Revisited: The Scope ofthe Doctrine in Federal Tax Cases
after United States v. Dalm, 80 KY. L.J. 95, 101-02 (1991) (footnote omitted).
Professor Arthur W. Andrews's description ofequitable recoupment is tied closely to
case law development:
Usually, equitable recoupment is potentially available
as a remedy where two different types of taxes are
implicated, at least one ofwhich is not an income tax.
These two tax cases may usefully be further divided
into two different categories or models. The first
category is where an item of receipt, expenditure or
other transaction is potentially subject to one of two
taxes, but not both ....
The other category is one in
which two taxes operate, in a given situation,
independently in the sense that a determination that
there is, for example, a deficiency in one tax pretty
much automatically means that there is an
overpayment of the other tax.
Arthur W. Andrews, Modern-DayEquitableRecoupment andthe "Two Tax Effect: "Avoidance
ofthe Statutes ofLimitation in FederalTax Controversies,28 ARIz. L. REV.595, 623-24 (1986)
(footnote omitted).
David N. McConnell defines recoupment more traditionally, stating that "[t]he word
'recoupment' is derived from the French 'recouper'--'to cut again.' It signifies the right or act
of making a reduction, defalcation, or discount by the defendant to the claim of the plaintiff."
David N. McConnell, The Doctrine ofRecoupment In FederalTaxation, 28 VA. L. REv.577,
577-78 (1942). Unlike others who define this doctrine, Mr. McConnell disputes that its nature
is equitable. Id. at 580-8 1.
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identified by Professor Steven J. Willis:
The theory begins with the premise that two wrongs can
make a right. Recoupment, rather than extending the statute
of limitations to correct a perceived injustice, permits a
wronged party to recoup the loss against a sum still open to
litigation. This does not correct the wrong, as does the
mitigation statute, but instead causes a later matter to be
equally wrong in the opposite direction.2
The present author concedes Professor Willis's point that application of
recoupment in tax cases violates the universal parental admonition-two
wrongs don't make a right. What is intrinsically wise and good on the
playground, however, may be less so in the field of taxation, particularly when
the correction method that purports to make both wrongs right, mitigation, has
proved over six decades to be so cumbersome. The Supreme Court, in its most
recent discussion of recoupment, summed up its jurisprudence by providing
"that a party litigating a tax claim in a timely proceeding may, in that
proceeding, seek recoupment of a related, and inconsistent, but now timebarred tax claim relating to the same transaction."3 "0 The important elements
of this statement are the defensive nature of recoupment and that it must be
sought with respect to a particular transaction by a party to such transaction.30 '
2. How the Supreme Court has Come to View Recoupment from
such a JaundicedPerspective
Analysis of Supreme Court decisions addressing recoupment reveals the
development of a gradual uneasiness with its application in tax matters. This
uneasiness is largely because application ofrecoupment has come to be viewed
as the exercise of equity jurisdiction as equity jurisdiction was understood
before the merger of law and equity in modem court systems." 2 Equity powers
are construed broadly, giving a court free-wheeling discretion to remedy
injustice.0 3 However, viewing the allowance of recoupment in tax matters as
299. Willis, supra note 206, at 633.
300. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990).
301. The Supreme Court itself has actually held that recoupment may be applied
against a party who, while not formally a party to the barred claim, has an identity of interest
with one of the parties to such claim. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 537 (1937).
302. This merger occurred in the federal court system with the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. FED. R. Civ. P. 2 advisory committee's note. See also
WRIGHT, supra note 254, § 67 (discussing the Supreme Court's move to "one form of action").
303. This discretion was described by Professor Dobbs:
Discretion of equity courts is long established. It
makes possible decisions that are flexible, intuitive,
and tailored to the particular case. It also makes
possible decisions that are unanalyzed, unexplained,
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akin to such powers has overlooked the limited character of the remedy, as well
as its common law heritage.
The Court's first application of recoupment in a tax case, Bull v. United
States,3° involved no such misconceptions. In Bull a member of a calendaryear partnership that involved no invested capital died on February 13, 1920.
With the concurrence of the decedent's personal representative, the business of
the partnership continued until December 31, 1920.305 The decedent's share of
the profits of the business to the date of his death was $24,124.20.306 Under the
partnership agreement, the estate was paid $200,117.99 in 1920 and $12,601.70
in 1921, these payments representing profits of the business from the
decedent's death until the end of the year.30 7
In valuing the decedent's estate, the Commissioner included both the right
to the amount of profits accrued to the decedent's death and payments
attributable to the remainder of the year, resulting in an estate tax of
$41,517.45. This estate tax was paid in June and August of 1921.308
In April 1921 the estate filed an income tax return that did not report as
income the partnership profits paid following the decedent's death,
$200,117.99. In July 1925 the Commissioner determined that the $200,117.99
represented taxable income for the estate for 1920. The estate appealed this
determination to the Board of Tax Appeals, which upheld the Commissioner.
The estate paid the tax in April 1928. 30
In July 1928 the estate filed a claim for refund contending that the
postdeath profits represented corpus of the estate and had previously been
determined as such by the Commissioner. The Commissioner denied the
claim.310 The estate then sued in the Court of Claims,3 seeking alternatively
either a refund of income tax predicated on the Commissioner's contention that
postdeath profits represented income to the estate or credit of the estate tax
allocable to such profits that had been paid by the estate. The Court of Claims
and un-thoughtful. The precise role for discretion of
judges has not been worked out. Discretion of the
chancellor originated in a society where authority
counted for more than democracy, and the wishes of
the powerful for more than their explanations.
DAN B. DOBaS, I LAw OF REMEDIES § 2.4(1), at 92 (2d ed. 1993).
304. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
305. Id. at 251.
306. Id. at 255.
307. Id. at 252.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 252-53.
310. Bull, 295 U.S. at 253.
311. Id. With respect to the year at issue, there was no direct judicial review of
decisions ofthe Board of Tax Appeals. A taxpayer dissatisfied with a decision of that body was
relegated to a refund suit in the Court of Claims or the district court. CRiMM, supra note 252, at
2.2[l]. This rule was changed in the Revenue Act of 1926, which provided forjudicial review
in federal circuit courts. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 22, 44 Stat. 2019 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 7482 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
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agreed with the Commissioner that postdeath profits were properly taxable as
income, but deemed itselfunable to consider the estate's contention concerning
of estate tax because the suit had not been timely filed for that
overpayment
12
purpose
On certiorari the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Claims that sums
paid to the estate representing profits after the death of the decedent were not
corpus of the estate but rather income to the estate. 3' Nevertheless, the Court
stated:
A serious and difficult issue is raised by the claim that the
same receipt has been made [on] the basis of both income and
estate tax, although the item cannot in the circumstances be
both income and corpus; and that the alternative prayer of the
petition required the court to render ajudgment which would
redress the illegality and injustice resulting from the
inclusion of the sum in the gross estate for estate
erroneous
34
tax. 1
As to the substance of the estate's contention that "[t]he identical
money,--not a right to receive the amount, on the one hand, and actual receipt
3 15
resulting from that right on the other,-was the basis of two assessments,
the Court agreed with the taxpayer.316 More to the point for present purposes,
however, the Court rejected the government's contention that the statute of
limitations barred correction of the government's errorin using profits accruing
to the estate to compute the estate tax.3" 7
Conceding that it was too late for the estate to file a claim for the
erroneously assessed estate tax when, in 1928, the Board of Tax Appeals
upheld the imposition of income tax for the estate on postdeath profits, the
Court stated that the "[i]nability to obtain a refund or credit, or to sue the
United States, did not, however, alter the fact that if the Government should
insist on payment of the full deficiency of income tax, it would be in possession
3
of some $41,000 in excess of the sum to which it was justly entitled." '
Although noting that limitations had expired on the estate tax and that the
income tax sought after overpayment of the estate tax was legitimately due, the
Court acknowledged the process by which the government generally collects

312. Bull v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 141, 141 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
313. 295 U.S. at 254.
314. Id. at 255.
315. Id. at 256.
316. Id. at 257. Nevertheless, the Court limited its analysis of tax liability ofparticular
rights to receive income for both estate and income tax purposes to the circumstances of the
decedent and his estate. Id. at 256-57.
317. Id. at 258-59.
318. Id. at 258.
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taxes. Because "taxes are the life-blood of government,"31 9 the Court indicated,
"the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed.""32 The government
does not generally have to maintain suit to collect the taxpayer's debt; the
administrative assessment is akin to a judgment and the taxpayer must resort
to a judicial proceeding "to have mistakes rectified.""32 If, after accepting the
excess estate tax, the government had done nothing further, the estate would
have had no redress with respect to such tax after expiration of limitations. The
government sought income tax with respect to the same transaction. If the
government had been required to maintain an action at law to collect this new
tax, the estate would have been able to demand recoupment of the amount
mistakenly collected against the government's claim.3"
In discussing this right of recoupment in claims by the government, the
32 4
Court cited three nineteenth century cases: 323 United States v. Macdaniel,
United States v. Ringgold,325 and The Siren.326 In each of these cases the
defendant was permitted, under a 1797 act, 327 to offset claims by the United
States with claims againstthe United States. This right of a defendant to assert
a claim defensively against the government was referred to by the statute and
the courts as setoff rather than recoupment. 328 This characterization was
appropriate in light of the nineteenth century procedural conception that the
claim asserted defensively did not need to be related to the same transaction as
that sued upon by the government. 329 This right of setoff was particularly
important before the adoption of the Tucker Act in 1855,330 since before that
time there was generally no right to sue the United States.33'
Although in Bull the Court relied upon decisions involving setoff in
applying the related doctrine of recoupment to federal taxation, the remedy it

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

Bull, 295 U.S. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 261-62.
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833).
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150 (1834).

326. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868).
327. Act of March 3, 1797, provided that when the United States filed an action, it
should obtainjudgment at the next term "unless the defendant shall, in open court... make oath
or affirmation, that he is equitably entitled to credits which had been, previous to the
commencement of the suit, submitted to the consideration of the accounting officers of the
treasury, and rejected." Act of March 3, 1797, ch. 368, § 3 (incorporated as tit. 13, R.S. 957
(1875); codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2407 (1994)).
328. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 759,764-65 (1869) (stating
that claims for a credit against the government will only be allowed if proper as setoffs).
329. See WATERMAN, supra note 297, § 2, at 4.
330. Tucker Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855) (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(a), 1491 (1994)).
331. Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 154. As the statute indicates, one could not use a
claim against the government as a setoff unless one had previously made such claim to the
Treasury and such claim had been rejected. Tucker Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
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fashioned more closely resembled common law recoupment because the claim
for which deduction was sought had to arise out of the transaction upon which
the main claim was based.332 The 1797 act refered to a defendant's oath in
asserting a claim for setoff that he is "equitably entitled to credits;" however,
this language did not imply that allowance of such setoff entailed the exercise
of equitable jurisdiction.333 Indeed, a claim for setoff could be submitted to a
jury,334 which strongly indicates that it does not entail administration of an
equitable remedy.335
In Bull the Court simply adapted to modem revenue law an old procedural
means of preventing the government from recovering an amount greater than
that to which it was entitled-a means freely utilized before the adoption ofthe
modem tax law. The most significant modification allowed use of recoupment
in instances in which the party with the recoupment claim instituted the judicial
proceedings.336 The recoupment device adapted to the tax law in Bull hardly
conjured up the spectre that the Supreme Court and some lower courts have
since sought to curtail. In Bull the Court did not even describe recoupment as
equitable recoupment.
The Supreme Court first described recoupment as equitable recoupment in
Stone v. White,337 a characterization appropriate in that case. In Stone a testator
left property in a testamentary trust with his widow as sole beneficiary. The
widow elected to take this benefit rather than her dower interest or statutory
share. In conformity with the decisions ofseveral appellate courts, 338 the widow

332. Bull v United States, 295 U.S. 247, 262 (1935). The setoffpermitted against the
government under the 1797 act was akin to recoupment in that no affirmative recovery was
allowed against the government. Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 154. It was different from
recoupment in that it allowed a defendant to assert claims unrelated transactionally to the
government claims. United States v. Ringgold, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150, 163-64 (1834).
333. Waterman states that "[t]he courts have frequently allowed claims as setoff
against the government, which were not strictly legal, provided they were due, ex wquo et bono."
WATERMAN, supra note 297, § 32, at 35-36. The phrase ex Mequo et bono implies fairness in a
more colloquial sense, rather than, strictly speaking, the exercise of equitable jurisdiction. See
BLACK'S LAw DICrIoNARY 557 (6th ed. 1990).
334. United States v. Macdaniel, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1, 11 (1833).

335. This was succinctly stated by Professor Dobbs: "Equity courts did not grant jury
trials; law courts did." DOBBS, supra note 303, at 149 (footnote omitted).
336. For example, BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY defines equitable recoupment as the
following:

Rule of the law which diminishes the right of a party
invoking legal process to recover a debt, to the extent
that he holds money or property of his debtor, to
which he has no moral right, and it is ordinarily a
defensive remedy going only to mitigation of

damages.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (6th ed. 1990).

337. 301 U.S. 532, 539 (1937).
338. Id. at 533 (citing Allen v. Brandeis, 29 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir. 1928); United
States v. Bolster, 26 F.2d 760, 762 (1st Cir. 1928); Warner v. Walsh, 15 F.2d 367,368 (2d Cir.

1926)).
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did not report distributions from the trust as income.339 The Commissioner
assessed a deficiency against the trustees for such income, which they paid
under protest.34 Before the time for a refund suit by the trustees expired, but
after the permitted time for assessment of tax against the widow for 1928, the
Supreme Court held, in a case involving another taxpayer, that in the trustees'
and widow's circumstances income is taxable to the beneficiary rather than the
trust.34' Thereafter the trustees sued for refund of the tax they paid for 1928.342
In defense to the trustees' suit in Stone, the Commissioner asserted that the
tax that should have been paid by the beneficiary, and which could not now be
collected from the beneficiary, exceeded the tax paid by the trustees. Because
any recovery would inure entirely to the widow, the sole beneficiary of the
trust, the government argued that it should be permitted to offset the
beneficiary's unpaid tax against the trustees' refund.343
In asserting this right to use a barred claim defensively, the government
confronted a problem not encountered by the plaintiffs estate in Bull. The
government sought benefit of recoupment against one taxpayer, the trust, of a
barred claim against another taxpayer, the beneficiary. Of course, the need to
look beyond legal formalities to untangle beneficial rights and obligations was
one of the main reasons for the development and endurance of equitable
jurisprudence. 3 " In preventing the beneficiary from escaping a tax because the
government first collected it from the wrong party, the Court asserted a
breathtaking scope of judicial power to correct inequity-a scope not at all
34
consonant with tax jurisprudence generally. 1
The Court characterized the suit for refund by a taxpayer as "equitable in
its function. .. the lineal successor of the common count in indebitatus
assunpsitfor money had and received." 3' This characterization is odd when
applied to the realm of tax refund litigation3 47 and appears to have been recently
339. Her contention was that distributions received from the trust were not income
until they exceeded the value of her dower interest. Stone, 301 U.S. at 533.
340. Id.
341. Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365, 369 (1933).
342. Stone, 301 U.S. at 533.
343. Id. at 534.
344. See DOBBS, supra note 303, § 2.3(1)-(3), at 74-81.
345. The Court recently stated in rejecting use of equitable tolling by taxpayers
against the government that "[t]ax law, after all, is not normally characterized by case-specific
exceptions reflecting individualized equities." United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352
(1997).
346. 301 U.S. at 534.
347. The common count of indebitatusassumpsit developed judicially as a means of
avoiding unjust enrichment in the absence of express assumpsit. Its pedigree is unquestionably

legal. See LB.Ames, The History ofAssumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 53 (1888). A tax refund suit
entails a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, and the courts have been most resistant to take
liberties with the statute. In Commissionerv. Lundy the Court stated that "[w]e are bound by the
language of the statute as it is written, and even if the rule [the taxpayer] advocates might
'accor[d] with good policy,' we are not at liberty 'to rewrite [the] statute because [we] might
deem its effects susceptible ofimprovement."' 516 U.S. 235, 252 (1996) (quoting Badaracco v.
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rejected by the Court.348
At any rate, this characterization of the tax refund as equitable was a step
toward the sweeping proposition that in tax refund suits, "the plaintiff must
recover by virtue of a right measured by equitable standards ... .""' Because
the plaintiffs recovery is so dependent upon such standards, "it is open to the
defendant to show any
state of facts which, according to those standards, would
35
0
deny the right....
The Court's infusion of an equitable character into tax refund actions far
exceeded the needs of the case-to treat the widow as the true party in the
trustee suit. When a court allows recoupment to a defendant on account of a
claim against someone other than the plaintiff, particularly in the absence of
any statutory guidance, it is unquestionably exercising an equitable function.351
In support of its characterization of a-tax refund suit as subject to equitable
principles, the only authority cited by the Court concerning modem federal tax
law was United States v. Jefferson Electric Manufacturing Co.,352 a case in
which adjudication of a taxpayer's claim for refund entailed consideration of
circumstances involving parties not before the Court.353 The Court then made
a detailed analysis of the relationship between trustee and beneficiary, the end
result of which was the Court's denial of recovery to the trustees because they
acted for the benefit of the beneficiary. The Court stated:
[W]henever the trustee brings suit in a court which is free to
consider equitable rights and duties, his right to maintain the
suit may be enlarged or diminished by reference to the fact
that the suit, though maintained in the name of the trustee
alone, is for the benefit and in the equitable interest of the
3
cestui. 14
Although Stone, like Jefferson Electric, involved judicial adaptation of
recoupment to a three-party situation, the Court in Stone stated (or overstated)

Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)).
348. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352.
349. Stone, 301 U.S. at 535.
350. Id. (citations omitted).
351. It was thus not necessary to attribute equitable characteristics in Stone, nor is it
necessary to exercise equitable functions in tax litigation generally.

352. 291 U.S. 386 (1934).
353. Jefferson Electric involved suits by manufacturers for taxes on the sales of
products that the plaintiffs contended were improperly imposed on such products. Id. at 389-90.
The plaintiffs attacked qualifications under section 424(a)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45
Stat. 791, 866 (repealed 1939) which conditioned recovery on a showing that the tax was not
collected directly or indirectly from the purchaser. 291 U.S. at 391. In upholding such a
condition on a refund action, the Court adverted to a tax refund action as equitable in character.
Id. at 401-02. This characterization justified the Court in examining whether the plaintiff is a
nominal party or the real party in interest. Id. at 407.
354. Stone, 301 U.S. at 536.
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a much broader equitable maxim for federal taxation: "It is in the public interest
that no one should be permitted to avoid his just share of the tax burden except
by positive command of law, which is lacking here. '3 55 Did this dictum portend
a free-wheeling power to deny refund claims on equitable grounds unless the
statute explicitly stood in the way? Or should such equitable power in refund
actions exist only for the narrower purpose of examining interests ofparties and
qualifying the right to recover on the basis of such analysis, a narrower scope
for the role of equity? Whatever the Court may have intended, its peroration
married the terms "equitable" and "recoupment":
The government, by retaining the tax paid by the trustees, is
not reviving a stale claim. Its defense, which inheres in the
cause of action, is comparable to an equitable recoupment or
diminution of petitioners' right to recover. "Such a defense is
never barred by the statute of limitations so long as the main
'
action itself is timely."356
In the handful of decisions pertaining to recoupment since Stone, the Court has
not seen fit to divorce the terms, leading to a general constriction of the
application of recoupment.
The next opportunity the Court took to consider recoupment was in
McEachernv. Rose.3 7 As in Stone, the Court's opinion was written by Justice
Stone. The Court did not permit recoupment, but the reasoning for the two
decisions appears to at least fit Justice Stone's framework for application of the
doctrine.
InMcEachernthe decedent sold five hundred shares of corporate stock for
$300,000 in 1924. The purchaser paid ten percent of the purchase price at the
time of sale and was to pay installments of ten percent in each of the nine
succeeding years. The decedent elected to report his gain on the installment
method. After the decedent's death in 1928, his administrator, for the calendar
tax years 1928 through 1931, continued to report gain from the transaction
pursuant to the decedent's election.3 s This reporting was erroneous because
under section 44(d) of the 1928 Revenue Act, the capital gain for remaining
installments was taxable to the decedent in the year of his death. Since the
capital gain was due in 1928, the administrator sued in district court for
3 9
overpayments for the years 1929 through 193 1. 1
The government contended in district court that, on equitable principles,
the taxpayer was not entitled to recover the overpayments for 1929 through
1931 because they amounted to less than the tax that should have been assessed

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 539 (quoting Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,262 (1935)).
302 U.S. 56 (1937).
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
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for 1928, which was then barred. The district court rejected the government's
contention. 3 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the administrator could
not in equity and good conscience recover overpayments that, because of
taxpayer's failure to pay the 1928 tax, resulted in no unjust enrichment to the
government.36
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit. 62 It assumed that equitable
principles might prevent the administrator's recovery in the absence of a
statutory prohibition, but found such a prohibition in I.R.C. §§ 607 and 609.363
Section 607 treated payment of a tax after expiration of limitations as an
overpayment,3" and I.R.C. § 609 forbade crediting by the government of
overpayments against liabilities barred by limitations.365 The Court viewed the
following provisions as applicable:
The similar treatment accorded by the statutes to credit
against an overdue tax, and to payment of it; the prohibition
of credit of an overpayment of one year against a barred
deficiency for another; and the requirement that payment of
a barred deficiency shall be refunded, are controlling
evidences of the Congressional purpose by the enactment of
§§ 607 and 609 to require refund to the taxpayer of an
overpayment, even though he has failed to pay taxes for other
periods, whenever their collection is barred by limitation.366
And what of Bull and Stone? Reconciling these decisions has provided a
lot of work for commentators.367 Justice Stone's final paragraph, in which Stone
is distinguished, is stunning in its opacity. Nevertheless, it appears that the
critical distinction between the two cases is that the party in Stone against
whom recoupment was applied, the trustees, were litigating a year not barred

360. Rose v. McEachem, 86 F.2d 231, 231 (5th Cir. 1936).
361. Id. at 233. The language of the Fifth Circuit is remarkable in that it bespeaks a
belief that a taxpayer is not entitled to recover in a refund action unless the government is
unjustly enriched. The more appropriate inquiry would be whether the tax is valid under the tax
statute.
362. McEachern, 302 U.S. at 63.
363. Id. at 59-60.
364. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 607, 45 Stat. 874 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 6401(a) (1994)).
365. Id. § 609,45 Stat. 875 (current version at I.R.C. § 6514(b) (1994)).
366. McEachern, 302 U.S. at 62.
367. Professor Andrews commented thatMcEachern appears to rule out recoupment
in the situation in which it would most ordinarily arise (i.e., cases involving the same taxpayer
and two tax periods where there is a deficiency in one period and an overpayment in the other).
Therefore, McEachern appears to overrule Bull. See Andrews, supra note 296, at 605-06.
ProfessorWatson ultimately distinguishes the government's obtaining recoupment in
Stone with its failure to do so in McEachern on the basis of the government's lack of diligence
inMcEachern.The latter presented no compelling equities. See Watson, supranote 298, at 730.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/4
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by the statute of limitations, at least as to them. The statute of limitations barred
collection of the tax from the beneficiary, but recoupment involved no attempt
to collect a barred tax from the beneficiary; thus, it was not precluded by I.R.C.
§§ 607 and 609.368 Justice Stone's final two sentences highlighted his
understanding of recoupment in Stone as involving the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction: "Equitable considerations not within the reach of the statutes
denied a recovery. It was enough, in the peculiar facts of the case, that the
trustees had
suffered no burden and that the Government was not unjustly
3 69
enriched.

Such a view of recoupment may be viewed alternatively as alarmingly
broad or highly restrictive. On one hand, it posits that courts may, in the
context of refund suits, exercise broad power to avoid unjust enrichment. This
theory is not consonant with tax jurisprudence, at least in terms of avoiding
unjust enrichment of the government.37 ° On the other hand, when only one
taxpayer is involved in a transaction and recoupment is sought against the
taxpayer, then I.R.C. §§ 607 and 609 and their descendants3 ' would generally
prevent its application. In such situations, whether defending a deficiency or
resisting a refund, the government would be attempting, in essence, to force
payment of barred taxes. Recoupment would thus not be permissible against
taxpayers in the more common "one taxpayer" situations.372
The highly restrictive view of McEachernhas prevailed. Recoupment has
been viewed as equitable in character, although that viewpoint has caused its
exercise to be restricted. McEachernwas thus just a small step in the restriction
of recoupment.
The adverse effect of this equitable characterization on the availability of
recoupment was evident when the Supreme Court next addressed recoupment
in Commissionerv. Gooch Milling & ElevatorCo.373 In Gooch Milling a 1938
audit of the taxpayer's books disclosed an erroneous valuation of inventory as
of June 30, 1935, the close of taxpayer's 1935 fiscal year. This error resulted
in an overpayment by the taxpayer for 1935, which was not subject to refund
because of the statute of limitations. The adjustment caused a corresponding
deficiency for 1936, however, which was less than the overpayment for 1935.
In its petition before the Board of Tax Appeals, the taxpayer sought to recoup

368. McEachern,302 U.S. at 62-63. InMcEachern the tax liability involved was that
of the administrator of the decedent. The issue was whether it arose in the year of the death of
the decedent or in later years.
369. Id. at 63.
370. See, e.g., Brockamp v. United States, 519 U.S. 347,354 (1997) (holding that the
Ninth Circuit may not read an "equitable tolling" exception into I.R.C. § 6511's filing
requirements).
371. I.R.C. §§ 6401(a), 6415(h) (1994).
372. Professor Willis has contended thatMcEachernand Bull, because both involve
one taxpayer, are perhaps inconsistent. See Willis, supra note 206, at 637-38.
373. 320 U.S. 418 (1943).
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the barred 1935 overpayment against the 1936 deficiency. 374 The Board of Tax
Appeals refused such recoupment for jurisdictional reasons,37 and the Eighth
377
Circuit reversed.376 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit.
The Court addressed both the Board's jurisdictional provision3 7' and the
nature of recoupment.379 The latter was unnecessary to the result and
perpetrated what may be shown to have been a 50-year heresy-that the Tax
Court could not exercise recoupment.3 0
The Court first looked to I.R.C. § 272(g) which provided that the Board,
in redetermining a deficiency in the taxable year before it, "shall consider such
facts with relation to the taxes for other taxable years." However, the section
also provided that the Board had "no jurisdiction to determine whether or not
the tax for any other taxable year has been overpaid or underpaid., 38 The Court
found that in determining a deficiency for 1936, it was unnecessary to consider
any facts relating to the 1935 taxable year. 2 Whether it was necessary to look
to 1935 in determining taxes for 1936 was really beside the point. Even if the
Board needed to do so, the statute provided that it could not adjust the taxes for
1935. This determination would be the case regardless of what sort of
jurisdiction, legal or equitable, the allowance of recoupment entailed.
The Court was quite correct in stating that allowing recoupment of the
1935 overpayment would involve a redetermination of the 1935 liability in

374. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 41,563,
at 41, 564 (1941).
375. Id.
376. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 131, 138 (8th Cir.
1943).
377. Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 418, 422.
378. I.R.C. § 272(g) (1939). The provision exists in much the same form today. See
I.R.C. § 6214(b) (1994).
379. Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 420-22.
380. This limitation was rejected by the Tax Court in Estate of Mueller v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551, 561 (1993), but the question has not clearly been resolved. In a
later decision involving the same controversy, EstateofMueller v. Commissioner,107 T.C. 189,
199 (1996), the Tax Court actually considered application ofrecoupment to the facts and found
it inapplicable. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this result in EstateofMueller v. Commissioner, 153
F.3d 302, 303,306-07 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1031 (1999), but held that the Tax
Court lacked jurisdiction to apply equitable recoupment. Prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision,
however, the Tax Court reaffirmed its recoupment power in EstateofBartels v. Commissioner,
106 T.C. 430, 433 (1996). Bartels involved an Illinois taxpayer and would not have been
appealable to the Sixth Circuit. See I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A) (1994). Consequently, the decision
of the Tax Court in Bartels would not necessarily be disturbed by the decision of the Sixth
Circuit in Estate ofMueller. See Stacey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 605, 606 (6th Cir.
1956).
381. Gooch Milling, 320 U.S. at 420 (quoting I.R.C. § 272(g) (1939)).
382. Id. This determination is true only in an attenuated sense. The crucial fact in
establishing a deficiency for 1936 was the revaluation (lowering) of the opening inventory. Such
inventory revaluation coincidentally lowered the ending inventory for 1935. Truly, however, it
was not necessary to look to an identical fact for the 1935 year to determine the tax effect of a
corresponding element of taxpayer's 1936 taxes.
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contravention of the statute; thus, there was no need for its characterization of
such an action as giving effect to an "equitable defense." '83 However, the
Court's motive for doing so was transparent.
The Court clearly wanted to avoid a spillover of its holding to the
applicability of recoupment in other forums.3" Its discussion of the Board of
Tax Appeal's jurisdiction was remarkable:
The Internal Revenue Code, not general equitable principles,
is the mainspring of the Board's jurisdiction. Until Congress
deems it advisable to allow the Board to determine the
overpayment or underpayment in any taxable year other than
the one for which a deficiency has been assessed, the Board
must remain impotent when the plea of equitable recoupment
is based
upon an overpayment or underpayment in such other
5
38

year.

While the Court purported not to address the powers of tribunals other than the
Board of Tax Appeals, its implication that the Board was limited by the Code
suggested that either other forums might not be or that equitable powers might
enable them to act outside the realm of the Code in tax cases. 386 However, such
a conception of recoupment would ultimately not comport with the Court's
juridical notions of taxation. This fact may be seen in the Court's remaining
two cases pertaining to recoupment:
Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery
38 8
Co. 387 and United States v. Dalm.

In Electric Storage Battery, the taxpayer had, from 1919 to 1926, paid
excise taxes on sales of storage batteries on the assumption that such sales were
subject to tax. In 1926 the taxpayer sought a refund of such taxes paid between
1922 and 1926. Taxes paid before 1922 were then barred by the statute of
limitations. The taxpayer sued for a refund of the 1922 through 1926 taxes and
prevailed in the refund suit. The government paid the taxpayer's refund in

383. Id. at421.
384. It stated: "We are not called upon to determine the scope of equitable
recoupment when it is asserted in a suit for refund of taxes in tribunals possessing general equity
jurisdiction." Id.
385. Id. at422.
386. The implication that tribunals other than the Board are not bound by the Code
is puzzling unless it may be understood as stating that the Board is more restricted to the letter,
or explicit language, of the Code. In truth, Article III tribunals have, on some famous occasions,
applied the Code without punctilious attention to its text. See, e.g., Corn Products Ref. Co. v.

Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (applying narrowly the statutory definition of"capital asset"
for capital gains purposes); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (interpreting "gross
income" broadly for income tax purposes).

On such occasions, however, the courts never view themselves as exercising freewheeling Article III equity powers to "do right," but rather to carry out the intent of Congress.

387. 329 U.S. 296 (1946).
388. 494 U.S. 596 (1990).
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1935. However, because the taxpayer had deducted such excise taxes in the
years in which it had paid them, the government treated the collection of the
refund by the taxpayer as income in 1935. The taxpayer paid the deficiency,
filed a claim for refund, and then sued for a refund.389
The trial court allowed the taxpayer to recoup the excise taxes paid from
1919 to 1921 against tax on income attributable to recovery of taxes paid from
1922 to 1926,390 and the Third Circuit affir'med. 391 The Supreme Court
reversed.392
The Court held that recoupment did not permit offsetting one transaction
against another. 393 This application of a long-established element of
recoupment, the requirement that the offsetting claims arise out of the same
transaction,394 was sensible under the circumstances. Taxes that the taxpayer in
Electric Storage Battery sought to recoup against the government were
imposed upon transactions that were merely identical, not common. The
insistence that recoupment applies only to a single transaction was the only
point needed to reject the taxpayer's claim. But the Court had more work to do.
The Court appeared to accept the government's contention that the lower
courts erred in approving the use of recoupment in a situation other than those
sanctioned in Bull and Stone.395 As the Court noted: "Whatever may have been
said indicating a broader scope to the doctrine of recoupment, these facts are
'
the only ones in which it has been applied by this Court in tax cases."396
As justification for such a limitation, the Court highlighted the policy
behind the statute of limitations: the avoidance of a "system under which there
never would come a day of final settlement and which require[s] both the
taxpayer and the Government to stand ready forever and a day to produce
vouchers, prove events, establish values and recall details of all that goes into
397
an income tax contest.,
Perhaps most significantly, the Court took cognizance of the egregious
situations wrought by limitations, those which create hardships for both
taxpayers and the government, and noted: "They tempt the equity-minded
judge to seek for ways of relief in individual cases."'3 98 In short, "lead us no[ ]
[longer] into temptation!"39 9 The Court emphatically expressed a distaste for

389. ElectricStorage Battery Co., 329 U.S. at 298.
390. Id. at 298-99.
391. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies, 152 F.2d 521,526 (3d Cir. 1945).
392. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. at 303.
393. Id. at 299.
394. See WATERMAN, supra note 297, § 424, at 471.
395. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. at 300.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 301.
398. Id. at 302.
399. The Court in Dalm recanted the agnosticism embraced in Gooch Milling &
Elevator Co. v. Commissioner,320 U.S. 418,421 (1943), about whether a tribunal with general
equity powers might exercise the power therein denied the Board of Tax Appeals. United States
v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). That is surely understandable. Whether or not Article III courts
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judicial creation ofremedies for injustices occasioned by limitations: "Ifthere
are to be exceptions to the statute of limitations, it is for Congress rather than
for the courts to create and limit them." 400
And then there ensued over four decades of silence from the Court about
recoupment! For the most part, recoupment languished in the stage of arrested
development that ElectricStorage Batterymandated. 4° 1In 1990, however, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. DalM402 and took another step to
curtail equitable recoupment. Dalm provides an elaboration of the Court's
uneasiness with the notion ofequitable jurisdiction in the context of federal tax
cases. In so doing, the Court signaled that the relation of limitations to
sovereign immunity, rather than to the stale claims considerations applicable
to all litigants, is at the heart of this uneasiness.
In Dalm the taxpayer had been a loyal secretary to one Harold Schrier.
Schrier died, and in May, 1975 the taxpayer was appointed administratrix of his
estate. Owing to her loyal service to Schrier, Schrier's brother Clarence paid
Dalm $180,000 from assets in Schrier's estate in 1976 and $133,813 in 1977.
Clarence filed a gift tax return with respect to the 1976 payment, and Dalim
paid a gift tax of $18,675.'
Upon an audit of Dalm's 1976 and 1977 income tax returns, the
Commissioner concluded that amounts paid to her by Clarence represented
additional fees for services as administratrix of Harold's estate and that she
should have reported them as income. The IRS asserted deficiencies in her
income tax of $91,471 for 1976 and $70,639 for 1977. Dalm petitioned for
redetermination ofthese deficiencies in the Tax Court. She and the IRS settled
the case after two days of trial. In the course of the Tax Court proceedings,
Dalm did not seek credit or recoupment of the gift tax she had paid with respect
to the transfers Clarence made to her.'"
After the settlement in Tax Court, Dalm filed an administrative claim for
refund of the gift tax she paid. This claim was filed nearly five years after
expiration of the time that the Code requires a refund claim to be filed." 5 The
taxpayer eventually filed suit in district court for refund of "overpaid gift
tax.'"' The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the suit
as untimely. It held that equitable recoupment did not authorize an independent

possess such equitable powers, liberal exercise of recoupment would result in the diverting of
cases to the district courts.
400. Electric StorageBattery Co., 329 U.S. at 303.

401. Resort to recoupment was also limited by the mitigation provisions, which have

been held to preclude recoupment in circumstances in which they apply. See Benenson v. United
States, 257 F. Supp. 101, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Coohey v. United States, 172 F.3d 1060,

1064 (8th Cir. 1999).

402. 494 U.S. at 598.

403.
404.
405.
406.

Id. at 598-99.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 600; see I.R.C. § 6511(a) (1994).
Dalm, 494 U.S. at 600.
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lawsuit. 7 The Sixth Circuit reversed. It rejected the government's contention
that Dalm's claim was an independent lawsuit barred by the statute of
limitations and determined that the government had made a timely claim for
deficiency of her income tax based on an inconsistent legal theory. In so
holding, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Ninth Circuit; the Seventh Circuit had
taken the opposite view." The Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.
In the Seventh Circuit case, O'Brien v. United States, 9 the taxpayer
transferred a 1975 liquidation stock he had received from the estate of his
father. He used the same valuation on the stock as the estate had used for estate
tax purposes. In 1980 litigation to determine the estate tax, the Tax Court fixed
the value of the stock high enough to nullify the taxpayer's gain on his earlier
sale.41° The taxpayer thus sought a refund of the tax he had paid pertaining to
the sale of the stock in 1975. The IRS denied the claim on the basis of the
statute of limitations.4" '
The district court allowed the taxpayer to recover, but the Seventh Circuit
reversed.412 It focused on recoupment after holding that mitigation was
inapplicable.4 13 The court held recoupment inapplicable to a situation in which
a taxpayer is not asserting a claim against a validly asserted deficiency. It noted
that "[a]ttempts by taxpayers to utilize the doctrine to revive an untimely
affirmative refund claim, as opposed to offset a timely government claim of
deficiency with a barred claim of the taxpayer, have been uniformly
rejected. 414
In Kolom v. United States,4"5 however, the Ninth Circuit took a different
view. In 1972 the taxpayer exercised stock options offered to him by his
employer. He did not report the bargain element entailed in exercise of the
options as an item of tax preference subject to the minimum t4w6 because the
stock was subject to certain restrictions. The taxpayer reported the bargain
element as an amount of tax preference in 1973 and paid a minimum tax of
$8,097. The IRS decided that the proper year for paying the minimum tax was
1972 .4" This position was upheld by the Tax Court in 1978.418 The Ninth

407. Id.
408. Dalm v. United States, 867 F.2d 305, 310-12 (6th Cir. 1989).
409. 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985).
410. See id. at 1040. Taxpayer's basis would be the fair market value of the stock at
the time of the decedent's death. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1994).
411. O'Brien, 766 F.2d at 1040.
412. Id. at 1042, 1051.
413. See id. at 1042, 1048-51. The court held in part that the circumstance involving
errors in basis, I.R.C. § 1312(7), was not met because the error occurred in respect of the
liquidation rather than the transfer of the shares at death. Id. at 1043.
414. Id. at 1049.
415. 791 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1986).
416. Id. at 764; see I.R.C. § 56(b)(3) (1994).
417. Kolom, 791 F.2d at 763-64.
418. Kolom v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 235, 250 (1978).
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419
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court.
The taxpayer filed a claim for refund of the minimum tax paid in 1973. In
1984 he sued for refund in district court. The district court held in favor of the
taxpayer on the basis of mitigation.420
In affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit rejected the applicability
ofmitigation.42' The court inKolom completely misperceived the issue that was
critical in O'Brien: that the lack of a pending proceeding instituted by the
government signified that the taxpayer relied on recoupment as an independent
basis of jurisdiction. In such a context, recoupment is robbed of its defensive
character. Although a recoupment claim is not untimely if the main claim is
timely,4' a recoupment claim is not timely if there is no "main" claim. The
court in Kolom insisted that the facts ofthe case were similar to those in Bull.4"
The court, however, overlooked an important jurisdictional change that had
occurred in the decades between Bull and Kolom. In contrast, the Dalm court
did not overlook this change.
In Bull the taxpayer maintained a suit in the Court of Claims to recover
barred overpaid estate taxes after the Board of Tax Appeals upheld imposition
of income taxes legally inconsistent with the barred estate taxes. 424 Recoupment
of the overpaid, barred taxes appeared to be the sole jurisdictional basis of the
suit in the Court of Claims, rather than a defense to an action by the
government asserting tax liability. As the Court in Dalm noted, however, there
was no direct judicial review of decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals in the
tax years at issue in Bull.4 ' If the Court of Claims action by the taxpayer in
Bull is viewed as a surrogate for direct review of Tax Court decisions now
provided in the courts of appeal, then Bull need not necessarily be read today
as supporting the notion that recoupment will independently support an action
for refund in a district court or the Court of Federal Claims.
Whether Bull is to be read restrictively or broadly concerning the scope of
recoupment is as much a matter of policy as of logic. In Dalm, as in Electric
Storage Battery, the policy basis of the Court's decision was clear. Unlike
Electric StorageBattery,however, which relied primarily on the avoidance of

419. Kolom v. Commissioner, 644 F.2d 1282, 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,454 U.S.
1011 (1981).
420. Kolom, 791 F.2d at 764-65.
421. Id. at 766. The court did notregard an item of tax preference as an item of gross
income since I.R.C. § 421(a)(1) excludes it from gross income. Thus the mitigation
circumstances entailing double inclusion of an item of gross income, I.R.C. § 1312(1), were
inapplicable. Id. at 765-66.
422. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 264 (1993).
423. Kolon, 791 F.2d at 768.
424. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,253 (1935).
425. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 603 n.4 (1990). Before the creation of
review of Board decisions by courts of appeal in the Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001 (a), 44
Stat. 109 (current version at I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (1994)), taxpayers unsuccessfulbefore the Board
were required to pay the deficiency and then seek a refund in a district court or the Court of
Claims. See CRIMM, supranote 252, § 2.2.
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stale claims,42 the Court in Dalm emphasized sovereign immunity. 427 It viewed
the statute of limitations as a condition of Congress's waiver of sovereign
immunity entailed in a refund suit.428 Since the taxpayer had not sought a
refund of the gift tax within the time permitted by statute, 42 her suit required
a consent the Court deemed itselfpowerless to give: "Ifany principle is central
to our understanding of sovereign immunity, it is that the power to consent to
'
such suits is reserved to Congress."43
The Court reinforced its unwillingness
to fashion a remedy to avoid limitations by noting that Congress had already
fashioned such a remedy in enacting the mitigation provisions.43 The Court
stated that application ofrecoupment under the circumstances "would be doing
little more than overriding Congress' judgment as to when equity requires that
432
there be an exception to the limitations bar."
The "equity" referred to by Justice Kennedy has no relationship to
chancery jurisdiction exercised by state and federal courts. 33 Dalm indicates
that if equity, in a colloquial rather than ajurisdictional sense, compels that the
rigors of the statute of limitations be relaxed, it is entirely up to Congress to
determine the nature and scope of such relaxation.43 4 So limited, recoupment
closely resembles its common law ancestor. It poses no threat to sovereign
immunity because it is in accord with the long-accepted notion that a barred
claim may be asserted by a litigant to reduce a claim by the government.4" The
only accommodation made to tax law is that a taxpayer, asplaintiffina refund
suit, may use recoupment. This goal is perhaps all the Court in Bull wanted to
accomplish. Although the Court in Dalm expressed no opinion as to whether
recoupment was available only in the district courts or the Court of Federal

426. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 301-03 (1946).
427. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 608-10.
428. Id. at 608.
429. See I.R.C. § 6511 (1994).
430. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 610.
431. Id.To some extent this flies in the face of some legislative history that indicates
that mitigation was not intended to stifle the development of recoupment but to supplement it.
See S.REP.No. 75-1567, at 49 (1938). As mitigation would clearly not apply to Dalm "ssituation,
which involved two taxes, a strong case could be made that Congress intended no such
preclusion of recoupment. See Willis, supra note 206, at 626.
432. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 610.
433. As Justice Story stated: "[O]ne of the most striking and distinctive features of
Courts of Equity is that they can adapt their decrees to all the varieties of circumstances which
may arise, and adjust them to all the peculiar rights of all the parties in interest.. . ." IJOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIESONEQUITYJURISPRUDENCE

21 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th ed. 1886).

434. The Court stated that recoupment would still be permitted with respect to a
barred tax overpayment in administrative proceedings before the IRS, Dalm, 494 U.S. at 610
(citing Rev. Rul. 71-56, 1971-1 C.B. 404), and in a court action in which another tax on the same
transaction is challenged in a timely fashion. Id.
435. See, e.g., United States v. Ringgold, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150 (1834) (allowing
defendant to assert claim in action by the United States where no direct action was permitted).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/4
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Claims, a point that was important to the dissent,436 the Tax Court has, since
Dalm, held that it may allow equitable recoupment.437 If this holding is
undisturbed, it would vitiate the charge that recoupment is more accessible to
taxpayers who can more easily pay the tax before litigating, and thus litigate in
a district court or the Court of Federal Claims.
Justice Stevens's fulminations in dissent reach a level of stridency not seen
in tax cases since the retirement of Justice Douglas.438 Insisting that "[tlhe case
casts a shadow on the Executive-and on this Court.. .,"" he denigrates the
importance of sovereign immunity. Deriding the "haunting charm" that the
"majestic voices of 'jurisdiction' and 'sovereign immunity' have "for this
Court's current majority," Justice Stevens held up Bull as reasoned "under the
reliable guidance of a bright star in our jurisprudence: the presumption that for
every right there should be a remedy."" Referring to sovereign immunity as
"the vainest of all legal fictions," 44' Justice Stevens states:
Its persistence cannot be denied but ought not to be
celebrated. Nor should its fictive origin ever be forgotten.
There is no cause to expand the doctrine, and we do better to
interpret § 1346(a)(1) by the light of equity and with due
regard for the practicalities ofrevenue collection discussed in
Bull.' 2
Although Justice Stevens's concern about "unjust retention of a previously
paid tax" is understandable," 3 his implication that the statute of limitations may

436. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens accepted the
representation of Dalm's counsel at oral argument that Dalm did not have the means to pay the
income tax deficiency and sue for refund, simultaneously attempting to recoup the gift tax she
paid. Id. at 615-16. Collection of the tax is prerequisite to a refund suit. See I.R.C. § 7422(a)
(1994). Justice Stevens stated: "[Ain affluent taxpayer, but not a less fortunate one, can pay a
deficiency assessment and file suit for a refund." Dalm, 494 U.S. at 615.
437. See Estate of Bartels v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 430,433-34 (1996).
438. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 19 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (remarking that "[tihis Court has, to many, seemed particularly ill-equipped to
resolve income tax disputes between the Commissioner and the taxpayers"); Rudolph v. United
States, 370 U.S. 269,280 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that "designing an 'equitable'
tax system" is the responsibility of Congress and not the Court).
439. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 612.
440. Id. at 616 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 162-163 (1803)).
In a sense, Justice Stevens's invocation of Marbury is odd. While Chief Justice Marshall did
indeed state the above equitable principle, see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) at 162, the Court,
somewhat fecklessly (though understandably), declined on jurisdictionalgrounds to order
Secretary Madison to deliver Mr. Marbury's commission. See id. at 173-80.
441. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 622.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 613; see also Stephen J. Legatzke, Note, The EquitableRecoupment
Doctrine in United States v. Dalm: Where's the Equity?, 10 VA. TAx RaV. 861, 862 (1991)
(arguing that Dalm represents unfairness in the tax system).
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be tempered"by the light of equity" runs afoul of notions of federal
444jurisdiction
so entrenched that they may not be evaded by judicial decision.
The Court again underscored its unwillingness to allow equity jurisdiction
to provide relief from harsh consequences of the statute of limitations in United
States v. Brockamp, a case in which the facts cried out for such relief even
louder than those of Dalm.
Brockamp involved consolidated cases in which two taxpayers who had
overpaid their taxes failed to make timely claims for refunds. Each claimed that
the delay was caused by a disability."6 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that
the statute of limitations under IRC § 6511 could be tolled for an equitable
reason, thereby implying an equitable tolling exception. 7 Because other
circuits hadrejected such an exception to the statute of limitations, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The taxpayers relied upon a nontax decision, Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs ,4 in which the Court held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that equitable tolling applies in suits against the government on the
same basis as it applies in suits against private defendants. 4 9 The taxpayers, in
a manner similar to the Court in Stone v. White, s0 analogized a tax refund
action to one for "Money Had and Received," in which equitable tolling
principles would be applicable against a private defendant.4"
The Court accepted the analogy of a refund action to one for money had
and received only forpurposes of argument," 2 but insisted that there was good
reason to believe that Congress did not want equitable tolling to serve as an
exception to I.R.C. § 6511. "[T]he iteration of the limitations inbothprocedural
and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions" of I.R.C. § 6511
indicated to the Court "that Congress did not intend [the] courts 4 3to
read.., open-ended, 'equitable' exceptions into the statute that it wrote.
The Court more broadly explained the rationale for not exercising equitable
jurisdiction to mitigate the statute of limitations:
To read an "equitable tolling" exception into § 6511 could
create serious administrative problems by forcing the IRS to

444. Dalm, 494 U.S. at 622.
445. 519 U.S. 347 (1997).
446. One taxpayer claimed the delay was caused by senility; the other claimed it was
caused by alcoholism. Id. at 348.
447. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 263 (9th Cir. 1995).
448. 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
449. Id. at 95-96.
450. 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937); see supra note 338 and accompanying text.
451. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 349-50.
452. Id. at 350. The Court actually expressed its scepticism of this analogy by citing
Flora v. UnitedStates, 362 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1960), in which the Court refused to equate the
suit against the collector with the "common-law action of assumpsit for money had and
received."
453. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352.
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respond to, andperhaps litigate, large numbers of late claims,
accompanied by requests for "equitable tolling" which, upon
close inspection, might turn out to lack sufficient equitable
justification.... The nature and potential magnitude of the

administrative problem suggest that Congress decided to pay
the price of occasional unfairness in individual cases
(penalizing a taxpayer whose claim is unavoidably delayed)
in order to maintain a more workable tax enforcement
system.45 4
Since the court decidedBrockamp, Congress has taken steps to mitigate the
harshness of the result in that case. 4 s Nonetheless, Dalm has cast a long
shadow over use of recoupment, as discussed immediately below. It must be
underscored, however, that the principal objection of the courts to recoupment
is that Congress has not sanctioned its use. Recoupment has been restricted
because it treads upon a congressional enactment-the statute of limitations.
B. Application ofEquitableRecoupment by the Lower FederalCourts
As previously discussed, either taxpayers or the government may seek
relief through equitable recoupment from equitably inconsistent tax
consequences of a single transaction.4"' A taxpayer who has an identity of
interest with another taxpayer with respect to a single transaction may also seek
relief pertaining to the tax consequences of such transaction for the other
taxpayer. The government may also seek recoupment on account of inequitable
inconsistencies involving taxpayers who have an identity of interest respecting
a single transaction. 457 The single transaction and identity of interest
requirements have guided the lower federal courts in administering
recoupment. As with the mitigation provisions, however, a principled
reconciliation of the case law construing these requirements demands
considerable struggle.
1.

The Same TransactionRequirement

Courts allow recoupment only for different tax aspects of a single

454. Id. at 352-53. Although Brockamp did not involve equitable recoupment, the
Court therein cited Dalm. See id. at 352.
455. Under the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of July 22,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat.) 740-41, § 6511 (h) was amended to
allow tolling oflimitations during aperiod in which an individual taxpayer is financially disabled
"if such individual is unable to manage his financial affairs by reason of a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment... which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
456. Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1946).
457. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1937).
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transaction. Lower federal courts have construed the term "transaction" in light
of the bipolar concerns that underlie recoupment itself. On one hand, they have
recognized that "it offends the sense of fairness to permit the sovereign to
collect two taxes arising from a single transaction... .""'On the other hand,
they have recognized that failure to apply a same transaction limitation would
mean that "every assessment of deficiency and each claim for refund would
'
invite a search of the taxpayer's entire tax history for items to recoup."459
The case law under the single transaction requirement has involved an
unceasing attempt to sort out precisely what sort of injustices recoupment is
intended to redress. Three sorts of "injustices" or anomalies appear to have
been encountered in the case law: (1) inconsistencies as to similar, but
different, transactions; (2) multiple inconsistent taxation ofa particular amount
of income or property; and (3) circumstances in which the purported single
transaction involves the relationship between the estate and income taxes with
respect to a decedent or related decedents.
In the first group of cases, the party seeking recoupment invariably does
so in vain. These attempts to obtain recoupment demonstrate that compelling
inequities may escape correction because of recoupment's limitations. Often
the circumstances of these claims entail some strong factual connection
between the open and barred claim other than the strict transactional
relationship that Rothensies460 and later cases have required.
A good example of such a case is MissouriPublicService Co. v. United
States." ' In that case a taxpayer, in tax years 1954 through 1957, had begun to
depreciate assets in the years in which it acquired them rather than in the years
in which they were put into service. The court determined this treatment to be
incorrect. 462 For all years but 1956, the taxpayer elected straight-line
depreciation. By amended returns it sought to use a declining balance
method. 463 The court gave effect to the premature elections by the taxpayer for
property placed in service in the years following such elections. Depreciation
deductions based on such elections yielded a deficiency for 1956, which was
barred, and an overpayment for 1957, for which the taxpayer had timely sought
a refund.'
The government sought to recoup 1956 against 1957, which the court
458. Harrah v. United States, 77 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying use of
recoupment because tax aspects did not relate to a common transaction).
459. National Biscuit Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 916, 927 (Ct. Cl. 1957)
(allowing recoupment because tax aspects did relate to a common transaction).
460. 329 U.S. at 296.
461. 245 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Mo. 1965), affd, 370 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1967).
462. Id. at 958-59. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-10 (1999) (stating that the period
for depreciation begins when the asset is placed in service).
463. The IRS contended that a change ofmethod required its consent, which was not
forthcoming. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co., 245 F. Supp. at 958. The taxpayer contended that the
prematurenature ofits original elections meant that ithad exercised no elections and, hence, was
free to do so in amended returns without IRS consent. Id.
464. Id. at 960.
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refused. It found that the same transaction requirement had not been met. The
claims for the two different years involved different identifiable assets. 5
The government's claim for recoupment had some plausibility. Claims
respecting both years were at issue in different counts of the taxpayer's
complaint in the refund action, and the effect accorded to premature elections
was an issue common to both actions. It is reasonable that the government
would not have known precisely what sort of assessment was necessary to
protect its claim as to 1956 because liability for that year depended on the
outcome of the refund action as to 1957. 46 Nonetheless, the claims related to
1956 and 1957 may be seen as transactions sharing a common legal question
rather than a single transaction. 67
How does one determine that circumstances for seeking recoupment entail
more than one transaction? The court in Bowen v. United States (In re
Bowen) 6 8 employed a useful approach to this problem.
In Bowen the court rejected an attempt by a bankrupt taxpayer to recoup
(or offset) a claim for individual income taxes for tax years 1989 and 1990
against barred claims for refund involving transactions by the taxpayer's
closely held corporation in 1985 and 1986.469

465. Id. at 962.
466. In its analysis the court noted four possible resolutions of the election validity
issue. Id. at 958-59. It is not clear that the government should have known which outcome to
expect.
467. Milburn v. United States, 947 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Tex. 1996) and Twitchco,
Inc. v. UnitedStates, 348 F. Supp. 330 (M.D. Ala. 1972) provide two additional examples of
courts viewing related transactions as separate. In Milburn the taxpayers, who sold property at
a loss in 1989, later filed a refund claim for that year. 947 F. Supp. at 1016. They claimed that
interest paid in 1987 which related to acquisition of the property should have been capitalized.
Id. Capitalization would have increased the taxpayers' loss. The IRS denied the claim because
the interest should have been deducted as a business expense in 1987. Id. The taxpayers filed a
refund suit based on equitable recoupment and mitigation. Id. at 1017. Respecting recoupment,
the court held that although transactions in 1989 and 1987 were related because each concerned
how to treat the 1987 interest expense, they remained separate "taxable events" for purposes of
equitable recoupment. Id. at 1018. The Court also rejected the taxpayers' claim based on
mitigation. Id. at 1020. In Twitchco the taxpayer "leased" three buildings from a municipality
beginning in 1957 and sold its assets in 1967. 340 F. Supp. at 332. The government treated the
lease as a financing arrangement by the municipality and treated the taxpayer as owner of the
buildings. Id. at 333. This treatment increased the taxpayer's basis and decreased its capital gain
in 1967. Id. The government sought to use equitable recoupment to obtain tax on the difference
between depreciation deductions-thatwould have been allowable had the taxpayer treated itself
as owner during the "lease" period-and the higher rental deductions the taxpayer took in those
years. Id. The court denied recoupment for years closed by the statute of limitations. Id. at 335.
It found that the single transaction requirement was not met because, while the taxpayer's claim
for refund related to the 1967 sale, the government's claim for recoupment related to the
purchase of the buildings; the court simply explained, "[a] purchase is not the same transaction
as a sale." Id. at 337.
468. 174 B.R. 840 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
469. Id. at 857. The court did not address whether there was sufficient identity of
interest between the individual taxpayer and his closely held corporation to warrant recoupment
as to their respective tax attributes. Cf. Hufbauer v. United States, 297 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Cal.
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Accepting the taxpayer's claim would have required the court to treat the
taxpayer's tax liability at issue in the bankruptcy proceeding as the transaction.
With such an understanding of a transaction the court might then search,
without regard to the statute of limitations, for any items that might affect the
amount of the liability at issue. The court embraced a much narrower notion of
a transaction (i.e., "that the evidence necessary to establish the recoupment
claim is the same as the evidence necessary to establish the plaintiff's
claim"). 47 ° Such an "operative facts" approach47' sensibly prevents offsetting
tax attributes that are logically related only because they pertain to the same
472
taxpayer.

In the second group of "same transaction" cases-involving multiple
inconsistent taxation ofthe same income or property-recoupment claims are
most likely to be successful. That fact is not surprising because those instances
47 3
are closest to the model in Bull v. United States.
A relatively complicated example of such a case is Pond'sExtract Co. v.
United States. 474 Pond'sExtractinvolved the relationship between normal tax
income and excess-profits taxes. 475 The taxpayer in Pond'sExtract,for income
and excess-profits tax purposes, allocated excise taxes paid in 1940 to tax years
1936 through 1939. The taxpayer learned from the Supreme Court in 1944,iat
1968) (finding identity requirement satisfied when a corporation with a sole shareholder
relationship exists).
470. Bowen, 174 B.R. at 857.

471. Id.
472. The test employed in Bowen was once used in the RESTATEMENT

(FIRST) OF

JUDGMENTS § 61 (1942). This test was replaced by the transactional test of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982), which looks to the relationship of the facts in terms of
"time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage."
473. 295 U.S. 247 (1935). Professor Andrews states, "[t]he effect of the conceded
presence of the single transaction element in the Bull model of cases is, of course, that there is
likely little or no significant problem of staleness." Andrews, supra note 296, at 627. Professor
Watson states that,"the focus of the single transaction requirement should be on whether the
taxpayer is double taxed, or has received a double benefit on the same dollars." Watson, supra
note 298, at 754 (footnote omitted). Professor Watson also notes that this test has not always
been applied so simply. Id. at 755.
474. 134 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1955). See also National Biscuit Co. v. United States,
156 F. Supp. 916, 925-26 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (finding that the taxpayer may receive a refund due to
the government's inconsistent treatment of a component of income when computing the excess
profits credit of a previous year); E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. United States, 147 F. Supp.
486, 493-94 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (holding that taxpayer may recover interest paid relating to excess
profits tax deficiencies as well as for interest resulting from an overassessment to excess profits
taxes).
475. Under the wartime excess-profits tax regime, tax was imposed under I.R.C.
§ 710(a)(1) (1939) (repealed Nov. 8, 1945) on excess-profits net income. Under I.R.C. § 711 (a)
(1939) the calculation of excess-profits net income started with normal tax income under I.R.C.
§ 13 (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 11 (1994)). Under I.R.C. § 713(a) (1939) an excessprofits tax credit was allowed, which was 95% of the average excess-profits net income for the
tax years between 1936 and 1940. In short, excess-profits taxes imposed during wartime years
were affected by income and deductions of prewar years.
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this was erroneous, that such excise taxes were deductible for income tax
purposes only when paid in 1940.476 For its 1944 excess-profits taxes, the
taxpayer treated the excise taxes properly by increasing its base period income
in 1936 through 1939. This inconsistent treatment of these taxes entitled the
government to make an addition to excess-profits taxes for 1944 in the amount
of the income taxes saved in 1936 through 1939 by the taxpayer's earlier
inconsistent position. 7 The taxpayer sought to recoup against this adjustment
the amount of income taxes it would have saved had it properly deducted the
excise taxes in their entirety in 1940.
The court permitted the taxpayer to recoup its barred 1940 refund claim
against the later deficiency in excess profits taxes. The court found the single
transaction requirement met and held that the single transaction was the
erroneous allocation of the excise tax.47 Without recoupment, the amount
erroneously not deducted in 1940 would have been taxed twice on two
inconsistent theories.
Hujbauerv. United States479 provides another example. In Hufbauer an
individual taxpayer, who had practiced as a sole proprietor architect for a
calendar year, incorporated his practice effective April 21, 1959. The
corporation erroneously reported the taxpayer's income for the period from
January 1 to April 21, 1959. After the time for the plaintiff corporation to claim
a refund for 1959 had expired, the IRS issued a deficiency against the taxpayer
for that amount. 40 The court allowed the corporation to recoup its barred claim
for refund for 1959 against the government's timely deficiency concerning the
same income. Clearly, both the taxpayer and the corporation could not be
compelled to report the same income."'
Finally, in Kolom v. UnitedStates482 the taxpayer paid tax in 1973 on the
exercise of stock options received in 1972. The government later asserted a
deficiency for the 1972 exercise. The court permitted the taxpayer to recoup for
1973 the barred refund claim against the government's 1972 successful claim
for taxes on the same transaction.4 3

476. See Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516,519 (1944).
477. Pond'sExtract Co., 134 F. Supp. at477. See I.R.C. § 734 (1939) (repealed Nov.
8, 1945), which was, essentially, a mitigation provision.
478. 134 F. Supp. at 479.
479. 297 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
480. Id. at 248.
481. Id. at 252. Because the corporation could not have pursued its own claim and
action for refund, the sole basis upon which it could maintain its claim was recoupment. In the
wake of Dalm, the corporation probably could not recover today under these circumstances.
482. 791 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1986).
483. Id. at 769. In United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1990) the Court
implicitly rejected the approach ofKolom as a means ofallowing recoupment of barred gift taxes
against income taxes that had already been adjudicated in the Tax Court. In that situation
recoupment would have been the sole basis ofjurisdiction. Litigation was not pending for an
open year. The taxpayer inKolom, under Dalm, would seemingly not be permitted to maintain
a refund action as to the barred year 1973. Taxpayer's "refund" action was in reality an attempt,
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Ponds Extract, Hufbauer and Kolom are exemplars of the single
transaction. When there is a single item that would be taxed more than once
without recoupment, or create a benefit for the taxpayer more than once,4 84 the
case fits within the strictures of ElectricStorage Battery.485
The third class of cases involves the relationship between estate and
income taxes, and occasionally, taxes on different estates that are difficult to
reconcile.
Two older cases, United States v. Herring486 and United States v.
Bowcut,487 allowed recoupment of barred claims for overpaid estate taxes

against income tax liability that arose during decedents' lives. In both cases the
courts' understanding of what constituted a transaction for recoupment
purposes was broader than what the Court accepted in Bull v. United States.48
In both Herringand Bowcut, the Commissioner examined predeath tax
years of the decedents after the personal representatives had paid the estate
tax.489 In both cases the personal representatives sought refunds of those income
taxes because the taxes reduced the size of the taxable estates and because they
were thus entitled to recoup overpaid estate tax.
Although unanticipated income tax liability for years preceding the
decedents' deaths would reduce their estates, recoupment of barred claims in
response to that liability is permitted only if claims for estate and income taxes

albeit successful, to obtain reimbursement for his payment of the Tax Court judgment in favor
ofthe governmentwith respect to 1972. Kolom v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 235 (1978), aft'd,644
F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1981).
484. See National Biscuit Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 916, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
485. 329 U.S. 296 (1946). It must be borne in mind that, in the wake of Dalm,
recoupment is allowable only in the course of litigation of an open year. In a couple of
instances-clearly motivated by public policy-courts have denied recoupment of claims that
arguably pertain to the same funds. In UnitedStates v. TomarHills,Inc., 783 F.2d 753 (8th Cir.
1986), the IRS sued to recover a refund that had been barred by limitations. The taxpayer
asserted a claim for recoupment with respect to the barred year. Although the funds atissue were
the same, the court refused to allow recoupment because it did not want to encourage taxpayers
to obtain refunds as to barred years and then resort to recoupment when the government sued to
recover such refunds. Id. at 755. In O'Haganv. Commissioner,70 T.C.M. (CCH) 498 (1995),
a lawyer who had embezzled client funds in 1986, 1987, and 1988 belatedly reported such funds
and paid taxes for those years. He sought to deduct repayments ofsuch amounts for purposes of
the alternative minimum tax for 1989. Id. at 499. The IRS successfully contended that
repayments in 1989 were nondeductible miscellaneous itemized deductions, not deductible for
purposes of the alternative minimum tax. Id. at 500. The court refused recoupment for the earlier
years of inclusion because the repayment in 1989 constituted a separate transaction. Id. at 502.
Although, again, there is inconsistent treatment regarding the same funds, the court's action is
consistent with other courts in refusing to allow an embezzler to shift the consequences of
repayment to an earlier year. See, e.g., McKinney v. United States, 574 F.2d 1240,1243 (5th Cir.
1978) (explaining that a taxpayer has no right to embezzle funds).
486. 240 F.2d 225, 228 (4th Cir. 1957).
487. 287 F.2d 654, 655 (9th Cir. 1961).
488. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
489. In both cases, the government was unhindered by limitations because it alleged
taxpayer fraud. See I.RC. § 6501(c)(1) (1994).
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arise out of the same transaction. Claims for predeath income taxes arguably
have only an indirect relationship to the estate tax, or at least a weaker
relationship than the claims for income and estate taxes in Bull, which
essentially involved the question as to how one fund should be taxed.4 The
court in Herringacknowledged that Bull involved claims to the same money,
but asserted that recoupment had the same practical effect therein as it had in
Bull:
The Government has asserted two claims against the monies
of the estate that came into the hands of the
administratrix--one on account of past due income taxes and
the other on account of the estate tax due on the net estate,
and it is impossible to determine the amount of the latter
without making due allowance for the deduction caused by
the former.49 '
The approach of Herringand Bowcut posits a transactional relationship
between estate and income taxes because claims for the latter reduce the tax
base of the estate and, hence, the amount of estate taxes. However, this
approach overlooks the fact that income taxes themselves arise from
circumstances unrelated to estate tax. 92 This is not to say that cases like
Herringand Bowcut do not alleviate an injustice, but simply that the injustice
may be beyond the reach of recoupment to correct.
Later cases have taken a different approach from Herringand Bowcut.
Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States493 provides an example. In Wilmington
Trustdifferent taxpayers in consolidated cases deducted from ordinary income,
prior to their deaths, land and wood management expenses in connection with
timber operations. The IRS denied the deductions because it contended that
those expenses should have been offset against capital gains from the sale of
timber.494 The IRS assessed income tax deficiencies against both taxpayers after
their deaths on account of their allegedly erroneous treatment of these items.
Those taxes were deducted against their estates, thus reducing their estate taxes.
Although the government allowed the statute of limitations to run on any
additional assessment of estate taxes, it sought to recoup claims for taxes

490. In Bull the inconsistent claims to income and estate taxes were against funds that
were paid to the personal representative after the decedent's death and as to which there could
be no pre-death income tax liability. See supra notes 304-36 and accompanying text.
491. Herring,240 F.2d at228. InBowcut the district court held that estate and income
taxes arose from the same transaction, and the government did not pursue the issue on appeal.
287 F.2d at 656, n.1.
492. See, e.g., Estate of Mann v. United States, 731 F.2d 267, 279 (5th Cir. 1984)
(agreeing with the court below that a deduction for income tax purposes and the failure to later
include the refund claims as an estate asset is not "a single transaction").
493. 610 F.2d 703 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
494. Id. at 706-07; see I.R.C. § 631(b) (1994).
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against the estates' successful income tax refund claims. The court sustained
the taxpayers' deductions against ordinary income.
The court rejected the government's recoupment claims because the
income and estate taxes the government sought to offset for recoupment
purposes did not arise out of common transactions.495 In so holding the court
seized upon an obvious distinction between the two claims in both cases: one
related to tax treatment of timber maintenance expenses while the other related
to the deduction from the estate.496 That the allowability vel non of the
taxpayers' deductions affected both the claims of the taxpayer and the
government did "not convert the two transactions into a single one."497
This holding is logically defensible, but it is not consistent with Herring
or Bowcut. While not citing any particular decisions concerning the scope of
a transaction for purposes of recoupment, the court acknowledged that there
had been differences of opinion:
As the decided cases show, there is no litmus paper test
for determining whether two tax claims arose out of the same
transaction. Some cases clearly are within that category, and
some cases clearly are without it. There is a large group of
cases, however, somewhere in between. Where a case is
within this middle range, so that the answer is more difficult
to determine-and the present cases are of that type-it is
important to consider the policy considerations the equitable
recoupment doctrine is designed to implement.4 98
The "policy considerations" highlighted by the court were those of Electric
Storage Battery. For example, the court stated that "[t]he statute of limitations
itselfrests upon concepts offairness, and an expansive application ofequitable
recoupment 'would seriously undermine the statute of limitations in tax
matters.""'4 Thus, the taxpayers were able to enjoy double, inconsistent tax
benefits related to tax treatment of their timber maintenance expenses.
Consistent with Wilmington Trust is Parker v. United States," ° which
involved estate taxes on the estates of two decedents. In Parkerthe taxpayers,
after the death of their mother, resolved an estate dispute with their stepfather
by creating a trust in which they were beneficiaries. The trust property was not
included in the mother's estate. At the stepfather's death, the trust was included
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Wilmington Trust Co., 610 F.2d at 713.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. 296, 302

(1946)).
500. 110 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 1997). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Michael

D. Beauvais, Note, Equitable Recoupment Was Unavailable to the Service in FederalTax
Proceedings:Parker v. United States, 51 TAx LAw. 423 (1998).
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in his estate, which paid estate tax on its value. The taxpayers filed as
beneficiaries for a refund on the basis that the trust property was not includible
in the stepfather's estate. The taxpayers ultimately prevailed on this claim."'
The government made a claim for recoupment on the basis that the trust
property should have been included in the mother's estate. The court agreed,
but held that the erroneous payment of estate tax by the stepfather's estate and
the failure of the mother's estate to pay tax represented two separate
transactions.50 2 The facts that taxing the trust property to both estates was
legally inconsistent under the circumstances and the claim for taxes against
both estates was against the same property did not mean that those claims
related to the same transaction. Like Wilmington Trust, Parkeris difficult to
distinguish from Herringand Bowcut. 0 3
Another recent decision taking a restrictive view of a transaction, and one
also influenced by Dalm, is Harrah v. United States.'04 In that case, when
decedent died in 1978, his estate included nearly six million shares ofHarrah's,
Inc. In 1980 Harrah's merged with Holiday Inns, Inc. In the merger the estate
received cash, a promissory note, and convertible debentures. The value of the
debentures was a factor in the value of the Harrah's stock for purposes of the
estate's 1979 estate tax return, the estate's income tax return for 1980 (the year
of the merger), and other dispositions of stock obtained on conversion of the
debentures by the estate and a trust in 1983 and 1984.
The value of the Harrah's stock in the estate was not established until 1986.
The estate had made a timely claim for a refund as to 1980, but not as to 1983
and 1984.'05 Owing to the higherbasis entailed in the estate tax valuation of the
stock, the estate sought recoupment with respect to its 1983 and 1984 income
taxes, and the trust sought recoupment with respect to its 1984 income taxes.
In response to the obvious problem created by Dalm, the taxpayer sought
recoupment with respect to 1980, which it had kept open.5 06
The court rejected these attempts to use recoupment. It acknowledged the
factual relationship among all the refund claims and the issue of the stock's
basis, but regarded stock dispositions in 1983 and 1984 as transactions separate

501. Parker,110 F.3d at 685.
502. Id. at 684.
503. In Estate of Vill v. United States, 706 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1983), the same real
estate was included in the estate ofboth decedents, husband and wife. The wife's estate sought
recoupment for barred estate taxes paid by husband's estate. The government argued that

recoupment was inapplicable because the deaths of the two spouses were two separate taxable
events. Id. at 875. The court rejected the government's contention, holding instead that only a
single transaction by one of the spouses, an inter vivos transfer while retaining a life estate,
resulted in the imposition of both taxes. Id.
504. 77 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 1995).
505. Id. at 1124. Additionally, the trust had notmade a timely refund claim for 1984.
Id.
506. Id. This was an unusual attempt to use recoupment because the taxpayer, rather
than seeking to offset the opponent's claim, was attempting to augment its own claim for refund
with respect to an open year.
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from those of 1980.507 This construction of a transaction is not illogical, but as
this discussion demonstrates, it is not consistent with all decisions in this area.
It is not surprising, in light of Electric Storage Battery and Dalm, that
courts have generally come to construe the transaction requirement
restrictively. It is also not surprising, in light of the lack of statutory guidance
for recoupment, that the course of decisions has been somewhat erratic.
2. The Identity ofInterest Requirement
Whenever those with claims involving different taxpayers have sought
recoupment, the courts have insisted on complete overlap of interest of such
taxpayers. Stone v. White did not explicitly set out this requirement, 5 8 but the
lower courts have viewed it as necessary to keep equitable recoupment strictly
within the bounds set out in Supreme Court decisions." 9 If recoupment will
adversely affect one other than the taxpayer against whom the barred claim
might have been timely asserted, or one who shares a common interest with
such taxpayer, the courts refuse recoupment.
Smith v. United Statess ° provides an example. In Smith the taxpayer was
a trust that collected sums on notes and, in turn, paid such sums to a trust
beneficiary. The beneficiary reported the payments as capital gain. In auditing
the beneficiary's income tax returns for 1953 and 1954, the IRS determined an
overassessment. It applied this to a deficiency assessed against the trustee
which was based on its determination that payments on the notes represented
ordinary income. On the trustee's suit for refund, the district court agreed that
the payments represented ordinary income, but held that they were not taxable
to the trust but, rather, to the beneficiary.5" ' However, the trial court allowed the
barred claim against the beneficiary to be offset against the trustee's refund.51 2
The Fourth Circuit did not agree with the trial court. It noted that the
remaindermen of the trust were not known and that denial of the trust's refund
would injure them. It also noted that the beneficiary was neither a party nor was
represented in the suit. It concluded that "[e]quitable relief will not be granted
to the possible detriment of innocent third parties." s 3 The court's holding

507. Id. at 1127.
508. 301 U.S. 532 (1937).
509. As noted earlier, seesupranotes 337-51 and accompanying text, Stone involved
use ofrecoupment by the government against a refund claim by an estate which had erroneously
been required by the government to report its income payments from a trust to a decedent's
widow. A claim against the widow, who should have reported such payments, was barred. The
widow, however, was decedent's sole beneficiary. Stone, 301 U.S. at 533. The Court allowed the
government to recoup the barred claim against the widow with the claim by the estate stating
"whether the tax is paid by one or the other, its source is the fund which should pay the tax, and
only the equitable owner of the fund is ultimately burdened." Id. at 537-38.

510.
511.
512.
513.

373 F.2d 419 (4th Cir. 1966).
Id. at421.
Id. at 420-21.
Id. at423-24.
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sanctioned at least a partial unjust enrichment to the beneficiary"1 4 simply
because recoupment would have adversely affected another.
Kramer v. United Statess s provides another example. The plaintiffs in
Kramer were executors of a decedent's estate. As part of its employment
agreement with the decedent, the decedent's employer agreed to pay his widow
$150.00 per week for life. Following the death of the decedent, the government
sought to include the value of this agreement in the decedent's estate as an
annuityi' 16 When the IRS took this action, the decedent's widow sought a
refund under I.R.C. § 691(c). 17 The IRS allowed such refund."' 8
When the Court of Claims held that I.R.C. §2039 did not require inclusion
of the value of payments to the widow in the estate, the government sought
recoupment of a barred claim against the widow for the erroneous refund.
Although the widow, suing on behalf of the estate, was the plaintiff in the suit,
the court refused to allow the government to use recoupment.51 9
The court found recoupment inapplicable because under Ohio law the
widow had but a life tenancy in the property of the estate. Remaindermen had
a vested interest in the estate that would benefit by a refund to the estate."' 0
Lack of complete overlap between the parties to the open claim and the claim
sought to be offset against it again resulted in denial ofrecoupment.5 2 ' Even the
514. The unjust enrichment was in the amount of the difference between treating the
payments as capital gain and ordinary income assuming that the trust remitted the refund to the
beneficiary.
515. 406 F.2d 1363 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
516. See I.R.C. § 2039 (1994).
517. I.R.C. § 691(c) (1994). This subsection allows a taxpayer that must report
income in respect ofa decedent to deduct a proportionate share of estate taxes attributable to the
value of such income for estate tax purposes.
518. Kramer, 406 F.2d at 1365.
519. Id. at 1371.

520. Id.
521. In a more recent and unusual equitable recoupment case, Lockheed Sanders,Inc.
v. UnitedStates, 862 F. Supp. 677 (D.N.H. 1994), the plaintiff in a refund action urged that:
[I]n all cases where the equitable recoupment
doctrine has been invoked, there has been a complete
identity of interest between the taxpayer in both the
year barred from assessment by the statute of
limitations and the later year where the government
seeks to invoke the doctrine as a defense against a
refund.
Id. at 682 (emphasis added).
In Lockheed Sanders the taxpayer had acquired all the stock of Calcomp which, in
turn, had acquired a large amount of the stock of a third corporation, CDS. Calcomp had filed
consolidated returns with CDS. The IRS disputed whether Calcomp had acquired more than 80%
of CDS stock-thereby gaining its eligibility to file a consolidated return with CDS-but the
court held the claim barred. Lockheed Sanders sought a refund on the basis of its attempt to
remove CDS from consolidated returns to free up credits and net operating loss carrybacks and
carryforwards. Id. at 679.
The court rejected the attempt by the government to offset taxpayer's claims against
the barred claims related to the consolidated returns. Although the court spoke in terms of
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few cases in which the identity of interest requirement has been at issue and in
which it was found to be met demonstrate that it is a significant barrier to
recoupment. 522
Although decisions of lower federal courts pertaining to equitable
recoupment are not completely consistent with each other, particularly with
respect to the same transaction requirement, for the most part one may view
them as carrying out the mandate of ElectricStorage BatteryandDalm to limit
equitable recoupment.
V. PROPOSAL AND RATIONALE FOR REPLACING MITIGATION WITH A
STATUTORY VERSION OF RECOUPMENT

"sufficient identity of interest between Lockheed [Sanders] and the owners of CDS at the time
CDS joined in Calcomp's consolidated return," it accepted the plaintiff's contention that
complete identity was necessary. Id. at 682. The court rejected recoupment because there were
minority shareholders (i.e., shareholders other than Calcomp) in CDS who had benefitted from
the earlier resort to a consolidated return by Calcomp and would now be unaffected by use of
recoupment against the plaintiff. The court stated that to ignore the interests of such minority
shareholders "would broaden the doctrine beyond the limited scope mandated by the Court in
Rothensies [v. ElectricStorage Battery Co.]." Id.
522. In Estate of Vitt v. UnitedStates, 706 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1983) the government,
because of an intervening change in its view on estate taxation ofproperty, see Rev. Rul. 69-577,
1969-2 C.B. 173 (revoking Rev. Rul. 57-448, 1957-2 C.B. 618), sought inconsistently to tax a
portion of the value of real property to the estates of both spouses ofa deceased married couple.
The government, on the basis of the identity of interest requirement, resisted the attempt by the
estate of the spouse who died second to recoup estate taxes against a barred claim for estate taxes
of the estate of the spouse who died first. Under the circumstances, however, the court found that
the identity of interest requirement had been met. Vitt, 706 F.2d at 875. Both spouses had created
interests in the property-life interests in their children, remainder to their grandchildren-that
were unaffected by estate proceedings. The same persons detrimentally affected by the
overpayment of taxes by the estate of one spouse would benefit from recoupment of such
overpayment by the estate of the other spouse. Id. at 875, n.3.
In McMullan v. United States,78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9656 (Ct. CI. 1978), the
government enjoyed a short-lived triumph in the identity of interest requirement. In that case a
decedent's estate successfully adjudicated an issue aboutdecedent's predeath income taxes. The
government contended that the estate's success in reducing decedent's income taxes necessarily
reduced the deduction for income taxes previously allowed the estate. The government thus
sought to recoup barred estate taxes against the estate's income tax refund. Id. at 85, 178.
The refund action was pursued by decedent's widow and his estate represented by the
widow as executrix. Although it was not clear that there were no beneficiaries to the estate other
than the widow, the court focused only on the interests of the estate, sidestepping the interests
of the widow as an individual with respect to the identity of interest requirement. The court
determined that the estate alone had been entitled to a deduction for decedent's income taxes.
Id. at 85, 184 (citing to Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-6(f) (1958)). Thus the widow had no individual
interest in the deduction of income taxes by the estate or recoupment of the benefit of the
deduction against the estate's income tax refund. At any rate, the effect of the Trial Division's
holding inMcMullanwas nullified in Wilmington Trust Co. v. UnitedStates, 610 F.2d 703, 713
(Ct. Cl. 1979), which denied recoupment in McMullan and a companion case on the basis that
the government's claims for recoupment failed the same transaction requirement.
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The current mitigation provisions poorly redress multiyear inequities
created by the tax law. The principle of recoupment, on the other hand, can
correct such inequities while simultaneously preserving the advantages of
annual accounting and the statute of limitations. The following is the text of a
proposal which would embody recoupment.
A. ProposedStatutory Change
1. Section 1311 Demandfor ConsiderationofTax Consequences of
Otherwise BarredTaxable Years"
(a) If a determination (1) sought by a taxpayer with respect to a
transaction would, because of treatment of such transaction in a different
taxable year, result in (a) double allowance of a deduction or credit, (b)
double exclusion of income or otherwise multiple inconsistent tax benefits
from such transaction; or (2) sought by the Secretary with respect to a
transaction would, on account of treatment of such transaction in a
different taxable year, result in (a) double disallowance of a deduction or
credit, (b) double inclusion of income or otherwise multiple inconsistent
taxation of such transaction, then the Secretary or any court from which
such determination is sought, shall, upon demand of the Secretary or the
taxpayer, as provided in section 1312, and notwithstanding any statute
pertaining to limitations or other rule of law, take into consideration in
making such determination and make appropriate adjustment for the
different reporting of such transaction by the taxpayer, or the different
treatment of such transaction by the Secretary, in order that such
determination shall be consistent with proper taxation as a whole of such
transaction. No adjustment under this section shall, if sought by the
taxpayer, exceed the amount of tax sought by the Secretary or, if sought by
the Secretary, exceed the tax refund claimed by the taxpayer. In
determining the amount of adjustment under this section, there shall be no
calculation of interest.
(b) Definitions'2 4
(1) For purposes of this section and section 1312, "taxpayer" means
the taxpayer who seeks the determination or a related taxpayer.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), "related taxpayer" means a
taxpayer who, with respect to the taxpayer seeking the determination,
stood in the different taxable year the tax consequences of which are
considered in the determination, in one of the following relationships:
(A) husband and wife,
(3) grantor and fiduciary,
523. See I.R.C. § 1311 (1994) for a comparison of the original to the proposed
statutory changes.
524. See I.R.C. § 1313 (1994) for comparison.
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(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)

grantor and beneficiary,
fiduciary and beneficiary, legatee or heir,
decedent and decedent's estate,
partner,
member of an affiliated group of corporations (as defined in
section 1504), or
(H) transferor of property to taxpayer in a disposition with respect
to which the determination establishes the recognition or
nonrecognition of gain by the transferor was erroneous.
(3) For purposes of this section and section 1312, "determination"
means:
(A) the disposition of a claim for refund by the Secretary, or
(B) a decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims, or
a United States District Court.
(4) Forpurposes ofthis section and section 1312, "transaction" means
a circumstance or set of related circumstances that gives rise to a liability
for federal tax or to any tax benefit or reduction in tax.
(5) For purposes of this section and section 1312, "inconsistent"
means that which negates the factual premise on which tax treatment of a
transaction in a barred year is based.
(6) For purposes of this section and section 1312, "tax" means all
taxes that may be imposed on a transaction under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986.
2. Section 1312 Manner ofMaking Demand"'
(a) The demand for consideration of the tax consequences of a different
taxable year shall be made:
(1) with respect to a determination as defined in subparagraph
(b)(3)(A) of section 1311, by the Secretary in his or her disposition of the
taxpayer's claim for refund;
(2) with respect to a determination as defined in subparagraph
(b)(3)(B) of section 1311:
(A) by the taxpayer in his petition to the Tax Court or complaint
in the Court of Federal Claims or a United States District Court, or
such amended pleading as is permitted by rules of such courts, or
(B)by the Secretary in his or her responsive pleading in the Tax
Court, the Court of Federal Claims, a United States District Court,
or
5 26
such amended pleading as is permitted by rules of such court.

525. See I.R.C. § 1312 (1994) for comparison.
526. In recognition of the administrative burdens on the government, particularly
when such inconsistent treatmentinvolves related taxpayers, the proposed statute perhaps should
include a provision allowing the IRS to assert a deficiency within one year after a determination
creates an inequitable inconsistency with a barred year if (a) it can prove by clear and convincing
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B. Explanation ofProvisions
The above proposal permits tax consequences of closed years to be
considered to prevent inequitably inconsistent results as to open years. One
seeking consideration of closed years may not obtain affirmative recovery. An
explanation of how its provisions would work is provided below.
1. Change in the Timing ofDemandsfor Adjustment
Under the mitigation provisions, a court may not make an adjustment based
on tax treatment ofa closed year until there has been a determination as defined
in I.R.C. § 1313(a). Often such a determination is the product of completed.
litigation. For purposes of the statute proposed herein, a determination is either
a disposition by the Secretary of a claim for refund or an adjudication by a
court. An adjustment taking into account the tax treatment ofa barred year may
be made when a refund sought by taxpayer or an adjudiction sought by
taxpayer or the government would create inequitably inconsistent double
taxation or tax benefit. The IRS or a court may adjust any refund or judgment
sought to prevent an inequitable inconsistency with a barred year.
When a determination that would create tax treatment of a transaction
inconsistent with a barred year is sought, the proposed statute generally places
the burden on the responding or defending party to identify the inconsistency
and demand an adjustment. In recognition of the administrative burdens on the
government, particularly when such inconsistent tax treatment involves related
taxpayers, the IRS may determine a deficiency within one year after a
determination creates an inequitable inconsistency with a barred year if it
proves by clear and convincing evidence that it was unaware that the
determination might result in a double or otherwise multiple inconsistent tax
benefit to the taxpayer and that it could not have learned through reasonable
diligence that such result might occur.
2. Change in the Circumstances in Which Adjustments May Be
Demanded
The mitigation provisions allow adjustments in only seven
circumstances. 27 In contrast, the statute proposed herein allows an adjustment
to reflect tax consequences of a transaction in a barred year as to any
inconsistent treatment sought in a determination concerning an open year about

evidence that it was unaware that the determination might result in a double or otherwise
multiple inconsistent tax benefit to the taxpayer, and (b)that it could not have learned through
reasonable diligence that such a result might occur.
527. I.R.C. § 1312.
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the same transaction.
Under the proposed statute, "transaction" has a broader meaning than it has
come to be construed in the case law of equitable recoupment. It is defined as
the circumstance or set of related circumstances that gives rise to liability for
federal tax or to any tax benefit or reduction in tax. This definition does not
necessarily fix a transaction to one particular year. It acknowledges,
notwithstanding the primacy of annual accounting, that taxes and tax benefits
or reductions are often the product of circumstances that span more than one
taxable year. Although both mitigation and recoupment also acknowledge that
transactions may have multiyear components, recoupment employs a restrictive
notion of transaction and mitigation functions only in a specified list of
multiyear transactions. The contrast between the statute proposed herein and
mitigation regarding the definition and function of transaction may be seen in
a consideration of O'Brien v. United States.528 This case involves the basis
portion of the mitigation provisions, the only provision that itself specifically
employs the term "transaction."529
In O'Brien the estate of a decedent in 1974 valued stock for estate tax
purposes at $215.7796 per share. 30 The IRS disputed this valuation. In 1975
the corporation in which the stock was held was liquidated. In computing gain
on liquidation, the estate used the above valuation. In 1980 the stock's value
for estate tax purposes was established in the Tax Court as $280.10 per share.
Because this would reduce the estate's capital gain on the liquidation
distribution, the estate sought an adjustment against additional estate taxes
based on the higher valuation. 31
The court held that mitigation was inapplicable and that there would be no
adjustment for the erroneously overpaid capital gain. 32 The court separated the
operative facts of estate and income taxation of the estate into two transactions:
the transfer of the stock at decedent's death, on which basis depended, and the
liquidating distribution the following year. Because the error was not in respect
of the transaction that determined basis, mitigation was inapplicable.533
Under the statute proposed herein, a taxpayer such as the estate in O'Brien
would be able to demand an adjustment in estate taxes should the Tax Court
impose higher estate taxes based on a higher valuation of stock in the estate.
This adjustment would reflect the lower capital gain on the liquidating
distribution that the higher valuation at decedent's death would represent.534 In
keeping with the traditional notion of recoupment, such an adjustment to the
tax consequences of an open year may only diminish recovery of the

528. 766 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1985).
529. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(A) (1954).
530. 766 F.2d at 1040.

531. Id.
532. Id. at 1043.
533. Id.
534. See I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2032 (1994 & Supp. HI 1997).
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government for taxes or of the taxpayer for a refund. If a taxpayer is litigating
in Tax Court, the adjustment may be considered in any redetermination of the
deficiency. 535 In contrast to the mitigation provisions, the proposed statute
would require the estate to bring to the attention of the tribunal the inequity that
would result from the tax consequences sought by the government-higher
estate valuation, and hence, higher estate taxes-if consequences dependent
upon the matter at issue in a barred year are not considered. The proposed
statute permits the court to avert the potential inequity if the matter is called to
its attention.
But what sort of inequity may a tribunal or the IRS, in disposing of a
refund claim, avert? At first blush, the proposed statute's definition of
transaction (i.e., circumstance or set of related circumstances giving rise to a
liability for federal tax or to any tax benefit or reduction in tax) may seem
unduly broad. The statute, however, requires multiple, inconsistent tax benefit
or liability. Inconsistent is defined as "that which negates the factual
premise
53 6
on which tax treatment of a transaction in a barred year is based."
This language is derived from the brief for the government537 in Hillsboro
National Bank v. Commissioner.53 Hillsboro involved the tax benefit rule,
which, like mitigation and equitable recoupment, seeks "to approximate the
results produced by a tax system based on transactional rather than annual
' In the companion
accounting." 39
case in Hillsboro,the government sought to
require the taxpayers to report income to offset deductions they had enjoyed in
earlier years. 5 The Court held that the government may require a taxpayer to

535. See I.R.C. § 6214(a) (1994). The proposed statute would require an amendment
to I.R.C. § 6214 to prevent the Tax Court from increasing a deficiency based on taxes from a
barred year.
536. See supra Part V.A.1.
537. Brief for Commissioner at 7.
538. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
539. Id. at381.
540. In Hillsboro an incorporated bank paid Illinois personal property taxes on its
shares for its shareholders. It deducted these taxes under I.R.C. § 164(e) (1954). After a state
court upheld the repeal of the tax, the County Treasurer refunded taxes, held in escrow, to the
shareholders. The government contended, unsuccessfully, that the refund of the tax to the
shareholders should be reported as income by the bank because it was inconsistent with the
bank's earlier deduction. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 372-73.
In United States v. Bliss Dairy,Inc., 460 U.S. 370 (1983), the companion case to
Hillsboro,a closely held corporation operating a dairy deducted the cost of purchases of cattle
feed. In the next taxable year, it adopted a plan of liquidation under then I.R.C. § 336 (1954)
(repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2269). Hillsboro,460 U.S.
at 374. Pursuant to this plan, the corporation distributed the assets, including a substantial portion
of the feed, to the shareholders. The shareholders, who operated the dairy in noncorporate form,
allocated part of their basis in its assets to the feed and deducted the amount as a business
expense under I.R.C. § 162 (1954). Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 376. The government contended,
successfully, that the deduction by the shareholders of a portion of the same feed, the cost of
which the corporation had deducted, amounted to a double deduction for the same cattle feed.
Brief for the Commissioner at 11-12. This required the corporation to report as income the
amount deducted later by the shareholders. Hillsboro, 460 U.S. at 389.
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report income in a later year when an event inconsistent with a deduction
occurs that, had it occurred in the year of the deduction, would have resulted
in disallowance of such deduction. 54'
The circumstances today addressed by mitigation and equitable
recoupment involve a tax problem that is both different from and related to that
in Hillsboro. They are different because, in cases such as Hillsboro, the
taxpayer's actions in the year she enjoys the tax benefit are proper. An event
that occurs later renders inequitable the benefit enjoyed earlier. Mitigation and
recoupment both entail assumptions that the taxpayer's actions in a closed year
were wrong. The problems addressed by mitigation and recoupment, on one
hand, and the tax benefit rule, on the other, are related in that all address the
inequities of annual accounting; all counteract incompatibly multiple benefits
or burdens in spite of the statute of limitations.
Although the Court in Hillsborodid not explicitly adopt the government's
formulation of the prerequisite for the tax benefit rule (i.e., that "subsequent
events establish the invalidity of the factual premise" on which an earlier
deduction is based542), it instead spoke of a later event being "fundamentally
inconsistent" with the premise on which a deduction is based.543 The test
proposed by the government in Hillsboro appears more focused and precise
and, hence, a more appropriate qualification for a mechanism that may
sometimes sidestep the statute of limitations. That is why it is embraced herein.
The degree of inconsistency between a determination sought for an open year
and treatment of the same transaction in a closed year should be a stark "either,
or." If the item must be reported in 1996, it cannot properly be subject to tax
in 1995; if A and B are equal partners in 1997, and B is thus compelled to
report 50% of the partnership income, A cannot be liable on 100% of such
income for the same year.'
The proposed statute allows an adjustment based on tax consequences of
a transaction in a closed year only when such consequences entail an
inequitable inconsistency-a negating of the factual premise of consequences
of the same transaction sought in the open year. Allowing an adjustment under
such circumstances entails substitution of an open-ended test for the exclusive
list of circumstances in which mitigation is allowable. The inconsistency
requirement of the proposed statute-mutual exclusivity of tax treatment in the
two years as a condition of an adjustment-is intended to foster the same

541. Hillsboro,460 U.S. at 389.
542. Brief for Commissioner at 7.
543. Hillsboro,460 U.S. at 385.
544. Hillsboroinvolves the inclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, which requires
recapture of a benefit as income if its premise is undermined in another year. The rule has an
exclusionary aspect also, which limits this recapture to the amount that an earlier deduction has
reduced a taxpayer's taxes. See I.R.C. § 111(a) (1994). Although the rule urged by the
govemrnentinHillsborowould have applied only to require a taxpayer to report income (or not),
it mayjust as sensibly be employed under the proposed statute to preclude the government from
benefitting from a multiyear inconsistency.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol51/iss1/4

86

Lynch: Income Tax Statute of Limitations: Sixty Years of Mitigation--Eno
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 62

protection of the statute of limitations as the exclusive list of circumstances of
adjustment in I.R.C. § 1312.
3.

TransactionsInvolving Related Taxpayers

The proposed statute permits adjustments for an open year because of tax
treatment of the same transaction in a barred year by related taxpayer. The
proposal preserves the catalogue of relationships in which adjustments are
permitted under the mitigation provisions."' 5 An innovative feature of the
proposal is the inclusion in the definition of related taxpayers of certain
transferors to taxpayer of property about which a determination of tax
consequences is sought. An adjustment is permitted ifa determination is sought
by a taxpayer for an open year that would result in the sort of inconsistency of
double tax benefit or double taxation that would allow an adjustment if tax
treatment of the property in both years involved the same taxpayer. Defining
a transferor as a related taxpayer in such circumstances provides a substitute in
situations involving more than one taxpayer for the current provision that treats
certain errors relating to basis as circumstances of adjustment for mitigation.546
As to errors related to basis that do not involve more than one taxpayer, the
proposed statute does not require a specific provision. An adjustment is allowed
for an open year if a taxpayer or the government seeks a determination that
would result in treatment inconsistent with basis or an item affecting basis in
a closed year. The same is true if the taxpayer or the government seeks a
determination for an open year that would be similarly inconsistent with basis
or an item affecting basis by another taxpayer who has transferred property to
the taxpayer seeking the determination, and such determination establishes that
recognition or nonrecognition of gain by the transferor was erroneous.
The proposed statute is broader than the mitigation provisions in that it
does not contain a closed-ended set of circumstances in which errors related to
basis may be corrected. On the other hand, the proposed statute is narrower
than I.R.C. § 1312(7) in that it would not allow an adjustment by or against a
party that has simply sold property in an arm's-length transaction to one that
later obtains a determination that his transferor has committed some sort of
error with respect to basis. That possibility under the current mitigation
provision, in light ofits potential harshness, has perhaps warranted the miserly
construction of I.R.C. § 1312(7) in the courts.
If an adjustment is sought by or against a related taxpayer and such a
545. See I.R.C. § 1313(c) (1994).
546. I.R.C. § 1312(7)(B)(ii) (1994) allows an adjustment for erroneous treatment of
a second taxpayer who acquired title to the property in the transaction in which the error
occurred and fromwhom thetaxpayer that obtained the determination, mediately or immediately,

derived title; I.R.C. § 1312(7)(B)(iii) permits an adjustment as to a second taxpayer that had title
at the time of the transaction that gave rise to the error and from whom the taxpayer who
obtained the determination derived title if the basis of such taxpayer is determined under I.R.C.
§ 1015(a).
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taxpayer is not a the beneficiary of an estate or trust or a partner subject to
notice under the proposed statute, such taxpayer has one year from the
determination to seek an adjustment by a claim for refund. If the taxpayer is
subject to notice, she must be given an opportunity to intervene in the
proceeding in which a determination is sought. If the government can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, following a determination that
brings about multiple, inconsistent tax benefits with respect to a transaction,
that it was not aware of the possibility of the inconsistency and could not by
reasonable diligence have become aware of it, then the government may within
one year ofthe determination seek an adjustment by notice of deficiency to the
taxpayer or related taxpayer.
C. Why the Proposed Statute Is Preferable to the CurrentMitigation
Provisions
The current mitigation provisions have generated much criticism, and
rightly so. They are extremely complex, both facially and in their application.
The primary difficulty in applying the mitigation provisions is determining
which tax inequities fit within the limited circumstances to which mitigation
applies. Limiting mitigation to a closed-ended list of circumstances creates both
a linguistic conundrum about whether particular inequities fit any circumstance
on the list and capriciously neglects inconsistences that cry out for adjustment.
The discussion in Part III identified two areas in which mitigation's
restricted circumstances have prevented redress of tax inequities that are not
significantly different from those for which mitigation is available. These two
areas involve the limitation generally of mitigation in I.R.C. § 1312 to
circumstances of adjustment and, more particularly, in I.R.C. § 1312(7) with
respect to a limited number of errors related to basis of property.
Most circumstances of adjustment require that the opponent of the party
seeking adjustment has maintained a position with a determination that is
inconsistent with earlier tax treatment of the item involved in such
determination.54 7 Some courts have required that this inconsistency be active.
This approach has led to difficulty in determining whether particular inequities
involved were purposefully brought about through inconsistent advocacy. In
instances in which that was not found to be the case, the approach has produced
a failure to redress tax inequities.
In contrast to the mitigation provisions, the proposed statute adopts a nofault approach towards inconsistencies. When the present provisions require an
active inconsistency, they have sometimes required detailed analysis of the
motives and actions of the parties to a transaction. The proposal herein focuses
on the inconsistency alone as a sufficient basis for redress without respect to

547. This requirement does not apply to the circumstances of adjustment in I.R.C.
§ 1312(3)(B) (relating to double exclusions from income) and I.R.C. § 1312(4) (relating to
double disallowance of deductions or credits).
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which party caused it or the motives of such party.
Finally, the proposal herein places a burden on the taxpayer and the
government to be attentive to the possibility that a determination in a refund
claim or litigation may create an inequitable inconsistency with tax treatment
of a transaction in a closed year. The taxpayer or the government must
generally act to prevent an inequitable adjudication from taking place by
preemptively seeking adjustment for the earlier treatment of the transaction.
This approach is more consistent with modem doctrines of former adjudication
that prevent parties from holding back issues to litigate another day.
D. Allowance of a Recoupment Adjustment in All Instances in Which
Inequitably Inconsistent Treatment ofa TransactionIs Sought
Under the current mitigation provisions, far too much judicial energy has
been expended on whether particular inequitable inconsistencies fit within the
circumstances of adjustment. A catalogue of circumstances was deemed
necessary to limit the effect of mitigation-but is that really necessary? No
such catalogue has limited the scope of the tax benefit rule, which also may
override the effect of the statute of limitations. The tax benefit rule is applied
on a case-by-case basis.548 It redresses a generic inconsistency regardless of the
type oftransaction.549 No evidence demonstrates that failure to limit application
of the tax benefit rule to particular specified circumstances has gravely
compromised the policies underlying the statute of limitations. The statute
proposed herein would allow an adjustment in circumstances in which tax
treatment of a transaction sought by taxpayer or the government would create
the sort of inconsistency that would invoke the tax benefit rule. The party
seeking a determination is not permitted to enjoy the consequences sought
without adjustment for earlier inconsistent treatment of the same transaction.
The difference in this respect between the operation of the statute proposed
herein and mitigation may be seen by revisiting the egregious circumstances of
B. C. Cook& Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner.Y As described earlier, the taxpayer
in 1965 discovered that its bookkeeper had embezzled over $800,000 in tax
years 1958 through 1965 through fictitious fruit purchases. Because these
purchases had been treated as part of cost of goods sold, the IRS sought to deny

548. Hilsboro,460 U.S. at 385.
549. The exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule, codified at I.R.C. § 111 (1994),
which limits taxation of recoveries of previously deducted items to the amount of the benefit
enjoyed, has also been deemed by the IRS to apply generally to all such recoveries. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.11 1-1(a)(1) (1999).
550. 65 T.C. 422 (1975). This case was discussed in Part III, see supra notes 105-23
and accompanying text, and was described as Cook I. An earlier related case, B. C. Cook &
Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 516 (1972), was also discussed supranotes 105-23 and
referred to as Cook L
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nearly half of the theft loss. s5 ' In Cook I the Tax Court opined that the IRS
would have to use mitigation to reckon with consequences inconsistent with
allowance of the theft deduction.5 2 In Cook l/the Tax Court then held that
mitigation was inapplicable because an overstatement of cost of goods sold is
not a deduction within the meaning of I.R.C. § 1312(2). ss3 Whether or not the
semantics of the Tax Court were correct, if the tax law is to contain any sort of
corrective mechanism for multiyear anomalies, such mechanism should have
provided relief to the government in Cook II. Treatment of the embezzled
monies in different years was logically incompatible and taxpayer should not
have benefitted by refusal of the court to account for tax consequences of
closed years.
VI. CONCLUSION

The catalogue of errors in I.R.C. § 1312 reflects a legislative determination
that such errors represent logical incompatibility of tax consequences in open
years with those in closed years. The mitigation provisions reflect a
determination that it is better for the legislature to set out the errors in advance.
Whatever uncertainty about the statute of limitations has been avoided by that
determination, it has been at the expense of a great deal of uncertainty and
litigation about the meaning of the mitigation provisions themselves. The courts
do not need advance legislative restriction or delineation in order to recognize
the sort of inequity involved in permitting a taxpayer to hide behind the statute
of limitations. The courts' time and effort would be more effectively employed
addressing inequities within the scope of the statute proposed herein rather than
untangling the complexities of a statute that after six decades still mystifies
practitioners.
The most significant aspect of the proposed statute is that it relies upon the
courts, without strict legislative definition, to recognize and correct inequities
caused by a combination of the statute oflimitations and the annual accounting
principle. It relies on the courts to do so without unduly compromising either
the statute of limitations or annual accounting.
The proposal entrusts the courts with recoupment. That they have
employed this remedy so cautiously in the past is compelling evidence that they
would employ it carefully in the future. Their hesitation has been based not on
the repugnance of the remedy itself, but rather on the lack of explicit legislative

551. Cook 11, 65 T.C. at 425.

552. 59 T.C. at 521.
553. 65 T.C. at 428.
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authorization for its use. That concern was appropriate, but it in no way calls
into question the efficacy of the remedy or its preferability to mitigation. It is
time for Congress to adopt a statutory version ofrecoupment and to discard the
mitigation provisions.
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